Reshapes IP banning around one idea: **core owns the question, content owns every answer.**
Core gains a single accept-path seam — `IConnectionFilter` — and loses everything that used to implement one. The firewall moves to UOContent, a new file-backed blocklist joins it there, and CrowdSec is repositioned from an in-app enforcer to a contribute-first reporter.
## The seam
```csharp
public interface IConnectionFilter
{
string Name { get; }
void Configure();
void Start(CancellationToken token);
void Stop();
bool ShouldDeny(IPAddress address);
}
```
The accept path went from hardcoded branches to one question:
```csharp
else if (ConnectionFilters.ShouldDeny(remoteIP, out var deniedBy))
{
logger.Debug("{Address} denied by connection filter '{Filter}'", remoteIP, deniedBy);
}
```
Filters register during the Configure sweep. The registry is a plain array walked by an indexed loop — no enumerator, no closure, no allocation — and the first denial short-circuits. An interface dispatch is noise next to the `accept()` syscall, so pluggability costs nothing measurable on the path that has to survive a DDoS.
Whatever a hit implies — persisting, promoting to an OS bouncer, contributing to the ban channel — is the filter's business, not the accept path's.
A filter that throws is **unregistered and the connection fails open**. A filter that faults once faults for every subsequent connection, so leaving it registered means an exception and a log line per accept — exactly the amplification an attacker wants — and a broken filter must not be able to deny everyone either.
This deliberately does **not** reuse `EventSink.InvokeSocketConnect`: that fires later and allocates a `SocketConnectEventArgs` per connection, which is what the accept path avoids for rejected traffic.
## What ships behind it
**`firewall`** (UOContent) — the existing admin-curated set. Collapsed from `Firewall` + `AdminFirewall` + a threaded enforcer into one single-threaded store with **zero concurrency primitives**: the accept path, admin gump, TTL expiry and boot load all run on the game loop. Persists to `Configuration/firewall.json` with automatic migration from the legacy `firewall.cfg`. No behavior change for operators — same namespace, same gump, same commands.
**`blocklist`** (UOContent) — new. Holds a millions-strong list in-app and **demand-pages** hits up to CrowdSec, which promotes them to the OS firewall.
The motivation is concrete: CrowdSec's Windows bouncer cannot load the ~3.9M IPs that 91 community feeds produce, but it handles ~100k fine. So the millions live in-process behind a binary search, and only addresses that *actually connect* get promoted. A `PromotedGuard` suppresses re-reporting an address until the bouncer picks it up.
The list is parsed straight from UTF-8 file bytes with no per-line string allocation, off the game loop, and published as an immutable snapshot swapped through a single `volatile` reference. Reloads yield to world saves.
**`tools/Export-IpBlocklist.ps1`** — the producer. Requires PowerShell 7 and runs on Windows, Linux and macOS; Windows PowerShell 5.1 is refused up front via `#requires`. Merges a thin, non-overlapping feed set into one de-duplicated, bogon-filtered file. Parsing runs in a compiled `Add-Type` hot loop (~1s for ~4M lines instead of minutes). Written to a `.tmp` sibling and swapped with `File.Replace`, so the shard never reads a half-written list, and a total feed outage refuses to overwrite a good list with an empty one. Re-running is idempotent — it exits without downloading anything while the list on disk is younger than `-MinInterval` (default 2h, the anchor feed's own refresh period), so a misconfigured scheduler can't hammer upstream.
## CrowdSec: contribute-first
`IBanReporter` + `BanChannel` fan locally-decided bans out to external systems. `CrowdSecReporter` (UOContent) posts to LAPI `POST /v1/alerts` and retracts via `DELETE /v1/decisions`.
Reporting is **enqueue-only** on the accept path: a bounded, coalescing channel drained off-loop with bounded retry, counted drops on overflow, and a flush on shutdown. Under a DDoS the accept path never does synchronous or lock-contending per-IP work.
### Why not pull decisions from CrowdSec?
The original design streamed decisions into an in-app snapshot and enforced them at the accept gate. That's the wrong layer: by the time the shard sees the connection, the TCP handshake and socket setup are already paid for. `cs-firewall-bouncer` drops the same traffic **at the kernel**, and it's what CrowdSec is built to do. So the shard now contributes what it uniquely knows (rate-limit trips, blocklist hits from real connection attempts) and lets the OS enforce.
The one thing the OS can't do — hold millions of entries on Windows — is exactly what the in-app blocklist covers, and it feeds the same pipeline.
## Threading policy
`CLAUDE.md` rule #3 is rewritten as an explicit three-part policy, with rule #10 restated in tandem:
- Anything touching game state runs **only** on the main loop.
- Heavy work that *needs* game state must be **chunked** across ticks, never threaded.
- Heavy work that does *not* need game state (large-file parse, external I/O) **must** run off-loop **and must yield to world saves**.
Results come back via an immutable snapshot swapped through a single `volatile` reference, or `Core.LoopContext.Post` — never by letting the scheduler decide where heavy work runs. Both new subsystems follow it.
## Shared primitives
`SortedRangeIndex<T> where T : IBinaryInteger<T>` — coalesced disjoint interval arrays plus a binary search. The firewall, the blocklist, and (as of this PR) core's reserved-network tables all use it.
Coalescing is a correctness requirement, not an optimization: multi-feed lists nest CIDRs (`/24` containing a `/32`), and a search that inspects only the rightmost run whose minimum is ≤ the value is sound **only** over disjoint runs. That bug was caught in review and is covered by regression tests.
`IPAddressUtility` collects the allocation-free `IPAddress` ↔ `UInt128` conversions and CIDR parsing that were previously scattered or duplicated.
## Config
| File | Owner | Keys |
|---|---|---|
| `Configuration/bans.json` | core | `reportRateLimitTrips`, `autoBanDuration` |
| `Configuration/blocklist.json` | content | `file`, `reloadInterval`, `reportHits`, `banDuration`, `promoteSuppression` |
| `Configuration/crowdsec.json` | content | `lapiUrl`, `machineId`, `password`, `origin`, `manualBanDuration`, `flushInterval`, `maxQueue` |
| `Configuration/firewall.json` | content | persisted firewall entries (migrated from `firewall.cfg`) |
Everything is inert by default. CrowdSec self-disables without credentials; the blocklist self-disables until its file exists. A shard that changes nothing sees no behavior change.
## Notes for review
- **Core no longer references `Firewall` or `IFirewallEntry` anywhere.** `NetworkUtilities` used to build its reserved-network tables out of `CidrFirewallEntry`, which coupled core to the firewall for something unrelated to banning; those are now a `SortedRangeIndex<UInt128>`, same semantics and public API.
- **`BanChannel.Stop()` no longer persists the firewall** — a contribution coordinator has no business saving an enforcement store. That's the firewall filter's `Stop()`.
- **A dead `whitelisted` parameter was dropped** from the blocklist gate: it was hardcoded `false` at its only call site, and no whitelist concept exists in core.
- **The blocklist filter is an instance, not a static.** The static version forced its tests onto the sequential collection with a reset hook; they now run in parallel.
- `dev-docs/networking-packets.md` documents the seam for content authors, plus a known wart in the `IPAddress` ↔ `UInt128` normalization flagged for a follow-up PR.
- The generator was verified on Linux, macOS and Windows under a temporary CI matrix (since removed). It caught two portability bugs — a Windows-only path separator, and a culture-sensitive duration parse that read `2.5` as `25` on comma-decimal locales and *silently* turned a 2.5h cooldown into 25h — plus a third that made the script unparseable on Windows PowerShell 5.1. The source is ASCII-only for that last reason: `#requires` is only honored once a file parses, so non-ASCII in a BOM-less script produces parse errors instead of the version message.
## Tests
**1344 pass** (782 `Server.Tests`, 562 `UOContent.Tests`). New coverage: filter registry (registration, short-circuit, fault-disable), blocklist parsing/CIDR/coalescing, snapshot reload markers, promote-guard TTL, ban-channel fan-out, CrowdSec alert building/dedup/flush-on-stop, and the generator's output-format contract pinned against the reader.
## Problem
Running the full `UOContent.Tests` suite, the test host **hangs ~2.5 minutes at shutdown and then crashes** (`Test host process crashed` / run aborted). The tests themselves are fine — they complete in ~1s — but the process can't exit.
Captured via `--blame-hang` dump. The blocking thread:
```
System.Threading.WaitHandle.WaitOne()
Server.SerializationThreadWorker.Sleep() SerializationThreadWorker.cs:54 (_stopEvent.WaitOne())
Server.SerializationThreadWorker.Exit() SerializationThreadWorker.cs:61
Server.World.ExitSerializationThreads() World.cs:429
Server.Tests.UOContentFixture..ctor()
```
### Root cause
Both collection fixtures (`UOContentFixture` and `PathfindingTestFixture`) each run the **full process-global ModernUO bootstrap**. `World.Load()` is guarded to run once per process, so the **second** fixture's `World.Load()` is a no-op and does **not** respawn the serialization workers — but `World.ExitSerializationThreads()` is **not** guarded, so the second fixture calls `Exit()` on workers whose threads have already terminated. `Exit()` → `Sleep()` → `_stopEvent.WaitOne()` then blocks forever (a dead thread never sets the event). The first collection's tests run; the second collection's fixture deadlocks in its constructor; the host eventually gets killed.
This is why single-collection (filtered) runs were fine — only one fixture ever bootstraps — but the full suite hangs. It's not a parallelization race: even strictly sequential, the second fixture deadlocks.
## Fix
**(a) Engine — idempotent `SerializationThreadWorker.Exit()`**
A second `Exit()` is now a safe no-op instead of a permanent block. Only the owning (main) thread calls `Exit()`, so no synchronization is needed, and the single-call production shutdown path is unchanged.
**(b) Tests — one shared bootstrap, strictly sequential collections**
- New `TestServerBootstrap.EnsureInitialized()` runs the superset global init **exactly once per process** (lock + once-flag).
- `UOContentFixture` / `PathfindingTestFixture` slim down to delegate to it and no longer tear down global state (which the single-bootstrap model owns for the host's lifetime).
- `[assembly: CollectionBehavior(DisableTestParallelization = true)]` so collections never overlap.
## Result
| | Before | After |
|---|---|---|
| Tests run (full suite) | 258 (UOContent collection deadlocked) | **418** |
| Outcome | 2.5-min hang → host crash | **418 passed, clean exit** |
| Wall time | killed | **~7s** |
> [!IMPORTANT]
> **Breaking Changes**
> - DecodePacket and EncodePacket delegates replaced with IClientEncryption interface
> - NetState.Connection (Socket) replaced with internal RingSocket management
> - NetState.RecvPipe and NetState.SendPipe removed (buffers managed internally)
## Summary
Upgrades the networking stack from PollGroup-based I/O to io_uring, significantly improving I/O performance on Linux.
This also adds native client encryption support for encrypted UO clients.
## Major Changes
io_uring Networking Architecture
- Replaced PollGroup with IORingGroup for async socket I/O operations
- Removed Pipe.cs (mirrored ring buffer) and TcpServer.cs in favor of RingSocketManager
- Added NetState.Network.cs - centralized network infrastructure handling accept, recv, send, and disconnect
completions
- Added SocketHelper.cs - platform-specific socket utilities for raw socket handle operations (getpeername,
getsockname)
- Buffer management now handled by RingSocketManager with configurable slab allocation
### Client Encryption Support
- Added full encryption stack in Network/Encryption/:
- EncryptionConfig.cs - configurable encryption modes (None, Unencrypted, Encrypted, Both)
- EncryptionManager.cs - encryption detection and initialization for login/game packets
- LoginEncryption.cs - handles login packet encryption with version-derived keys
- GameEncryption.cs - handles game server encryption using Twofish
- TwofishEngine.cs - optimized Twofish block cipher implementation
- LoginKeys.cs - encryption key table for client versions
- IClientEncryption.cs - interface for client encryption implementations
### NetState Improvements
- Replaced Socket Connection with RingSocket _socket for managed socket lifecycle
- Changed from GCHandle polling to event-based completion processing
- Disconnect handling now properly waits for pending sends to flush
- Simplified connecting socket management using lazy queue removal
### Configuration
- New settings: network.encryptionMode and network.encryptionDebug
- Encryption mode flags: Unencrypted, Encrypted, or Both
### Dependencies
- Replaced PollGroup NuGet package with IORingGroup
- Linux requires liburing-dev / liburing-devel package
### Test plan
- Verify server starts and accepts connections on Linux with io_uring
- Verify server starts and accepts connections on Windows (fallback to IOCP)
- Test unencrypted client connections (ClassicUO with encryption disabled)
- Test encrypted client connections if available
- Verify graceful disconnect flushes pending data
- Confirm CI builds pass on all target platforms
### Summary
- Adds CanSpawnMobile(x, y, minZ, maxZ, canSwim, cantWalk, out spawnZ) overload for finding spawn surfaces within a Z range
- Adds CanSpawnItem(x, y, minZ, maxZ, out spawnZ) for item spawning with Surface+Impassable support (tables, furniture)
- Uses bitmask optimization inspired by Item.DropToWorld's m_OpenSlots pattern for O(1) surface/blocker checks
- HomeRange spawners now use surface detection to set proper Z bounds
### Key Changes
Map.cs:
- CanSpawnMobile with Z-range finds lowest valid surface for mobiles
- CanSpawnItem with Z-range finds lowest valid surface for items (including tables)
- CanFitItem for point-check item placement on Surface+Impassable tiles
- Bitmask approach eliminates nested loops and stackalloc arrays
Spawners:
- Simplified GetSpawnPosition using new Z-range methods
- HomeRange setter detects surface below spawner for proper Z bounds
- Consistent handling for mobiles and items
### Bug Fixes
- Water tiles (Impassable | Wet) no longer block swimming mobs
- Items can now spawn on tables/furniture (Surface+Impassable)
### Test Plan
- Run dotnet test - 631 tests pass
- Manual testing: multi-story spawning, water mobs, item spawning on tables
- Verify HomeRange spawner movement shifts bounds correctly
Kamron Batman