Follow-up to #2721. It fixes how the remaining tests behave and changes no production code.
## CI
- Both `dotnet test` steps pass `--filter "Category!=Manual"`. Before this, Manual-tagged tests ran on CI anyway.
- The one surviving movement-throttle latency test is the only coverage of burst forgiveness over a full, wrapped history. It loses its Manual tag, so it runs on CI.
## Tests that passed on CI without testing anything
- **Corpse and throwing tests.** They relied on tiledata for the weapon `Layer`, so on CI the equip silently failed and they asserted against empty lists. They now set `Layer` explicitly and assert the equip took effect. `TestThrown` also pins its own strength and range values, so a shard retuning SoulGlaive no longer breaks them.
- **Healthbar poison rows.** Server.Tests registers no poisons, so every row tested `null`. They now use real poison levels.
- **Account packet tests.** The mock accounts reported `Length` 0, so the character-list tests only ever encoded empty slots. They now encode the real characters.
- **Pathing and AI tests that only mean something on real Trammel/Felucca terrain** are now guarded with `TileDataRequirement.SkipIfMissing()`: Britain desk and clutter scenes, house footprints (no MultiData on CI) and fingerprints. Tests that are valid on flat blank terrain stay unguarded. (A synthetic tiledata fixture to run these on CI is a planned follow-up.)
- **Assertions that couldn't fail now check their claim.** Affected tests include the `DefaultWalker` cache use, cache on/off parity requiring a path, the recorder capability flags, the idle-pet gate, the monthly DST recurrence, the AdvancedSearch `Record.Exception` wrappers, `CanFitItem` with no branch-guarded assert, the Firewall callback, and `Import_NoMap`. The Geometry Parse asserts also now use the same input as their TryParse.
## Shared state
Every test that changes process-wide state now restores it, even when an assert fails:
- **The clock.** A new `TimerWheelScope` saves and restores `Core._tickCount`, `Core._now` and the timer wheel. `SimulatedClockScope` covers decay tests.
- **StepCache settings and caches**, via `StepCacheStateScope`.
- **Network state.** The ManualAllowlist, LoginAllowlist, firewall and BanChannel reporters are restored. Global packet handlers are now registered per test and removed afterwards, so they no longer stay registered for later tests.
- **Data and config tables.** `ArchiveJournal` statics, `TileData.ItemTable`, `ObjectPropertyList.Enabled`, `Core.Expansion` and the localization table are restored. One `MobileStatusVersion` restore was resetting a different expansion than the one the test changed.
- **Entities.** Tests with fixed serials now delete what they create. Fixed mobile serials moved to `World.NewMobile`, because deleting a hard-coded serial could unregister a live entity.
- **Collection race.** `SpiralScanTests` no longer clears the spawn cache from a separate collection that could run in parallel with the cache-manager tests.
- **Shared statics.** Classes reading shared static allowlists joined the sequential collection.
## Duplication
New shared helpers replace copy-pasted harness code:
- **Server.Tests:** `PacketAssert.Sends`, used by about 130 packet tests; `TestClientHarness`, `PersistencePipelineScope`, `NetTestHelpers`, `EntityCleanup` and one `TestMulti`.
- **UOContent.Tests:** `TimerWheelScope`, which also holds one wraparound-safe `RunFor`/`RunUntil`; `AiTestStubs`, which merges six walker copies and five identical creature stubs; `MobileTestHarness`, `CommandTestHarness` and `TempDirectory`.
Dead oracle packet classes are removed.
## Cost
| Test | Before | After |
|---|---|---|
| `VirtualSerialTests` | 1.57s | 2ms (starts near the wrap via reflection instead of drawing ~17.9M serials) |
| Event scheduler recurrence loop | 473ms | 1ms |
| CrowdSec drain | 517ms | 16ms (event-driven instead of a fixed 500ms wait) |
| AuthId tests | 248ms | 99ms (SHA2 except the two GameLogin tests) |
| Container cap tests | 5,000 items | 3,449 / 3,277 (one past each protocol cap) |
| Bulk removal | 100k children | 20k children |
| OPL hash distribution | 60k builds | 10k builds |
## Shard-tuning decoupling
- AI assertions read `ReacquireDelay` and `FollowMoveSpeed` instead of hard-coding production tuning.
- The guard friendly-fire test uses an `AI_Mage` stub instead of WhiteWyrm.
- Argon2 assertions pin the `argon2id` variant and `v=19` but read the cost parameters from the configured hasher.
## Tests
| Run | Server.Tests | UOContent.Tests |
|---|---|---|
| With client files | 812 pass | 1,123 pass |
| Without client files (CI simulation) | 800 pass, 12 skip | 1,021 pass, 102 skip |
- The UOContent fixture reads `MODERNUO_TEST_DATA_DIR`; Server.Tests reads `MODERNUO_CLIENT_PATH`.
- The 15 new UOContent skips are the map-dependent guards above.
- Total run time with client files is about 5s, down from about 8s.
## Problem
Contributing a ban to CrowdSec failed against a real LAPI — `POST /v1/alerts` answered **500**, and depending on the shard's locale, auth answered **401**. Three independent defects, each sufficient on its own.
## Fixes
**`scenario_hash` / `scenario_version` were never serialized.** LAPI dereferences both unconditionally when persisting an alert, so omitting them is a nil deref and a 500 rather than a validation error. Both are now emitted with the values a watcher without a hub scenario is expected to send (`""` and `"1.0"`).
**`start_at`/`stop_at` were formatted without an `IFormatProvider`.** `:` is the time separator *specifier* in a custom .NET format string, not a literal — a shard running under a culture like `fi-FI` emitted `T15.04.05.123Z`, which Go's `time.RFC3339` rejects, producing another 500. Non-Gregorian cultures (`th-TH`, `ar-SA`) would also shift the year. Formatting is now pinned to `InvariantCulture` in `FormatTimestamp`, which additionally converts non-UTC input — the trailing `Z` is a literal and was previously an unchecked claim.
**The `User-Agent` was a plain product string.** LAPI's default watcher profile matches the `crowdsec/` prefix and answers 401 without it, so the header is a protocol constraint, not cosmetic. It is now an `internal const` carrying that reason.
Also fixed, same root cause as the timestamp bug: the login-expiry parse used a bare `DateTime.TryParse` on LAPI's RFC3339 `expire`. Under a mismatched culture that silently fails and falls back to a fabricated `UtcNow + 1h`, pushing re-auth past the real expiry and costing a 401-relogin round trip on every send.
`capacity` now defaults to `1` instead of `0`, matching the one-decision-per-alert shape actually being sent.
## Note on scope
The two 500 causes are independent. On an `en-US` shard only the missing scenario fields were biting; the date bug was latent and would have surfaced as an unexplained regression the first time someone ran a shard under a European locale.
## Verification
The emitted payload is field-for-field identical to a hand-verified request that a live LAPI accepts:
```json
[
{
"scenario": "modernuo/rate-limit",
"scenario_hash": "",
"scenario_version": "1.0",
"message": "ModernUO rate-limit ban for 192.0.2.123",
"events_count": 1,
"start_at": "2026-07-27T15:04:05.123Z",
"stop_at": "2026-07-27T15:04:05.123Z",
"capacity": 1,
"leakspeed": "0s",
"simulated": false,
"events": [],
"remediation": true,
"source": { "scope": "Ip", "value": "192.0.2.123" },
"decisions": [
{
"origin": "modernuo",
"type": "ban",
"scope": "Ip",
"value": "192.0.2.123",
"duration": "300s",
"scenario": "modernuo/rate-limit"
}
]
}
]
```
Regression tests assert the required scenario fields on the **serialized JSON** rather than the DTO — the DTO is not what goes on the wire — and cover the timestamp as a `[Theory]` across `fi-FI`/`th-TH`/`ar-SA`.
`dotnet test --filter "FullyQualifiedName~CrowdSec"` → **21/21 passed**, build clean with 0 warnings.
Reshapes IP banning around one idea: **core owns the question, content owns every answer.**
Core gains a single accept-path seam — `IConnectionFilter` — and loses everything that used to implement one. The firewall moves to UOContent, a new file-backed blocklist joins it there, and CrowdSec is repositioned from an in-app enforcer to a contribute-first reporter.
## The seam
```csharp
public interface IConnectionFilter
{
string Name { get; }
void Configure();
void Start(CancellationToken token);
void Stop();
bool ShouldDeny(IPAddress address);
}
```
The accept path went from hardcoded branches to one question:
```csharp
else if (ConnectionFilters.ShouldDeny(remoteIP, out var deniedBy))
{
logger.Debug("{Address} denied by connection filter '{Filter}'", remoteIP, deniedBy);
}
```
Filters register during the Configure sweep. The registry is a plain array walked by an indexed loop — no enumerator, no closure, no allocation — and the first denial short-circuits. An interface dispatch is noise next to the `accept()` syscall, so pluggability costs nothing measurable on the path that has to survive a DDoS.
Whatever a hit implies — persisting, promoting to an OS bouncer, contributing to the ban channel — is the filter's business, not the accept path's.
A filter that throws is **unregistered and the connection fails open**. A filter that faults once faults for every subsequent connection, so leaving it registered means an exception and a log line per accept — exactly the amplification an attacker wants — and a broken filter must not be able to deny everyone either.
This deliberately does **not** reuse `EventSink.InvokeSocketConnect`: that fires later and allocates a `SocketConnectEventArgs` per connection, which is what the accept path avoids for rejected traffic.
## What ships behind it
**`firewall`** (UOContent) — the existing admin-curated set. Collapsed from `Firewall` + `AdminFirewall` + a threaded enforcer into one single-threaded store with **zero concurrency primitives**: the accept path, admin gump, TTL expiry and boot load all run on the game loop. Persists to `Configuration/firewall.json` with automatic migration from the legacy `firewall.cfg`. No behavior change for operators — same namespace, same gump, same commands.
**`blocklist`** (UOContent) — new. Holds a millions-strong list in-app and **demand-pages** hits up to CrowdSec, which promotes them to the OS firewall.
The motivation is concrete: CrowdSec's Windows bouncer cannot load the ~3.9M IPs that 91 community feeds produce, but it handles ~100k fine. So the millions live in-process behind a binary search, and only addresses that *actually connect* get promoted. A `PromotedGuard` suppresses re-reporting an address until the bouncer picks it up.
The list is parsed straight from UTF-8 file bytes with no per-line string allocation, off the game loop, and published as an immutable snapshot swapped through a single `volatile` reference. Reloads yield to world saves.
**`tools/Export-IpBlocklist.ps1`** — the producer. Requires PowerShell 7 and runs on Windows, Linux and macOS; Windows PowerShell 5.1 is refused up front via `#requires`. Merges a thin, non-overlapping feed set into one de-duplicated, bogon-filtered file. Parsing runs in a compiled `Add-Type` hot loop (~1s for ~4M lines instead of minutes). Written to a `.tmp` sibling and swapped with `File.Replace`, so the shard never reads a half-written list, and a total feed outage refuses to overwrite a good list with an empty one. Re-running is idempotent — it exits without downloading anything while the list on disk is younger than `-MinInterval` (default 2h, the anchor feed's own refresh period), so a misconfigured scheduler can't hammer upstream.
## CrowdSec: contribute-first
`IBanReporter` + `BanChannel` fan locally-decided bans out to external systems. `CrowdSecReporter` (UOContent) posts to LAPI `POST /v1/alerts` and retracts via `DELETE /v1/decisions`.
Reporting is **enqueue-only** on the accept path: a bounded, coalescing channel drained off-loop with bounded retry, counted drops on overflow, and a flush on shutdown. Under a DDoS the accept path never does synchronous or lock-contending per-IP work.
### Why not pull decisions from CrowdSec?
The original design streamed decisions into an in-app snapshot and enforced them at the accept gate. That's the wrong layer: by the time the shard sees the connection, the TCP handshake and socket setup are already paid for. `cs-firewall-bouncer` drops the same traffic **at the kernel**, and it's what CrowdSec is built to do. So the shard now contributes what it uniquely knows (rate-limit trips, blocklist hits from real connection attempts) and lets the OS enforce.
The one thing the OS can't do — hold millions of entries on Windows — is exactly what the in-app blocklist covers, and it feeds the same pipeline.
## Threading policy
`CLAUDE.md` rule #3 is rewritten as an explicit three-part policy, with rule #10 restated in tandem:
- Anything touching game state runs **only** on the main loop.
- Heavy work that *needs* game state must be **chunked** across ticks, never threaded.
- Heavy work that does *not* need game state (large-file parse, external I/O) **must** run off-loop **and must yield to world saves**.
Results come back via an immutable snapshot swapped through a single `volatile` reference, or `Core.LoopContext.Post` — never by letting the scheduler decide where heavy work runs. Both new subsystems follow it.
## Shared primitives
`SortedRangeIndex<T> where T : IBinaryInteger<T>` — coalesced disjoint interval arrays plus a binary search. The firewall, the blocklist, and (as of this PR) core's reserved-network tables all use it.
Coalescing is a correctness requirement, not an optimization: multi-feed lists nest CIDRs (`/24` containing a `/32`), and a search that inspects only the rightmost run whose minimum is ≤ the value is sound **only** over disjoint runs. That bug was caught in review and is covered by regression tests.
`IPAddressUtility` collects the allocation-free `IPAddress` ↔ `UInt128` conversions and CIDR parsing that were previously scattered or duplicated.
## Config
| File | Owner | Keys |
|---|---|---|
| `Configuration/bans.json` | core | `reportRateLimitTrips`, `autoBanDuration` |
| `Configuration/blocklist.json` | content | `file`, `reloadInterval`, `reportHits`, `banDuration`, `promoteSuppression` |
| `Configuration/crowdsec.json` | content | `lapiUrl`, `machineId`, `password`, `origin`, `manualBanDuration`, `flushInterval`, `maxQueue` |
| `Configuration/firewall.json` | content | persisted firewall entries (migrated from `firewall.cfg`) |
Everything is inert by default. CrowdSec self-disables without credentials; the blocklist self-disables until its file exists. A shard that changes nothing sees no behavior change.
## Notes for review
- **Core no longer references `Firewall` or `IFirewallEntry` anywhere.** `NetworkUtilities` used to build its reserved-network tables out of `CidrFirewallEntry`, which coupled core to the firewall for something unrelated to banning; those are now a `SortedRangeIndex<UInt128>`, same semantics and public API.
- **`BanChannel.Stop()` no longer persists the firewall** — a contribution coordinator has no business saving an enforcement store. That's the firewall filter's `Stop()`.
- **A dead `whitelisted` parameter was dropped** from the blocklist gate: it was hardcoded `false` at its only call site, and no whitelist concept exists in core.
- **The blocklist filter is an instance, not a static.** The static version forced its tests onto the sequential collection with a reset hook; they now run in parallel.
- `dev-docs/networking-packets.md` documents the seam for content authors, plus a known wart in the `IPAddress` ↔ `UInt128` normalization flagged for a follow-up PR.
- The generator was verified on Linux, macOS and Windows under a temporary CI matrix (since removed). It caught two portability bugs — a Windows-only path separator, and a culture-sensitive duration parse that read `2.5` as `25` on comma-decimal locales and *silently* turned a 2.5h cooldown into 25h — plus a third that made the script unparseable on Windows PowerShell 5.1. The source is ASCII-only for that last reason: `#requires` is only honored once a file parses, so non-ASCII in a BOM-less script produces parse errors instead of the version message.
## Tests
**1344 pass** (782 `Server.Tests`, 562 `UOContent.Tests`). New coverage: filter registry (registration, short-circuit, fault-disable), blocklist parsing/CIDR/coalescing, snapshot reload markers, promote-guard TTL, ban-channel fan-out, CrowdSec alert building/dedup/flush-on-stop, and the generator's output-format contract pinned against the reader.
Kamron Batman