Reshapes IP banning around one idea: **core owns the question, content owns every answer.**
Core gains a single accept-path seam — `IConnectionFilter` — and loses everything that used to implement one. The firewall moves to UOContent, a new file-backed blocklist joins it there, and CrowdSec is repositioned from an in-app enforcer to a contribute-first reporter.
## The seam
```csharp
public interface IConnectionFilter
{
string Name { get; }
void Configure();
void Start(CancellationToken token);
void Stop();
bool ShouldDeny(IPAddress address);
}
```
The accept path went from hardcoded branches to one question:
```csharp
else if (ConnectionFilters.ShouldDeny(remoteIP, out var deniedBy))
{
logger.Debug("{Address} denied by connection filter '{Filter}'", remoteIP, deniedBy);
}
```
Filters register during the Configure sweep. The registry is a plain array walked by an indexed loop — no enumerator, no closure, no allocation — and the first denial short-circuits. An interface dispatch is noise next to the `accept()` syscall, so pluggability costs nothing measurable on the path that has to survive a DDoS.
Whatever a hit implies — persisting, promoting to an OS bouncer, contributing to the ban channel — is the filter's business, not the accept path's.
A filter that throws is **unregistered and the connection fails open**. A filter that faults once faults for every subsequent connection, so leaving it registered means an exception and a log line per accept — exactly the amplification an attacker wants — and a broken filter must not be able to deny everyone either.
This deliberately does **not** reuse `EventSink.InvokeSocketConnect`: that fires later and allocates a `SocketConnectEventArgs` per connection, which is what the accept path avoids for rejected traffic.
## What ships behind it
**`firewall`** (UOContent) — the existing admin-curated set. Collapsed from `Firewall` + `AdminFirewall` + a threaded enforcer into one single-threaded store with **zero concurrency primitives**: the accept path, admin gump, TTL expiry and boot load all run on the game loop. Persists to `Configuration/firewall.json` with automatic migration from the legacy `firewall.cfg`. No behavior change for operators — same namespace, same gump, same commands.
**`blocklist`** (UOContent) — new. Holds a millions-strong list in-app and **demand-pages** hits up to CrowdSec, which promotes them to the OS firewall.
The motivation is concrete: CrowdSec's Windows bouncer cannot load the ~3.9M IPs that 91 community feeds produce, but it handles ~100k fine. So the millions live in-process behind a binary search, and only addresses that *actually connect* get promoted. A `PromotedGuard` suppresses re-reporting an address until the bouncer picks it up.
The list is parsed straight from UTF-8 file bytes with no per-line string allocation, off the game loop, and published as an immutable snapshot swapped through a single `volatile` reference. Reloads yield to world saves.
**`tools/Export-IpBlocklist.ps1`** — the producer. Requires PowerShell 7 and runs on Windows, Linux and macOS; Windows PowerShell 5.1 is refused up front via `#requires`. Merges a thin, non-overlapping feed set into one de-duplicated, bogon-filtered file. Parsing runs in a compiled `Add-Type` hot loop (~1s for ~4M lines instead of minutes). Written to a `.tmp` sibling and swapped with `File.Replace`, so the shard never reads a half-written list, and a total feed outage refuses to overwrite a good list with an empty one. Re-running is idempotent — it exits without downloading anything while the list on disk is younger than `-MinInterval` (default 2h, the anchor feed's own refresh period), so a misconfigured scheduler can't hammer upstream.
## CrowdSec: contribute-first
`IBanReporter` + `BanChannel` fan locally-decided bans out to external systems. `CrowdSecReporter` (UOContent) posts to LAPI `POST /v1/alerts` and retracts via `DELETE /v1/decisions`.
Reporting is **enqueue-only** on the accept path: a bounded, coalescing channel drained off-loop with bounded retry, counted drops on overflow, and a flush on shutdown. Under a DDoS the accept path never does synchronous or lock-contending per-IP work.
### Why not pull decisions from CrowdSec?
The original design streamed decisions into an in-app snapshot and enforced them at the accept gate. That's the wrong layer: by the time the shard sees the connection, the TCP handshake and socket setup are already paid for. `cs-firewall-bouncer` drops the same traffic **at the kernel**, and it's what CrowdSec is built to do. So the shard now contributes what it uniquely knows (rate-limit trips, blocklist hits from real connection attempts) and lets the OS enforce.
The one thing the OS can't do — hold millions of entries on Windows — is exactly what the in-app blocklist covers, and it feeds the same pipeline.
## Threading policy
`CLAUDE.md` rule #3 is rewritten as an explicit three-part policy, with rule #10 restated in tandem:
- Anything touching game state runs **only** on the main loop.
- Heavy work that *needs* game state must be **chunked** across ticks, never threaded.
- Heavy work that does *not* need game state (large-file parse, external I/O) **must** run off-loop **and must yield to world saves**.
Results come back via an immutable snapshot swapped through a single `volatile` reference, or `Core.LoopContext.Post` — never by letting the scheduler decide where heavy work runs. Both new subsystems follow it.
## Shared primitives
`SortedRangeIndex<T> where T : IBinaryInteger<T>` — coalesced disjoint interval arrays plus a binary search. The firewall, the blocklist, and (as of this PR) core's reserved-network tables all use it.
Coalescing is a correctness requirement, not an optimization: multi-feed lists nest CIDRs (`/24` containing a `/32`), and a search that inspects only the rightmost run whose minimum is ≤ the value is sound **only** over disjoint runs. That bug was caught in review and is covered by regression tests.
`IPAddressUtility` collects the allocation-free `IPAddress` ↔ `UInt128` conversions and CIDR parsing that were previously scattered or duplicated.
## Config
| File | Owner | Keys |
|---|---|---|
| `Configuration/bans.json` | core | `reportRateLimitTrips`, `autoBanDuration` |
| `Configuration/blocklist.json` | content | `file`, `reloadInterval`, `reportHits`, `banDuration`, `promoteSuppression` |
| `Configuration/crowdsec.json` | content | `lapiUrl`, `machineId`, `password`, `origin`, `manualBanDuration`, `flushInterval`, `maxQueue` |
| `Configuration/firewall.json` | content | persisted firewall entries (migrated from `firewall.cfg`) |
Everything is inert by default. CrowdSec self-disables without credentials; the blocklist self-disables until its file exists. A shard that changes nothing sees no behavior change.
## Notes for review
- **Core no longer references `Firewall` or `IFirewallEntry` anywhere.** `NetworkUtilities` used to build its reserved-network tables out of `CidrFirewallEntry`, which coupled core to the firewall for something unrelated to banning; those are now a `SortedRangeIndex<UInt128>`, same semantics and public API.
- **`BanChannel.Stop()` no longer persists the firewall** — a contribution coordinator has no business saving an enforcement store. That's the firewall filter's `Stop()`.
- **A dead `whitelisted` parameter was dropped** from the blocklist gate: it was hardcoded `false` at its only call site, and no whitelist concept exists in core.
- **The blocklist filter is an instance, not a static.** The static version forced its tests onto the sequential collection with a reset hook; they now run in parallel.
- `dev-docs/networking-packets.md` documents the seam for content authors, plus a known wart in the `IPAddress` ↔ `UInt128` normalization flagged for a follow-up PR.
- The generator was verified on Linux, macOS and Windows under a temporary CI matrix (since removed). It caught two portability bugs — a Windows-only path separator, and a culture-sensitive duration parse that read `2.5` as `25` on comma-decimal locales and *silently* turned a 2.5h cooldown into 25h — plus a third that made the script unparseable on Windows PowerShell 5.1. The source is ASCII-only for that last reason: `#requires` is only honored once a file parses, so non-ASCII in a BOM-less script produces parse errors instead of the version message.
## Tests
**1344 pass** (782 `Server.Tests`, 562 `UOContent.Tests`). New coverage: filter registry (registration, short-circuit, fault-disable), blocklist parsing/CIDR/coalescing, snapshot reload markers, promote-guard TTL, ban-channel fan-out, CrowdSec alert building/dedup/flush-on-stop, and the generator's output-format contract pinned against the reader.
## Summary
Captures the durable learnings from the message-interpolation work (PRs #2434, #2436, #2437, #2438, #2440) as reference documentation. **Doc-only PR — no code changes.**
The original Phase 2 audit (PR #2435) was development scaffolding and was closed unmerged once Phase 3 consumed it. This PR replaces it with proper reference docs that future authors can consult.
## What's added
### `dev-docs/string-handling.md`
- Promote `RawInterpolatedStringHandler` from a one-line note to a proper section listing all APIs that accept it (messages, OPL, gumps, packets).
- Document the `:L` lowercase format specifier.
- New comprehensive **"Interpolation Anti-Patterns"** section covering 8 patterns with before/after examples — applies to any handler-aware API:
1. Ternary with interpolated branches
2. Switch expression with interpolated arms
3. Pre-built local typed as `string`
4. `.ToString()` (or any string-returning method) inside a hole
5. String concatenation inside a hole
6. `string.Format` feeding a handler-aware API
7. LINQ-built strings inside a hole
8. Pre-built concat var
### `dev-docs/networking-packets.md`
- Add **"Player-Facing Message APIs"** section listing `Mobile` / `Item` / `NetState` message methods with their handler overloads.
- Note the `IBroadcastFilter` pattern for new spatial-broadcast helpers.
### `dev-docs/property-lists.md`, `dev-docs/gump-system.md`
- Cross-reference the new anti-patterns section.
- Add explicit `.ToString()` inside holes warning to property-lists (it had no such guidance before).
### `dev-docs/claude-skills/`
- Mirror the same content (condensed) in `modernuo-string-handling.md`, `modernuo-networking.md`, `modernuo-property-lists.md`, `modernuo-gump-system.md`.
- Add audit rule #17 to `modernuo-code-audit.md` covering all 8 anti-patterns with severity WARNING, plus the `:L` format spec.
### `CLAUDE.md`
- Add audit rule #18 summarizing the interpolation anti-patterns + `:L`, pointing to `dev-docs/string-handling.md` for details.
## Why this matters
Before this PR there was no documentation explaining when an interpolated string call site silently allocates a string despite the receiving API providing a handler overload. The Phase 3 cleanup (PRs #2436/#2437/#2438) discovered ~28 such sites in the codebase; without these docs the same patterns would re-emerge. The new audit rule + CLAUDE.md entry will catch them at write time.
Summary
- Adds CLAUDE.md at repo root with 14 terse code audit rules (always loaded, low token cost)
- Adds pointer files for other AI tools: AGENTS.md (Codex), GEMINI.md, .github/COPILOT-INSTRUCTIONS.md (Copilot), .cursorrules (Cursor) — all redirect to CLAUDE.md as single source of truth
- Gitignores /.claude so personal AI config isn't distributed
- Moves Claude skills to dev-docs/claude-skills/ (opt-in, not auto-loaded)
- Adds 14 dev-docs covering codebase conventions
Code Audit Rules (in CLAUDE.md)
1. LINQ tiered rules (Tier 1 free, Tier 2 warm, Tier 3 forbidden)
2. No Console.WriteLine — use LogFactory.GetLogger()
3. No concurrency primitives in game code
4. No World.Mobiles/World.Items iteration
5. Clean up refs in OnDelete()/OnAfterDelete()
6. Cancel timers in OnDelete()/OnAfterDelete()
7. STArrayPool<T>.Shared not ArrayPool<T>.Shared
8. PooledRefList<T> not new List<T>() on hot paths
9. Serialization: partial class, [Constructible], no serialized TimerExecutionToken
10. No Task.Run/new Thread() in game code
11. Never assume era — ask which expansion
12. _camelCase fields, PascalCase properties/methods
13. No empty gumps — use DisplayTo() pattern
14. PropertyList string literals must be {} holes, cliloc-as-argument uses :#
Kamron Batman