## Why
The shard owner, on a Starlink CGNAT address, was blocked by the imported reputation blocklist.
The cause was not CrowdSec. The address was a literal line in `ip-blocklist.txt`, so `BlocklistFilter` denied it at accept and then promoted it — and clearing the CrowdSec decision could not fix it either, because the file entry re-reports within `promoteSuppression` of every reconnect attempt.
This is structural, not a one-off. Reputation feeds list shared consumer address space constantly: on CGNAT one public address fronts many subscribers **at the same time**, so a single abusive customer gets the address listed and everyone else behind it is blocked with them. Where leases rotate, a listing says little about whoever holds the address now. Around 1,000 Starlink addresses sit in the current list.
So exemptions go where they cost nothing, and escalation is driven by what a connection actually does.
## Generator — `tools/Export-IpBlocklist.ps1`
`-AllowlistFile` takes multiple paths, subtracted from the merged set before the output is written. Defaults to every `ip-allowlist*.txt` beside the output, merged into one allow set:
- `ip-allowlist.txt` — operator exemptions, created once and **never rewritten**
- `ip-allowlist-<name>.txt` — a carve-out you built, regenerable and copyable between shards
**Subtraction is range-correct.** An allowlisted address inside a blocked CIDR splits that CIDR around the hole rather than being silently ignored. This also fixes `-ExcludeAnonymizers`, which parsed CIDR entries into `$anonCidr` and then only ever subtracted singles.
**No carve-out ships.** A carve-out names a real network, and which ones a shard should exempt depends on where its players actually are — so publishing one would make that policy call for every shard and put a specific provider's address space in the repo. The script builds them on request instead:
```powershell
.\Export-IpBlocklist.ps1 -AddCarveout starlink -Asn 14593
```
Carve-outs are **discovered, not configured**: every `ip-allowlist*.txt` beside the output is subtracted, by the generator and by the shard, so a file an admin adds needs no config edit and no code change. Each carries an `asn=` marker in its header, which is how `-RefreshCarveouts` rebuilds it without the script keeping a list of anyone's networks; a hand-written allowlist has no marker and is never rewritten.
Prefixes come from **announcements, not ownership records**, because registry data disagrees with what is actually routed and silently caps result sets: ARIN whois returns at most 256 rows and gives per-customer /24s, and `206.83.96.0/19` reads as APNIC in RDAP even though `206.83.96/21` is announced by Starlink.
Editing an allowlist bypasses `-MinInterval`, so a just-added exemption isn't indistinguishable from the allowlist not working. A Starlink carve-out, if you build one, costs **~4,300 IPs + ~144 CIDRs of 4.2M (0.10%)**.
## Allowlists
**`FileAllowlist`** reads the same files the generator subtracts, so an operator entry means "leave this address alone" for real. Subtraction alone only covers being *blocked*; behavioural detections never consult the blocklist, so without this a carve-out was quietly routed around — one scanner behind a shared address was enough to get everyone behind it contributed and firewalled, with nothing in the shard's own config explaining why. Reading the files also means an entry applies on the next reload rather than the next regeneration, which is what matters when someone is complaining now.
**`LoginAllowlist`** is earned by authenticating, with a 90-day TTL because an address that logged in years ago is a stranger. Its own store rather than `Account.LoginIPs`, which has no timestamps and cannot be backfilled. An entry is evidence rather than a licence: 10 suppressed contributions in an hour revokes it, and a fresh login forgives the tally.
Both are consulted **only after the blocklist has already matched**, so a normal accept pays nothing for them and the accept gate stays allowlist-free. `BanExemptions` combines them behind `BanChannel.IsExempt` and suppresses escalation only — every local defence still applies.
Two limits, both deliberate and documented in the class: `LoginAllowlist` **cannot bootstrap** (an entry is only earned by getting in, so it never repairs an existing false positive), and it is weakest on rotating CGNAT. That is why `FileAllowlist` is the fix for those, and why it is manual.
## Behavioural detection
| Reason | Trigger |
|---|---|
| `silent-connect` | Reaped after 5s having sent **zero bytes** |
| `invalid-seed` | Opened with a zero seed |
| `foreign-protocol` | Positively identified as HTTP, TLS or SSH |
**`ForeignProtocol` inverts the test.** Asking "is this a good UO client?" cannot work: `LoginEncryption.ClientDecrypt` is a byte-for-byte stream XOR, so a legitimate client with encryption enabled when the shard expects none sends a structurally perfect connection whose payload is noise. "Speaks HTTP" is safe where "unreadable" is not — however misconfigured a UO client is, it never sends `GET / HTTP/1.1`.
Nothing assumes arrival framing. TCP has no message boundaries, so a rule of the form "these bytes must arrive together" is broken by construction and drops real players on poor links. A prefix match with too few bytes to confirm waits for more. A four-byte seed can legitimately spell `GET ` (the address 71.69.84.32) or `0x16 0x03 0x0?` (22.3.x.x), so confirmation requires the request line to continue in printable ASCII or an actual ClientHello inside a plausible record — a real client's fifth byte is a packet id (`0x80`, `0x91`, `0xEF`), none of them printable, so those collisions fall through.
Everything is keyed on **bytes-received rather than elapsed time**. A connection that sent something and ran out of time is far more likely a slow link than an attack, and banning those produces the worst failure mode available: the player retries, trips the rate limiter, and compounds a bad connection into hours of being firewalled off.
## `AutoDenylist`
A short-lived local hold (15m) on behavioural detections, as `IConnectionFilter` + `IBanReporter` over one store so the engine detection sites never reach into content.
This closes the gap where a flood pays for a socket, buffer and `NetState` slot per connection while waiting for the OS bouncer — the verdicts that matter most are reachable only *after* reading bytes — and it is the entire defence on a shard running no bouncer, which is the default config. Not persisted: a holding pen that survives restarts is a ban without a ban's review.
Cost: one dictionary lookup on a usually-empty dict per accept.
## `BanReasons`
Centralises the reason slugs. `IsBehavioral` is an **opt-in** set, not "everything except manual", so a future reason escalates normally instead of silently inheriting an exemption or entering a local denylist.
This caught a real bug during review: the first cut of the exemption swallowed `manual` admin bans (`Commands.cs`, three sites in `AdminGump`) for any allowlisted address.
## Fixes found in review
- **`BanConfiguration.Settings` was null until `Configure()` ran**, while the reap path dereferences it every `Slice()`. A harness driving `NetState.Slice()` directly hit an NRE that presented as flaky because it depended on whether an earlier test had already called `Configure()` — which is why it failed on some CI platforms and not others. Now starts at the record's defaults, with idempotency tracked by a flag; this also removes the same latent NRE from the pre-existing rate-limit path.
- **`-AllowlistFile` was typed `[string]`** while documented and used as a list, so passing two paths would have collapsed them into one string.
## Layout and docs
Content network code moves out of `Misc/` into `UOContent/Network/`, one concern per folder — `AutoDenylist/`, `Blocklist/`, `CrowdSec/`, `Firewall/`, `LoginAllowlist/`, `Packets/`. **Namespaces are untouched**, so these are pure file moves (git tracks all 16 as renames).
`dev-docs/ip-bans-and-allowlists.md` documents the subsystem, leading with the operator process for unblocking a player — including the three things that look sufficient and are not: deleting the CrowdSec decision alone, editing `ip-blocklist.txt` by hand, and `cscli allowlists` alone. `.gitignore` covers the new config files.
## Testing
Build clean. **Server.Tests 810 passed**, **UOContent.Tests 637 passed**, zero warnings. This branch adds 38 tests; the rest of the delta is main's, since this is rebased on current `main`.
New coverage: TTL boundary and renewal, private-address exclusion, manual-ban-never-exempt, unopted-reason-never-exempt, strike revocation, quiet-window reset, login forgiveness, file-allowlist CIDR coverage, file-allowlist not spending the earned list's strikes, denylist expiry-on-read, cap enforcement, lapsed-entry reclaim, HTTP/TLS/SSH identification, seed-collision fall-through, and encrypted-login-is-not-foreign.
Generator verified end-to-end against live feeds: a clean run ships no carve-out, `-AddCarveout starlink -Asn 14593` fetches and collapses 213 prefixes to 115 ranges in 0.1s over 4.2M entries, `-RefreshCarveouts` rediscovers it by its `asn=` marker, a hand-written allowlist is left untouched, and deleting a carve-out drops it rather than having it rewritten. CIDR splitting verified exhaustively: a single-IP hole in a /24 leaves exactly 255 of 256 addresses blocked.
## Operator note
Existing installs are unaffected until the generator next runs, which creates `ip-allowlist.txt` and nothing else. To unblock someone: add the address to that file and delete any live CrowdSec decision — the existing ban outlives the config change. The shard picks the entry up on its next reload, so re-running the generator is optional.
A shard whose players are on CGNAT (satellite, mobile, or an ISP short on IPv4) will likely also want `-AddCarveout`; see `dev-docs/ip-bans-and-allowlists.md`.
## Also included: a latent CI failure this PR surfaced
`fix(tests): serialize test classes that rent through STArrayPool` touches a property-list test file that has nothing to do with this feature. It is here because it was failing macOS CI, and it is trivially cherry-pickable out if you would rather it went to `main` on its own — **which may be the better call, since it is failing `main` today.**
CI has since gone green with it applied.
`STArrayPool` is single-threaded by design and its bucket cache is a plain `static`, not `[ThreadStatic]`, with a check-then-act initialize in `Return()`:
```csharp
var cacheBuckets = _cacheBuckets ?? InitializeBuckets();
```
Two threads both see null, both initialize, and the loser trips `Debug.Assert(_cacheBuckets is null)`. Anything renting from it has to stay off parallel test threads — which is what the `DisableParallelization` collections are for.
- `ObjectPropertyListReentrancyTests` and `ObjectPropertyListNestedBuildTests` (added in #2555) build property lists, which rent the interpolation buffer, but were not in the sequential collection — unlike `PropertyListInvalidationDuringBuildTests` in the same file. This is a **latent failure already on `main`**; it is timing-dependent, so it shows on some platforms and not others.
- `AutoDenylistTests` (added here) has the same exposure: its cap tests reach `AutoDenylist.Sweep`, which rents a `PooledRefList` without `mt`. The blocklist tests need no marking because `BlocklistSnapshot.Build` asks for the `mt` pool explicitly.
No production change — `STArrayPool` is the right pool on the game loop, where both `Sweep` and the property list actually run.
## Deliberately not included
Waiting for a fragmented four-byte seed at `AwaitingSeed`. It looked like a bug but the disconnect is a deliberate defence: only pre-0xEF clients reach it (0xEF goes through `HandlePacket`, which already waits for its 21 bytes), and waiting converts an instant drop into a full 5s slot hold for a client sending one or two bytes, or a loris dribbling a byte every few seconds. Against a fixed 4096-entry `MaxConnections` table that trades capacity that matters for a fragmentation case a reconnect already fixes.
## Summary
Two related fixes on the outbound path:
1. Consume **IORingGroup 1.0.8**, which allows more than one send in flight per socket, and expose the two settings that go with it.
2. Stop `NetState.Send` silently discarding packets when the send buffer fills — including an out-of-bounds write reachable in that state.
## 1. Send-path stall (RIO)
RIO reports send completion on **acknowledgement**, not on copy, so a completion cannot arrive sooner than one round trip. With one send in flight, `PostSend` refused to post again until the previous completion arrived — capping a connection at **one send per RTT** whenever it had data queued.
Measured on a 50ms-RTT production shard:
| | before | after |
|---|---|---|
| in-game latency, data flowing | **101–146 ms** | **48–51 ms** |
| p95 | ~135 ms | 52.8 ms |
| samples > 70 ms | 20 | **0** |
The control that confirms the mechanism: server-side post→completion was **unchanged** at median 92ms across both runs. The ACK-binding is inherent to RIO and did not move; only its propagation into application latency did.
Two things worth recording, because they explain why this went unnoticed:
- As little as **6 bytes** of queued data held the gate shut, so it reproduced in empty areas, not just crowded ones.
- The same measurement at loopback RTT is **microseconds**, so local testing could never surface it.
New settings, both restart-time:
- **`network.maxOutstandingSends`** (default 32) — sends in flight per connection. Honoured by RIO only; other backends complete sends on copy and report 1. Costs a request-queue and completion-queue slot per send, **not another buffer**, since every outstanding send addresses a different range of the same registered buffer. Worst-case added latency is roughly `completion RTT / value`.
- **`network.sendBufferSize`** (default 256KB) — per-connection send buffer, coerced to a power of two of at least the platform allocation granularity. This is the lever for the disconnects below, and the per-connection memory ceiling.
## 2. Send buffer full
`NetState.Send` had three failure modes once the buffer filled, none of them visible:
| writable | behaviour |
|---|---|
| `0` | `GetSendBuffer` returned false → **packet dropped**, no log, no disconnect |
| `4 … needed-1` | `Compress` returned 0 → `CommitWrite(0)` → **packet dropped** the same way |
| `1 … 3` | `safeOutputLength = (nuint)output.Length - 4` **underflows** → hot-loop bounds check never trips → **writes past the span** |
The first two leave a client connected while quietly missing game state, which is undiagnosable from either end. The third corrupts the in-flight region of the ring buffer, and is reachable precisely when a connection is congested, since callers only check for non-zero space.
`Compress` now refuses an output too small to bound, and `Send` reports exhaustion instead of dropping — logging and disconnecting with **needed / writable / unacked / capacity**. Those numbers separate a slow client holding the buffer from a buffer genuinely too small for the shard, which is the case that warrants raising `network.sendBufferSize`.
## Testing
`NetworkCompressionBoundsTests` covers the underflow using sentinel bytes around the output window. **Verified to fail without the guard** (4 failures from overwritten sentinels), confirming the out-of-bounds writes were real rather than theoretical.
Full suites green: **788 Server.Tests**, **597 UOContent.Tests**, Release build clean against the published 1.0.8.
## Notes for reviewers
- Upstream change: modernuo/IORingGroup#9.
- The buffer-full path is now *loud* where it used to be silent. If a shard has been quietly dropping packets under load, this will surface as disconnects — that is the intended outcome, and the log line says which setting to raise.
- Follow-up under discussion: promoting a connection to a larger buffer instead of disconnecting, which looks feasible on a live connection since buffers are referenced per-operation rather than bound to the request queue.
Reshapes IP banning around one idea: **core owns the question, content owns every answer.**
Core gains a single accept-path seam — `IConnectionFilter` — and loses everything that used to implement one. The firewall moves to UOContent, a new file-backed blocklist joins it there, and CrowdSec is repositioned from an in-app enforcer to a contribute-first reporter.
## The seam
```csharp
public interface IConnectionFilter
{
string Name { get; }
void Configure();
void Start(CancellationToken token);
void Stop();
bool ShouldDeny(IPAddress address);
}
```
The accept path went from hardcoded branches to one question:
```csharp
else if (ConnectionFilters.ShouldDeny(remoteIP, out var deniedBy))
{
logger.Debug("{Address} denied by connection filter '{Filter}'", remoteIP, deniedBy);
}
```
Filters register during the Configure sweep. The registry is a plain array walked by an indexed loop — no enumerator, no closure, no allocation — and the first denial short-circuits. An interface dispatch is noise next to the `accept()` syscall, so pluggability costs nothing measurable on the path that has to survive a DDoS.
Whatever a hit implies — persisting, promoting to an OS bouncer, contributing to the ban channel — is the filter's business, not the accept path's.
A filter that throws is **unregistered and the connection fails open**. A filter that faults once faults for every subsequent connection, so leaving it registered means an exception and a log line per accept — exactly the amplification an attacker wants — and a broken filter must not be able to deny everyone either.
This deliberately does **not** reuse `EventSink.InvokeSocketConnect`: that fires later and allocates a `SocketConnectEventArgs` per connection, which is what the accept path avoids for rejected traffic.
## What ships behind it
**`firewall`** (UOContent) — the existing admin-curated set. Collapsed from `Firewall` + `AdminFirewall` + a threaded enforcer into one single-threaded store with **zero concurrency primitives**: the accept path, admin gump, TTL expiry and boot load all run on the game loop. Persists to `Configuration/firewall.json` with automatic migration from the legacy `firewall.cfg`. No behavior change for operators — same namespace, same gump, same commands.
**`blocklist`** (UOContent) — new. Holds a millions-strong list in-app and **demand-pages** hits up to CrowdSec, which promotes them to the OS firewall.
The motivation is concrete: CrowdSec's Windows bouncer cannot load the ~3.9M IPs that 91 community feeds produce, but it handles ~100k fine. So the millions live in-process behind a binary search, and only addresses that *actually connect* get promoted. A `PromotedGuard` suppresses re-reporting an address until the bouncer picks it up.
The list is parsed straight from UTF-8 file bytes with no per-line string allocation, off the game loop, and published as an immutable snapshot swapped through a single `volatile` reference. Reloads yield to world saves.
**`tools/Export-IpBlocklist.ps1`** — the producer. Requires PowerShell 7 and runs on Windows, Linux and macOS; Windows PowerShell 5.1 is refused up front via `#requires`. Merges a thin, non-overlapping feed set into one de-duplicated, bogon-filtered file. Parsing runs in a compiled `Add-Type` hot loop (~1s for ~4M lines instead of minutes). Written to a `.tmp` sibling and swapped with `File.Replace`, so the shard never reads a half-written list, and a total feed outage refuses to overwrite a good list with an empty one. Re-running is idempotent — it exits without downloading anything while the list on disk is younger than `-MinInterval` (default 2h, the anchor feed's own refresh period), so a misconfigured scheduler can't hammer upstream.
## CrowdSec: contribute-first
`IBanReporter` + `BanChannel` fan locally-decided bans out to external systems. `CrowdSecReporter` (UOContent) posts to LAPI `POST /v1/alerts` and retracts via `DELETE /v1/decisions`.
Reporting is **enqueue-only** on the accept path: a bounded, coalescing channel drained off-loop with bounded retry, counted drops on overflow, and a flush on shutdown. Under a DDoS the accept path never does synchronous or lock-contending per-IP work.
### Why not pull decisions from CrowdSec?
The original design streamed decisions into an in-app snapshot and enforced them at the accept gate. That's the wrong layer: by the time the shard sees the connection, the TCP handshake and socket setup are already paid for. `cs-firewall-bouncer` drops the same traffic **at the kernel**, and it's what CrowdSec is built to do. So the shard now contributes what it uniquely knows (rate-limit trips, blocklist hits from real connection attempts) and lets the OS enforce.
The one thing the OS can't do — hold millions of entries on Windows — is exactly what the in-app blocklist covers, and it feeds the same pipeline.
## Threading policy
`CLAUDE.md` rule #3 is rewritten as an explicit three-part policy, with rule #10 restated in tandem:
- Anything touching game state runs **only** on the main loop.
- Heavy work that *needs* game state must be **chunked** across ticks, never threaded.
- Heavy work that does *not* need game state (large-file parse, external I/O) **must** run off-loop **and must yield to world saves**.
Results come back via an immutable snapshot swapped through a single `volatile` reference, or `Core.LoopContext.Post` — never by letting the scheduler decide where heavy work runs. Both new subsystems follow it.
## Shared primitives
`SortedRangeIndex<T> where T : IBinaryInteger<T>` — coalesced disjoint interval arrays plus a binary search. The firewall, the blocklist, and (as of this PR) core's reserved-network tables all use it.
Coalescing is a correctness requirement, not an optimization: multi-feed lists nest CIDRs (`/24` containing a `/32`), and a search that inspects only the rightmost run whose minimum is ≤ the value is sound **only** over disjoint runs. That bug was caught in review and is covered by regression tests.
`IPAddressUtility` collects the allocation-free `IPAddress` ↔ `UInt128` conversions and CIDR parsing that were previously scattered or duplicated.
## Config
| File | Owner | Keys |
|---|---|---|
| `Configuration/bans.json` | core | `reportRateLimitTrips`, `autoBanDuration` |
| `Configuration/blocklist.json` | content | `file`, `reloadInterval`, `reportHits`, `banDuration`, `promoteSuppression` |
| `Configuration/crowdsec.json` | content | `lapiUrl`, `machineId`, `password`, `origin`, `manualBanDuration`, `flushInterval`, `maxQueue` |
| `Configuration/firewall.json` | content | persisted firewall entries (migrated from `firewall.cfg`) |
Everything is inert by default. CrowdSec self-disables without credentials; the blocklist self-disables until its file exists. A shard that changes nothing sees no behavior change.
## Notes for review
- **Core no longer references `Firewall` or `IFirewallEntry` anywhere.** `NetworkUtilities` used to build its reserved-network tables out of `CidrFirewallEntry`, which coupled core to the firewall for something unrelated to banning; those are now a `SortedRangeIndex<UInt128>`, same semantics and public API.
- **`BanChannel.Stop()` no longer persists the firewall** — a contribution coordinator has no business saving an enforcement store. That's the firewall filter's `Stop()`.
- **A dead `whitelisted` parameter was dropped** from the blocklist gate: it was hardcoded `false` at its only call site, and no whitelist concept exists in core.
- **The blocklist filter is an instance, not a static.** The static version forced its tests onto the sequential collection with a reset hook; they now run in parallel.
- `dev-docs/networking-packets.md` documents the seam for content authors, plus a known wart in the `IPAddress` ↔ `UInt128` normalization flagged for a follow-up PR.
- The generator was verified on Linux, macOS and Windows under a temporary CI matrix (since removed). It caught two portability bugs — a Windows-only path separator, and a culture-sensitive duration parse that read `2.5` as `25` on comma-decimal locales and *silently* turned a 2.5h cooldown into 25h — plus a third that made the script unparseable on Windows PowerShell 5.1. The source is ASCII-only for that last reason: `#requires` is only honored once a file parses, so non-ASCII in a BOM-less script produces parse errors instead of the version message.
## Tests
**1344 pass** (782 `Server.Tests`, 562 `UOContent.Tests`). New coverage: filter registry (registration, short-circuit, fault-disable), blocklist parsing/CIDR/coalescing, snapshot reload markers, promote-guard TTL, ban-channel fan-out, CrowdSec alert building/dedup/flush-on-stop, and the generator's output-format contract pinned against the reader.
Reduces the world-save freeze window from ~740ms to ~78ms (measured on a synthetic 10M-entity / 1.7GB world, 24 cores, through the real pipeline classes) by removing the per-entity handoff between the game loop and the serialization workers, fixing how large indivisible payloads are scheduled, rewriting the BufferWriter hot path, removing per-entity placement state entirely, and finally replacing the global serialized-types tracking with a per-file type table (idx v4) that also shrinks idx files by ~21% and speeds the background write phase. The pipeline has also been validated end-to-end on live-copy worlds in the multi-million-entity range, where the freeze is drain-bound (real `Serialize()` costs far more CPU per byte than synthetic writes) — the same structural wins hold, and entity/file round-trips are byte-clean across both load paths.
## The problem
The freeze window is `max(main-thread handoff, slowest worker drain)`:
1. **The producer was the bottleneck.** The main thread round-robined every entity through per-worker `ConcurrentQueue`s — two interlocked ops per entity, ~740ms of freeze floor at 10M entities before any serialization happened.
2. **Round-robin distributes count, not cost.** "Deep" systems (50MB generic persistence blobs) and "thick" entities (100K-item storage keys) landed on arbitrary workers, producing lopsided drain times on large worlds.
3. **Worst-case scheduling.** `GenericEntityPersistence.Serialize` pushed its self-payload *after* all entities, and generic persistences sort last in the registry — so the biggest indivisible blobs started serializing at the very end, extending the freeze by their entire duration.
## The fix
**Commit 1 — chunked handoff + LPT scheduling + heap pre-sizing:**
- Pooled 4096-entity chunks published to one shared queue; workers pull chunks and load-balance dynamically (a worker busy with a thick entity simply takes fewer chunks).
- `Persistence.SerializeAll` pushes systems largest-first (LPT) using the previous save's payload size (or loaded file size on first boot); self-payloads get dedicated single-entity chunks so they overlap the entity stream instead of ending it.
- Worker heaps pre-size from the loaded save's `.bin` totals, eliminating copy-on-grow inside the first save's freeze.
- `SpinWait` backoff in the drain loop (never `Sleep(1)`), per-worker balance stats logged in debug builds (the call site is compiled out of Release), 1MB snapshot write buffer.
**Commit 2 — workers iterate the dictionaries directly + main thread joins the drain:**
- `GenericEntityPersistence` publishes 4096-slot ranges over its dictionary's backing entries array; workers serialize occupied slots (`value != null`) directly through a `ShadowEntry<TValue>` struct mirroring the runtime's private `Entry` layout. Safe because the dictionary is frozen during `Saving` (mutations divert to the pending safety queues).
- The layout is **proven at startup before any code reads through it**: validation measures the true `Entry` stride via precise allocation accounting (guaranteeing all shadow reads are in-bounds), then verifies every key/value of a churned, resized, freelist-exercised dictionary — reading value slots as raw pointer bits only, never materializing a managed reference until the layout is proven. If a future runtime changes `Dictionary` internals, validation fails with a logged warning and saves fall back to the (fully maintained) enumerate-and-push path.
- The main thread joins the drain via an inline worker after publishing, instead of idling — worth a full worker share, proportionally more on low-core hosts.
**Commit 3 — 2.2x faster BufferWriter write path, single-pass short strings:**
- PGO already devirtualizes and inlines every `IGenericWriter.Write` callsite (interface vs concrete measured identical) — the real per-write cost was the non-inlinable `Index` setter (range-check throw path + per-write high-water tracking) plus span bounds checks. Writes now reserve capacity once, then do an unaligned store through a ref with a raw index increment; the high-water mark folds at Seek/Resize instead of per write.
- Class-level implementations of the hottest default interface methods keep nested writes inlined (a DIM re-dispatches on `this` even at a devirtualized callsite).
- Strings of 85 chars or fewer encode once into a stack scratch instead of walking the string twice (`GetByteCount` + `GetBytes`). Byte output is identical.
- Measured: 34.4 → 15.7 ns/entity on a generated-style write mix; end-to-end freeze ~99ms → ~74-82ms.
**Commit 4 — branch-free fallback push loop:**
- A bare `foreach { PushToCache(entity); }` runs at 2.3ns/entity; the same loop carrying a per-entity heavy-check runs 2.3x slower — the cost is the fatter loop body defeating tight-loop codegen. Entity-level >1MB payloads are rare enough to ride in shared chunks; system self-payloads (the large ones) are still explicitly scheduled largest-first.
**Commit 5 — drop the 9-byte per-entity placement state; snapshots write from worker segment logs:**
- Every `ISerializable` carried `SerializedThread/SerializedPosition/SerializedLength` so `WriteSnapshot` could gather each entity's bytes from the worker heaps in dictionary order. But the idx records absolute positions — bin order is free — so the snapshot is now written in worker-heap order and the join inverts: workers log segments (owner, slot range, heap start) plus one length per record as they serialize; positions are implicit because a worker's writes are contiguous, and identity comes from re-walking the same snapshot slots in the same order (stable until `PostWorldSave`).
- Chunks are persistence-homogeneous (the partial chunk publishes at each `SerializeAll` boundary) so segments route to files by owner with zero per-entity state. Self-payloads keep placement as three private fields on the handful of persistence instances.
- Net: 9 bytes (plus padding) of resident state removed from every item, mobile, guild, and account on every shard; three interface-property stores per entity leave the drain hot path (stamping dirtied one cache line per entity mid-freeze — the lengths log is one sequential stream); each segment's bytes hit the bin as a single span write instead of one copy per entity, speeding the background write phase; and `IGenericSerializable` shrinks to just `Serialize(IGenericWriter)`. Transient cost: ~4 bytes per entity in pooled per-worker logs, released after each write. The save format was unchanged at this point (idx v3, same loader); the v4 bump comes later in the branch.
**Commit 6 — staged file writes replace memory-mapped snapshot writing:**
- `MemoryMapFileWriter` is removed. `FileBufferWriter` composes through the full `BufferWriter` raw write path into a pooled staging block that drains to the file as large sequential positional writes (`RandomAccess.Write`); seeks flush the block and move the file offset, so backwards patches (the idx entity count) become small positional writes.
- Memory-mapped composition paid a soft page fault on every composed page plus unpredictable dirty-section teardown stalls at dispose — measured ~4x slower end-to-end than staged writes at snapshot sizes.
**Commits 7–11 — idx v4: per-file type table replaces SerializedTypes.db and all runtime type tracking:**
- Previously every `Write(Type)` from every worker enqueued into a shared `ConcurrentQueue<Type>` during the freeze (interlocked writes on a shared cache line, millions of mostly-duplicate entries), the background phase drained and deduped it all into a `HashSet`, and the snapshot recomputed `xxHash64(Type.FullName)` once per entity record (~5.4M redundant hashes per save on a large world) to write 9-byte tag+hash idx records plus a global `SerializedTypes.db`.
- The db's only real job was diagnostics: the string name behind "Type `<X>` was not found. Delete all of those types?" during idx loading. That map now lives in the idx itself: each `GenericEntityPersistence<T>` keeps an insertion-ordered `Type -> ushort` table, hydrated at `AddEntity` and on every deserialize path — one dictionary `TryAdd` per entity add on the game thread, amortized across gameplay, and provably immutable while the background writer reads it (adds divert to the pending queues during saves).
- idx v4 layout: the table (names only) is written before the records; records reference it by 2-byte index, shrinking from 33 to 26 bytes (−21%). The loader resolves each table name **once** (`FindTypeByHash(ComputeHash64(name))` — semantically identical to v3 resolution, `TypeAlias` included) into a constructor array, and each record becomes an array index instead of an 8-byte hash read plus dictionary probe. The unresolved-type prompt now surfaces once per type, with the name.
- Deleted outright: `World.SerializedTypes`, the drain/dedupe pass in `WriteFiles`, `BufferWriter`'s type tracking (its `Write(Type)` is now pure — payload format unchanged: tag byte + xxHash64), `FileBufferWriter`'s typeSet parameter, `Persistence.WriteSerializedTypesSnapshot`, and the adhoc db write. SerializedTypes.db is no longer produced.
- **Backward compatibility:** v0–v3 saves (including their SerializedTypes.db and legacy tdb files) load exactly as before, and every legacy load path hydrates the new table so the first v4 save after an upgrade is complete. Stale db files in existing save folders are simply ignored. Verified live: a v3 save boots, saves as v4 (Items.idx −20.2% on a dev world), and reloads with identical entity counts.
## Measured (synthetic 10M entities / 1.7GB, 64+64+32MB system blobs, 24x 2MB thick entities, dense write profile, 24 cores)
| Metric | Before | After |
|---|---|---|
| Steady-state freeze | ~740 ms | **~78 ms** |
| Main-thread publish cost | ~740 ms | **~0.1 ms** |
| Steady-state allocations | 0 | 0 (by iter 2) |
| Worker byte-load spread | 2x | ~1.15x |
The freeze is now bound by pure serialize throughput (payload / cores).
## Tests
- 779 Server.Tests + 501 UOContent.Tests pass.
- New across the branch: chunk fill/flush/owner-boundary tests, pool reuse/clear tests, an end-to-end multi-worker drain through the real wake/push/flush/pause protocol, a 50K-entry churn equivalence test for the shadow iteration re-walk (the exact pairing the snapshot writer relies on), byte-level BufferWriter output/position pins, `RuntimeLayoutIsSupported` so a silent fallback on a future runtime upgrade fails loudly in CI, and a full snapshot **round-trip test** that serializes 25K entities plus a self-payload through real workers, writes the idx/bin from the segment logs, and reloads them through the standard loader (now in v4 format).
- For idx v4 specifically: `FileBufferWriter` staging/drain/seek-patch and oversized-item tests, type-table registration tests, a hand-written v4 fixture proving an unresolvable type name skips only its own records through the console confirmation flow, and a hand-written **legacy v3 fixture** proving old saves still load and hydrate the type table for their next save.
## Trade-offs
- Chunk scheduling is nondeterministic, so worker heaps ratchet to each worker's max-ever draw rather than a fixed share. With slot ranges the balance is tight (~1.15x), so the effect is small; a shared slab pool remains an option if production shows retention creep.
- Entity-level heavy items inside slot ranges are serialized wherever they're encountered (no LPT for them); worst-case tail is one thick entity's serialize time (~ms). System self-payloads — the large ones — are still explicitly scheduled largest-first.
- Snapshot-write error granularity is per segment rather than per entity (heap-bounds bugs were the only thing the per-entity catch ever caught; idx metadata reads keep per-record granularity).
- idx v4 is a save-format version bump: old saves load unchanged through the preserved legacy paths, but saves written by this branch require this loader. Per-persistence type tables cap at 65,535 distinct entity types per boot (hard throw, orders of magnitude of headroom), and a type's table slot persists until restart even if its last entity is deleted — a few stale name entries per file, by design.
## The bug
#2522 rewrote the outgoing huffman table in `NetworkCompression.cs` and transposed symbol `0x19`'s code from `0x1CE` to `0x12E` (both 9 bits, so the length distribution — and the Kraft sum — stayed valid, which is why nothing obvious tripped).
The real damage is that it broke prefix-freeness. `0x12E` is `100101110`, and symbol `0x0D`'s 8-bit code is `10010111` — a proper prefix of it. The client's decoder walks the tree bit by bit, so it hit a valid leaf at `0x0D` after 8 bits, emitted the wrong byte, and then reframed every subsequent code.
That is exactly what the reporter's capture shows. Server sends `BF 00 0C 00 19 02 00 00 00 01 00 00`; the client's post-decompression stream reads `BF 00 0C 00 0D 55 00 00 01 00 00` — the literal `0D` is the mis-decoded `0x19`, and the packet is now one byte short, so framing desyncs from there on.
## Impact
Any outgoing packet with byte `0x19` anywhere in its body (serials, coordinates, hues, lengths, text) corrupted the stream. Because the desync is in framing rather than a single field, the client silently stops applying server updates while still being able to send — no disconnect, no error.
`StatLockInfo` (`0xBF` subcommand `0x19`) is sent during login, so it reproduces on essentially every connection. This is also #2526: "can only walk a few steps, then the client stops responding" is the same desync, not a VPS sizing problem.
## Fix
One entry, restored to the canonical value:
```diff
- 0x9, 0x191, 0x9, 0x12E, 0x7, 0x03F, ...
+ 0x9, 0x191, 0x9, 0x1CE, 0x7, 0x03F, ...
```
## Validation of the whole table
Rather than eyeball 257 entries, I diffed the current table against **every revision of it in this repo's history** — all 34, back through the renames to the original import. All 34 agree with each other, and `0x19` is the sole disagreement with #2522's rewrite. No other entry has ever changed.
I also validated the table structurally: all 257 lengths in `[2,11]`, every value fits its declared bit-length, Kraft–McMillan sum exactly 1, and no code is a prefix of any other. It passes on all counts now, and the prefix check is what located the bug in the first place.
Both checks were one-off validation scripts, not committed — see below.
## Test
A single known-answer test (`~10ms`) that compresses all 256 symbols and asserts the exact output bytes. The expected bytes were generated from the canonical table, *not* from the implementation, so the test isn't circular. Any single wrong table entry changes the output, so it pins all 256 entries plus the terminal code, and it exercises the encoder end to end.
A round-trip test would **not** catch this class of bug — encoder and decoder built from the same table agree with each other even when the table is wrong. The contract being violated is with the client's hard-coded tree, so the expected bytes have to come from outside the implementation.
The structural prefix-free check and a second `StatLockInfo` vector were deliberately dropped after they'd served their purpose: the table is now verified and effectively frozen, so the structural check was guarding a constant, and the `StatLockInfo` vector is a strict subset of the all-symbols one. What remains covers the risk that's still live — `Compress` is a hand-unrolled bit-packing loop that will get optimized again, and this is the guard against that rewrite silently corrupting the wire format, which is precisely what happened here.
Verified the test fails when the bug is reintroduced and passes when fixed. Full `Server.Tests` suite green: 727 passed.
Fixes#2462
## Summary
Removes the per-object `VirtualHairInfo` heap wrapper for mobile/corpse hair. Hair is now stored **inline** on `Mobile` and `Corpse` as `int _hairItemId` / `int _hairHue` plus a lazily-allocated, **non-serialized** ephemeral `Serial _hairSerial` (in the high virtual-serial range) — and likewise for facial hair. The `VirtualHairInfo` class is deleted, with a **lossless** save migration.
This delivers three things:
1. **Fixes a hair-removal bug.** `Delta(MobileDelta.Hair)` is deferred (it enqueues; `ProcessDeltaQueue` runs later in the tick). The old `HairItemID = 0` setter nulled `_hair` *immediately*, so by the time `ProcessDelta` built the remove packet the equipped virtual serial was already gone — the old `??=` code then re-materialized a **fresh** serial (≠ the equipped one), so clients never removed the right entity, and it left a phantom ItemId-0 object behind. The serial now lives on the entity and **persists across removal**, so remove packets carry the correct serial.
2. **Lightens the entity.** No heap hair object; bald mobiles allocate nothing (the serial is minted lazily only when hair is present). This was the original reason `HairItemID`/`HairHue` exist.
3. **Removes `VirtualHairInfo` entirely**, keeping the high-range virtual serial behavior.
## How
- **Mobile** (manual serialization): inline `_hairItemId/_hairHue/_hairSerial` (+facial); lazy `HairSerial`/`FacialHairSerial`; `ProcessDelta` reads those. Serialization **v36 → v37** — the v30-v37 deserialize is unified, reading the legacy per-hair `VirtualHairInfo` version int only when `version < 37`. Setting item id to 0 clears the hue (matching the old object-nulling) while retaining the serial.
- **Corpse** (codegen serialization): decomposed to `[SerializableField] int _hairItemId/_hairHue` (+facial) + ephemeral serial; **v16 → v17** with `MigrateFrom(V16Content)`.
- **Lossless migration:** the loader validates exact byte length, and the old corpse hair is a presence-bool-gated block, so a tiny **migration-only** `LegacyHairInfo` reader (no runtime role) consumes the legacy `[bool][int ver][int itemId][int hue]` bytes. Frozen `Corpse.v14/v15/v16.json` are retyped to it; `v17.json` describes the new int fields.
- All consumers updated to discrete accessors: `OutgoingMobilePackets`, `CorpsePackets`, corpse subclasses (`MilitiaFighterCorpse`, `SchmendrickApprenticeCorpse`), and the packet test mirrors.
- `VirtualHair.cs` renamed to `OutgoingVirtualHairPackets.cs` (the only type left in it after `VirtualHairInfo` was removed).
## Test Plan
- [x] Full solution build: **0 warnings, 0 errors** (`TreatWarningsAsErrors`).
- [x] `Server.Tests`: **708 passed** (incl. new `RemoveHairUsesEquippedSerial` / `RemoveFacialHairUsesEquippedSerial` proving the serial survives removal + hue clears).
- [x] `UOContent.Tests` corpse/hair: **6 passed** (incl. `CorpseHairMigrationTests` asserting the legacy hair bytes are consumed exactly — the loader's length invariant).
- [x] Generated migration code inspected: V14/V15/V16 readers consume the legacy block byte-for-byte; serial never written to disk.
## Upgrade notes
- Old Mobile (v30–v36) and Corpse (v13–v16) saves load losslessly.
- Minor cosmetic-only change: `SchmendrickApprenticeCorpse` hair/facial-hair RNG draws shift order within each pair (same draw count); irrelevant for a quest NPC corpse.
## Summary
Phase 1 of a multi-phase optimization to eliminate intermediate string allocations between `$"..."` interpolation and the packet text region for ModernUO's player-facing message APIs.
- Adds `[InterpolatedStringHandler]` overloads to every `Send*`/`Public/Local/Private/NonlocalOverheadMessage`/`Say`/`Emote`/`Whisper`/`Yell`/`SendLocalizedMessageTo` API in `OutgoingMessagePackets`, `Mobile`, and `Item`. Each overload is a 3-line shim that forwards `handler.Text` to the existing span-based path then calls `handler.Clear()` to return the rented `STArrayPool<char>` buffer (matches the established `SpanWriter.WriteAscii(ref RawInterpolatedStringHandler)` precedent).
- Converts `string text/args/affix/name` parameters to `ReadOnlySpan<char>` for consistency with the handler path. `lang` intentionally stays `string` (it's never interpolated and the `??= "ENU"` fallback stays cleaner).
- Adds `int charCount` overloads of the three `GetMaxMessage*Length` helpers so stackalloc sizing can avoid the redundant `ROS<char>` round-trip.
- Moves `Mobile` (17 methods) and `Item` (4 methods) message methods into new partial-class files (`Mobile.Messages.cs`, `Item.Messages.cs`) for organization.
No UOContent call sites change in this PR — existing `string`/`ROS<char>` calls compile unchanged via implicit conversion. Phase 2 (intermediate-string audit) and Phase 3 (cleanup PRs) follow.
## Files
- `Projects/Server/Network/Packets/OutgoingMessagePackets.cs` — `string` → `ROS<char>` for text params, `int charCount` length helpers added, class made `partial`
- `Projects/Server/Network/Packets/OutgoingMessagePackets.Interpolated.cs` (new) — 3 `ref RawInterpolatedStringHandler` extension overloads
- `Projects/Server/Mobiles/Mobile.cs` — message methods extracted (-262 lines)
- `Projects/Server/Mobiles/Mobile.Messages.cs` (new, 463 lines) — moved + ROS-converted methods + 25 handler overloads
- `Projects/Server/Items/Item.cs` — message methods extracted (-93 lines)
- `Projects/Server/Items/Item.Messages.cs` (new, 142 lines) — moved + ROS-converted methods + 4 handler overloads
- `Projects/Server.Tests/Tests/Network/Packets/Outgoing/MessagePacketTests.cs` — 3 new regression tests verifying byte-equivalence for the handler overloads
## Summary
Server-side movement throttle that prevents speed hacking while accurately identifying cheaters with detection of lagging connections.
**Key features:**
- Credit buffer (200ms) absorbs timing jitter from legitimate players
- Movement queue handles larger bursts, draining at proper game-tick intervals
- RTT measurement distinguishes network lag from speed hacks
- Queue depth detection catches ACK-throttled speed hacks (going straight)
## How It Works
**Throttle** (prevention): Movements arriving too early either consume credit or get queued. The queue drains at
correct intervals, so speed hackers can't move faster regardless of what they send.
**Detection** (identification): Combines multiple signals to identify cheaters:
| Signal | What it catches |
|--------|-----------------|
| Queue depth ≥4 sustained | ACK-throttled speed hacks (client limits unacked moves to 5) |
| Movement rate >1.05x | Direction-change speed hacks where timing is visible |
| Stable RTT + high queue | Eliminates false positives from laggy players |
**RTT-Aware Logic:**
- Probes only sent to players actively moving (event-driven, not global loop)
- Stable low-latency + problems = suspicious
- Unstable/high-latency + problems = probably just lag, throttle handles it
## Configuration
```json
{
"movementThrottle.maxCredit": 200,
"movementThrottle.softQueueLimit": 6,
"movementThrottle.hardQueueLimit": 10,
"movementThrottle.debugLogging": false
}
```
> [!IMPORTANT]
> **Breaking Changes**
> - DecodePacket and EncodePacket delegates replaced with IClientEncryption interface
> - NetState.Connection (Socket) replaced with internal RingSocket management
> - NetState.RecvPipe and NetState.SendPipe removed (buffers managed internally)
## Summary
Upgrades the networking stack from PollGroup-based I/O to io_uring, significantly improving I/O performance on Linux.
This also adds native client encryption support for encrypted UO clients.
## Major Changes
io_uring Networking Architecture
- Replaced PollGroup with IORingGroup for async socket I/O operations
- Removed Pipe.cs (mirrored ring buffer) and TcpServer.cs in favor of RingSocketManager
- Added NetState.Network.cs - centralized network infrastructure handling accept, recv, send, and disconnect
completions
- Added SocketHelper.cs - platform-specific socket utilities for raw socket handle operations (getpeername,
getsockname)
- Buffer management now handled by RingSocketManager with configurable slab allocation
### Client Encryption Support
- Added full encryption stack in Network/Encryption/:
- EncryptionConfig.cs - configurable encryption modes (None, Unencrypted, Encrypted, Both)
- EncryptionManager.cs - encryption detection and initialization for login/game packets
- LoginEncryption.cs - handles login packet encryption with version-derived keys
- GameEncryption.cs - handles game server encryption using Twofish
- TwofishEngine.cs - optimized Twofish block cipher implementation
- LoginKeys.cs - encryption key table for client versions
- IClientEncryption.cs - interface for client encryption implementations
### NetState Improvements
- Replaced Socket Connection with RingSocket _socket for managed socket lifecycle
- Changed from GCHandle polling to event-based completion processing
- Disconnect handling now properly waits for pending sends to flush
- Simplified connecting socket management using lazy queue removal
### Configuration
- New settings: network.encryptionMode and network.encryptionDebug
- Encryption mode flags: Unencrypted, Encrypted, or Both
### Dependencies
- Replaced PollGroup NuGet package with IORingGroup
- Linux requires liburing-dev / liburing-devel package
### Test plan
- Verify server starts and accepts connections on Linux with io_uring
- Verify server starts and accepts connections on Windows (fallback to IOCP)
- Test unencrypted client connections (ClassicUO with encryption disabled)
- Test encrypted client connections if available
- Verify graceful disconnect flushes pending data
- Confirm CI builds pass on all target platforms
### Summary
- `GenericEntityPersistence` is now a type of `GenericPersistence`. This allows developers to serialize both entities and non-entities in the same system. 🎉
- Each `SerializationThreadWorker` now allocates 1MB of heap for serialization _permanently_. If more memory is needed, that thread will double it's memory, not to exceed increments of 64MB.
- Several bugs with serialization introduced with the pure MMF implementation have been fixed.
- `BinaryFileReader` has been added back. 🎉
- Adds `world.useMultithreadedSaves` to allow disabling threaded saves.
> [!IMPORTANT]
> **Developer Note**
> The split file serialization has been deprecated and is no longer used. We have effectively gone back to the same file writing we had before the pure MMF implementation.
> [!Important]
> **Developer Note**
> This code change will **completely move gumps out of the core**
### Summary
- Adds `GetGumps()` convenience which exposes methods to Find/Close/Send multiple gumps. This helper is a performance improvement by eliminating the Dictionary<Player, List> lookup for gumps.
### Summary
* Added World.NewVirtual for creating virtual serial numbers
* Reserved range 0x7EEEEEEE to 0x7FFFFFFF for virtual serials
* Hair and Facial hair (for mobiles) now use virtual serials instead of FakeSerial() functions
* Consolidated virtual hair to a single `VirtualHairInfo` class.
Corpse hair and facial hair now persists across save/load and hair and facial hair no longer teleport to newest corpse.
## Summary
- Removes allocation of a `List<ContextMenuEntry>` every time a context menu is created.
- Moves packet/context menu creation logic out of the core
- Fixes tame entry
## BREAKING CHANGE
> [!Important]
> **Developer Note**
> ```cs
> public virtual void GetContextMenuEntries(Mobile from, List<ContextMenuEntry> list)
> ```
> and similar functions changed to
> ```cs
> public virtual void GetContextMenuEntries(Mobile from, ref PooledRefList<ContextMenuEntry> list)
> ```
### Summary
Updates the serialization strategy to use `MemoryMappedFile` instead of thick buffers. This has the benefit of being on-par with the current implementation (based on hardware/OS), however won't incur the double-memory issue.
> [!Important]
> **Developer Note**
> The `BinaryFileWriter` and `BinaryFileReader` has been removed in favor of `MemoryMapFileWriter` and `UnmanagedDataReader`
### Summary
- Generalizes the On/Off toggle items concept
- Updates the OnOffGump so it is static
- Standardizes OnOff items so they can be used by staff
### Notes
Decided to not fix#1417 because it is not clear that the clilocs or errors are for that purpose. Can't test this on OSI anyways.
> [!Warning]
> Users on Linux/OSX will need to follow the Readme
> and make sure `libdeflate` is properly installed
> [!Note]
> **Developer Note**
> The API for compression has changed. Use `Deflate.Standard` for the same functionality.
### Summary
* Replaces Zlib with LibDeflate for a 50% performance improvement!
* Adds MacOS 14 to properly test Arm64
# New Gump API
We are pleased to release a new API that is faster, allocates nearly zero memory, and still feels very similar to the original API. The API is broken into 3 types of gumps, dynamic, static with placeholders, and static without placeholders.
### Dynamic Gumps
These gumps will inherit `DynamicGump` and are meant for gumps that have a dynamic layout. This includes specifying dynamic arguments to HtmlLocalized entries.
## Static Gumps
Static gumps are those where the function to the build the layout is called only once and cached forever. They can optionally have placeholders. These placeholders allow the developer to specify the string values later, dynamically in a `BuildStrings` method on the gump. If a gump does not have any placeholders, the string entries will also be cached forever.
## Benchmarks
To make sure we were going in the right direction and not wasting time, we took copious benchmarks. Here are the final benchmarks for a really simple gump.
Note:
* The majority of creating a gump is compressing the layout and the strings. Compressing each section takes ~6,000ns (12us total).
```cs
| Method | Mean | Error | StdDev | Median | Ratio | RatioSD | Gen0 | Allocated | Alloc Ratio |
|------------------------------- |-------------:|-------------:|-------------:|-------------:|------:|--------:|-------:|----------:|------------:|
| OldGump | 13,308.29 ns | 1,059.695 ns | 1,883.608 ns | 14,330.72 ns | 1.000 | 0.00 | 0.1526 | 2400 B | 1.00 |
| DynamicLayoutGump | 13,357.86 ns | 129.144 ns | 226.185 ns | 13,323.60 ns | 1.029 | 0.17 | - | 48 B | 0.02 |
| StaticLayoutDynamicStringsGump | 6,653.10 ns | 81.815 ns | 143.292 ns | 6,617.45 ns | 0.514 | 0.09 | - | 40 B | 0.02 |
| StaticLayoutGump | 86.33 ns | 0.760 ns | 1.350 ns | 86.07 ns | 0.007 | 0.00 | 0.0020 | 32 B | 0.01 |
```
# Non-Breaking Changes
* All gump components in the core have been moved to `Gumps/Legacy`.
* All legacy gumps will still inherit `Gump`, which now inherits `BaseGump`
# Special Thanks
Thank you to @stefanomerotta for considerable contributions/benchmarking/testing to make this effort a reality! We collectively went through over 10 iterations, but it is finally ready.
### Summary
* Removes old gump packet support
* Removes support for v4 clients
* Removes `Unpack` flag and assumes it is always true.
* Removes StringToBuffer since this is built into .NET now.
> [!Note]
> View the file changes with white space off: https://github.com/modernuo/ModernUO/pull/1739/files?diff=split&w=1
## Breaking Changes
* The Firewall and IP Limiter have been rewritten. Please read the notes carefully!
* `TcpServer.Instances` moved back to `NetState.Instances` - sorry - it was stupid to move it to begin with.
> [!Note]
> Sockets that fail the IP Limiter or Firewall will be immediately and forcibly disconnected.
> This means they will be stuck at "Verifying account..." if it was a real client.
### Summary
- Removes firewall wildcard support.
- Removes `AccessRestrictions`.
- Moves Firewall/IPLimiter to the core.
- Moves `TcpServer` to its own thread.
- Removes the `SocketConnect` and `SocketDisconnect` event sinks.
- Moves `Instances` back to `NetState.Instances`.
- Fixes a long standing bug with bad handling of duplicate listener addresses.
#### Firewall
The firewall has been completely rewritten. There is now an "Admin Firewall" which saves to the config file. Secondarily, there is an internal firewall used exclusively by the TcpServer while processing sockets. The Admin firewall mirrors it's additions/deletions to the internal firewall by adding requests to a queue.
> [!IMPORTANT]
> **Wildcard firewall entries, such as `X`, `*`, `?` are not allowed.**
> **Ranges in between IP classes or sextets are not allowed.**
> **Please make sure to use one of the following:**
> * IP Address - `192.168.1.1`
> * CIDR - `192.168.1.0/24`
> * Range - `192.168.1.1-192.168.1.100`
#### IP Limiter
The IP Limiter has been completely rewritten. The available configurations are:
```json
"ipLimiter.enable": "True",
"ipLimiter.maxConnectionsPerIP": 10,
"ipLimiter.clearConnectionAttemptsDuration": "00:00:00:10",
"ipLimiter.clearThrottledDuration": "00:00:02:00",
```
The IP Limiter is set up to prevent spamming connections from the same IP. Every time an IP connects, it is added to a connection list. After 10 attempts, the IP is added to the throttle list. To keep the system fast, the connection list is entirely wiped every 10 seconds, and the throttle list is entirely wiped every 2 minutes.
### Summary
- Removes old death packet that isn't used. Doubtful this causes issues with clients that are v4+.
- Removes duplicate incoming packets. Again, probably to fix some old client issues, doubtful it affects clients v4+.
- Fixes setting serials and entities in props/commands. Note: Disabled setting `Parent` since the new sector code has issues. We shouldn't rely on it anyway!
- Reverts a recent change to healthbars that should not have been made. Oops!
### Summary
- Fixes usernames not being `Intern`ed
- Reverts methods related to getting accounts from returning `Account` to `IAccount`.
- Makes `IAccount` also `ISerializable`
- Adds `IGenericReader.ReadAccount()` and `IGenericWriter.Write(IAccount)` -> The read method supports the original serialization of username, and using `IAccount.Serial`. The write method only serializes the `Serial`.
- Exposes `ReadStringRaw()` to allow some advanced scenarios.
## Breaking Changes
Incoming packet registration signature has changed to:
```cs
delegate* void OnReceiveCallback(NetState state, SpanReader reader, int packetLength);
IncomingPackets.Register(int packetID, int length, bool ingame, OnReceiveCallback onReceive);
```
For example, an incoming packet handler signature would now look like this:
```cs
public static void SomeIncomingPacket(NetState state, SpanReader reader, int packetLength)
{
// Parse the data
}
```
## Summary
Updates the network Pipe class to use a mirrored memory technique. This technique involves mapping the same physical memory to two contiguous virtual memory spaces so the byte buffer appears duplicated. This allows writing to a double-sized array to wrap around without the need for the `CircularBuffer` classes.
In practice this allows us to use `Span<byte>` as if the buffer was a regular array.
### Bug Fixes
- [X] Fixes bad fixed length string parsing
### Summary
- Removes Fastwalk system
- Removed the following settings:
- `movement.enableFastWalkPrevention`
- `movement.fastwalkExemptionLevel`
- Adds movement throttle system.
- Adds the following settings:
- `movement.throttleReset` - Default value is `1000` (1 second).
- `movement.throttleThreshold` - Default value is `400` (400ms).
### Movement Throttling
This new system will trigger if a player requests 400ms (configurable) worth of movements quicker than wall clock time. When this happens, the player is throttled (all incoming packets to the server are halted) until wall clock time catches up with the requests. Upon each throttle, the player receives enough credit to handle up to 400ms of "lag" as a grace/catch-up.
### Developer Notes
We use two throttle queues to prevent an infinite loop.
**Only one functional change**
* Fixes a bug in LogFactory where `Warning` is being logged as `Information`
Non-functional changes:
* Updates/Fixes copyright headers
* Removes namespace scopes for core files.
View with [whitespace off](https://github.com/modernuo/ModernUO/pull/1187/files?w=1).
- [X] Fixes NPE from account tags.
- [X] Fixes bad skill check due to missing cast to double.
- [X] Fixes water elemental duration.
- [X] Standardizes spell summon duration by expansion.
- [X] Fixes issue with wepoll losing GCHandle.
- [X] `NetState.Disconnect()` is no longer thread safe.
- Use `Core.LoopContext.Post()` to post disconnects
- [X] Optimizes PollGroup by not processing IntPtr -> GCHandle for discard polls.
Changes gump compilation to use string interpolation. .NET 6 uses code generation and compile time tricks to speed up string interpolation between 15 and 30% and reduce allocations dramatically.
