ModernUO/Projects/UOContent/Network/CrowdSec/CrowdSecReporter.cs
Kamron Batman 2dbaa87377
feat: make the blocklist and manual allowlist opt-in; cut the ban subsystem's on-loop cost (#2577)
Two features ran on every shard out of the box, each polling on its own 60s timer for files most shards never generate, neither ever asked for. Fixing that turned into untangling why they shared a config file — and then into the on-loop cost of the three lists behind them.

## Before / after

Measured on the shipped defaults. On-loop numbers are what freezes the world; the tick budget is 8 ms.

| | before | after |
|---|---:|---:|
| Blocklist poll on a shard with no list | every 60s, forever | **none** (opt-in) |
| Manual allowlist poll on a shard with no carve-outs | every 60s, forever | **none** (opt-in) |
| Promote-guard sweep timer | leaked on `Stop()` | stopped, and only started when hits are reported |
| Login allowlist flush, on-loop | O(n) walk + 2 arrays **every 60s**, LOH past ~5,300 entries | reused buffers, **hourly**, zero steady-state allocation |
| Auto-denylist, accept path | 9.1 ns/call | **6.1 ns/call** |
| Auto-denylist, sustained flood at cap (60k rejected) | 26.7 ms | **9.3 ms** |
| Auto-denylist, flood end — **worst single call** | 9.49 ms | **0.05 ms** |
| Auto-denylist cap | 65,536 (stranding 9,895 slots) | **324,449** (exact `HashSet` capacity, ~19 MB) |

The auto-denylist row that matters is the third: the on-loop stall at flood end drops **190×**, because retiring lapsed holds is now the number expiring rather than the number held.

## Why this design

It is built for the shape of attack these shards actually see: **hundreds to a few thousand connections per second**, occasionally tens of thousands, sustained over minutes rather than delivered instantly. Against that shape the cap now covers the whole observed range (50k–250k distinct sources) in memory, and the work of expiring them spreads across the accept calls that were already happening.

There is one case this design is *worse* at than the old one: if every held entry lapses within the same millisecond, retiring them costs ~10.7 ms against the old ~8.9 ms, because the ring's random-access set removals lose to a sequential dictionary scan. Reaching it requires an entire flood to arrive inside one millisecond. **A shard absorbing 324,449 connections in a millisecond is finished at the accept path no matter what this list does** — that is the point where the answer is upstream security and scrubbing (an L4 proxy, edge filtering, a bouncer at the kernel), not a data structure in the game loop. We chose the design that fits the attacks we see and degrades honestly past them, rather than over-engineering for one we do not.

## Blocklist — now opt-in

`BlocklistFilter.Start` only bailed when `_path == null`, which needs `file` to be empty. The default is `"Configuration/ip-blocklist.txt"`, so on any default install both `Task.Run(PollLoop)` and a recurring `SweepGuard` timer started unconditionally, logging *"Blocklist inert: no list at …; polling every 60s"* and then doing exactly that forever.

Adds `"enabled"`, default `false`, using the `_enabled = s.Enabled && <preconditions>` idiom already in `LoginAllowlist` and `AutoDenylist`. **Upgrade is deliberately loud**: a missing key binds to the default, so `LogWhyDisabled()` splits three cases and a shard with a list on disk but no `enabled` key gets a **Warning**, not silence.

## `FileAllowlist` → `ManualAllowlist`, with its own config

Moves to `Configuration/ip-allowlist.json` (`enabled` default `false`, `files`, `reloadInterval`) and into `Network/ManualAllowlist/`, mirroring `Network/LoginAllowlist/`.

It was never a sub-feature of the blocklist. `ManualAllowlist.Contains` has two callers:

| Caller | Could anything else do it? |
|---|---|
| `BlocklistFilter.Evaluate` | **Yes** — the generator already subtracts these files at generation time |
| `BanExemptions.IsExempt` | **No** — sole mechanism for suppressing behavioural ban contributions |

The second reaches `BanChannel.IsExempt` with no blocklist in the path. A shard running **no blocklist** still needs this so the admin's own IP isn't auto-banned by rate-limit detection, so a shared flag couldn't express it — the implication is asymmetric. They still work together via a startup warning when the blocklist is on and the allowlist is not.

On the name: "File" described the storage. The distinction from `LoginAllowlist` is **provenance** — declared by an operator versus earned by authenticating — and "Manual" matches `BanReasons.Manual`. `allowlistFiles` is removed from `BlocklistSettings` outright; blocklists have not shipped long enough for anyone to have set it.

## Login allowlist flush

`Flush()` allocated two arrays sized to the live entry count and copied the whole dictionary into them **on the game loop**, every 60s. `UInt128` is 16 bytes, so past ~5,300 entries that first array was an LOH allocation once a minute, forever. The file write was already off-loop; the walk was not.

Static buffers grown geometrically; the writer owns them until it posts completion back through `Core.LoopContext`, so `_writing`/`_dirty` stay loop state (rule #10). Interval → 1 hour against a 90-day TTL. Clean shutdown writes synchronously via `EventSink.Shutdown`; `HandleClosed` skips `InvokeShutdown` when crashed, so the crash path subscribes separately and only writes when it is actually on the loop thread. Also fixes a pre-existing hole where `_dirty` was cleared *before* the write, so a failed write dropped entries despite the comment promising a retry.

## Auto-denylist: expiry ring

Reclaiming lapsed holds was O(entries held) — every cap-triggered reclaim during a flood walked the whole dictionary to find the few that expired, and `_warnedFull` suppressed the log, not the work.

A hold is **never refreshed** now: the first detection sets the expiry, later ones leave it. That makes insertion order equal to expiry order, so a ring of the same keys is sorted by construction and retiring stops at the first live record. Nothing is lost — the rate limiter runs *ahead* of the connection filters (`NetState.Network.cs`) and reports to the ban channel, so a flooder whose hold lapses is re-held on its next attempt.

Because the ring carries the expiry, the membership side only answers "present?", so it is a `HashSet` — measured at **36 B/slot against the dictionary's 52**. `HashSet` and `Dictionary` share `HashHelpers`, so the from-empty capacity progression is identical (36,353 → 75,431 → 156,437 → 324,449 → 672,827) and the cap still lands on one exactly. The ring is parallel `UInt128[]`/`long[]` rather than an array of structs — `UInt128` forces 16-byte alignment, so a packed pair costs 32 bytes where these cost 24, and the drain reads only the `long[]`.

Rejected after measuring: splitting the drain into a scan loop plus a removal loop (inside noise — both issue N hash removes, and the pointer math was never the bottleneck), and `Dictionary<UInt128,bool>` with tombstoning instead of removal (10% slower *and* unbounded, which breaks the cap).

## Testing

Build clean, 0 warnings. **1,530 tests pass** — 708 UOContent, 822 Server.

Tests were reworked rather than patched: the refresh test inverts to `Repeat_detection_does_not_extend_the_hold`, the obsolete sweep-throttle test is deleted along with the throttle, and four were added for the ring — set/ring parity, release-then-re-hold not being retired by the stale record, exact fill of a non-power-of-two cap, and the moved allowlist config's casing contract. The throttle test added mid-PR was verified to fail without its fix before being deleted.

One commit is comments only (verified: a diff filtered of `//` lines is empty), removing development narration — a `"(Task 2)"` plan reference, `"matching the per-feature JSON config pattern used by X"` across four loaders, a duplicated threading note — and repointing `Firewall` at `dev-docs/ip-bans-and-allowlists.md` instead of a "ban-channel design doc" that does not exist.

Note `Distribution/Configuration/blocklist.json` is gitignored (`.gitignore:14`) and generated from the record defaults on first boot, so the record default *is* the shipped default.
2026-08-13 23:22:35 -07:00

409 lines
15 KiB
C#

/*************************************************************************
* ModernUO *
* Copyright 2019-2026 - ModernUO Development Team *
* Email: hi@modernuo.com *
* File: CrowdSecReporter.cs *
* *
* This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify *
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by *
* the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or *
* (at your option) any later version. *
* *
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License *
* along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>. *
*************************************************************************/
using System;
using System.Collections.Generic;
using System.Globalization;
using System.Net;
using System.Threading;
using System.Threading.Channels;
using System.Threading.Tasks;
using Server.Logging;
namespace Server.Network.Bans.CrowdSec;
/// <summary>
/// Contributes locally-decided bans to CrowdSec via the LAPI alerts API. Non-blocking on the accept
/// path: <see cref="Report"/> enqueues onto a bounded, drop-on-overflow channel drained by a single
/// background task that coalesces by IP and POSTs batched alerts.
/// </summary>
public sealed class CrowdSecReporter : IBanReporter
{
private static readonly ILogger logger = LogFactory.GetLogger(typeof(CrowdSecReporter));
internal readonly record struct ReportItem(IPAddress Ip, TimeSpan Ttl, string Reason, bool Retract);
// Bounded retry for transient LAPI failures during a drain send (network blips, 5xx). Distinct from
// CrowdSecAlertClient.SendWithRetryAsync's single 401-relogin retry, which is an auth concern.
private static readonly TimeSpan[] _retryDelays = [TimeSpan.FromSeconds(1), TimeSpan.FromSeconds(2)];
private ICrowdSecAlertClient _client;
private CrowdSecSettings _settings;
private Channel<ReportItem> _queue;
private CancellationTokenSource _cts;
private Task _drainTask;
private int _dropped;
private int _sendFailures;
public CrowdSecReporter()
{
}
// Test/embedding ctor with an injected client + settings.
internal CrowdSecReporter(ICrowdSecAlertClient client, CrowdSecSettings settings)
{
_client = client;
_settings = settings;
_queue = CreateQueue(settings.MaxQueue);
}
public string Name => "crowdsec";
public bool CanRetract => true;
public int DroppedCount => _dropped;
/// <summary>
/// Batches ultimately dropped after the bounded transient-retry in <see cref="DrainLoop"/> gave up.
/// Distinct from <see cref="DroppedCount"/> (queue-overflow drops on the accept path): this counts
/// sustained LAPI outages so operators can see contribution loss instead of it being silent.
/// </summary>
public int SendFailureCount => _sendFailures;
/// <summary>The drain loop's task, so tests can assert it stays alive until the loop exits.</summary>
internal Task DrainTaskForTesting => _drainTask;
public static void Configure()
{
BanChannel.Register(new CrowdSecReporter());
}
public void Register()
{
CrowdSecConfiguration.Load();
_settings ??= CrowdSecConfiguration.Settings;
}
public void Start(CancellationToken token)
{
if (!_settings.ReportingEnabled)
{
logger.Information("CrowdSec reporter disabled (machineId/password empty in crowdsec.json)");
return;
}
_client ??= new CrowdSecAlertClient(_settings);
_queue ??= CreateQueue(_settings.MaxQueue);
_cts = CancellationTokenSource.CreateLinkedTokenSource(token);
_drainTask = Task.Run(() => DrainLoop(_cts.Token), _cts.Token);
}
public void Stop()
{
_cts?.Cancel();
// The flush below reads a SingleReader channel, so wait for the drain to actually exit first.
var drainExited = true;
try
{
// Wait(timeout) is false only on timeout; a throw means faulted/cancelled, which is still exited.
drainExited = _drainTask == null || _drainTask.Wait(TimeSpan.FromSeconds(2));
}
catch
{
// Ignored: a faulted wait means the drain has completed and released the channel.
}
_cts?.Dispose();
_cts = null;
if (drainExited)
{
FlushRemainingOnStop();
}
_client?.Dispose();
_drainTask = null;
}
/// <summary>
/// Best-effort bounded flush of whatever is still queued at shutdown. Blocking is correct here — the
/// loop has stopped ticking — but must not happen on the loop thread: <see cref="Stop"/> runs where
/// <c>SynchronizationContext.Current</c> is the <c>EventLoopContext</c>, and a captured continuation
/// would be posted to a queue nothing pumps any more. <see cref="Task.Run(Func{Task})"/> keeps the
/// chain on the pool; the bounded wait caps a wedged send at a few seconds of shutdown.
/// </summary>
private void FlushRemainingOnStop()
{
if (_queue == null || _client == null)
{
return;
}
_queue.Writer.TryComplete();
List<ReportItem> reports = [];
List<ReportItem> retracts = [];
while (_queue.Reader.TryRead(out var item))
{
(item.Retract ? retracts : reports).Add(item);
}
if (reports.Count == 0 && retracts.Count == 0)
{
return;
}
try
{
if (!Task.Run(() => FlushRemainingOnStopAsync(reports, retracts)).Wait(TimeSpan.FromSeconds(4)))
{
logger.Warning(
"CrowdSec flush-on-stop timed out; {Count} item(s) not contributed",
reports.Count + retracts.Count
);
}
}
catch (Exception e)
{
logger.Warning(e, "CrowdSec flush-on-stop failed");
}
}
/// <summary>
/// Uses a fresh token, not the drain loop's already-cancelled one, which would fail every send
/// immediately. Reports go as one deduped batch; retracts go as individual DELETEs so an admin's
/// unban propagates on a clean shutdown. Leftovers self-heal via
/// <see cref="CrowdSecSettings.ManualBanDuration"/>.
/// </summary>
private async Task FlushRemainingOnStopAsync(List<ReportItem> reports, List<ReportItem> retracts)
{
using var flushCts = new CancellationTokenSource(TimeSpan.FromSeconds(3));
if (reports.Count > 0)
{
var alerts = BuildAlerts(reports, _settings, DateTime.UtcNow);
try
{
await _client.PostAlertsAsync(alerts, flushCts.Token).ConfigureAwait(false);
}
catch (Exception e)
{
logger.Warning(e, "CrowdSec flush-on-stop reports failed");
RecordSendFailure(alerts.Count);
}
}
HashSet<string> seen = [];
for (var i = 0; i < retracts.Count; i++)
{
if (flushCts.IsCancellationRequested)
{
break; // out of budget; the rest self-heal via ManualBanDuration
}
var ip = retracts[i].Ip;
if (!seen.Add(ip.ToString()))
{
continue;
}
try
{
await _client.DeleteDecisionsAsync(_settings.Origin, ip, flushCts.Token).ConfigureAwait(false);
}
catch (Exception e)
{
logger.Warning(e, "CrowdSec flush-on-stop retract failed for {Address}", ip);
RecordSendFailure(1);
}
}
}
public void Report(IPAddress address, TimeSpan ttl, string reason) =>
Enqueue(new ReportItem(address, ttl, reason, false));
public void Retract(IPAddress address) =>
Enqueue(new ReportItem(address, TimeSpan.Zero, "retract", true));
private void Enqueue(ReportItem item)
{
if (_queue == null || !_queue.Writer.TryWrite(item))
{
Interlocked.Increment(ref _dropped);
}
}
// FullMode.Wait (the default) makes TryWrite return false immediately when the channel is full
// instead of blocking the caller — exactly the non-blocking drop-on-overflow behavior the accept
// path requires. DropWrite would silently discard the new item and always report success, which
// would make overflow undetectable.
private static Channel<ReportItem> CreateQueue(int capacity) =>
Channel.CreateBounded<ReportItem>(new BoundedChannelOptions(Math.Max(1, capacity))
{
FullMode = BoundedChannelFullMode.Wait,
SingleReader = true
});
// Must return Task: Start() passes this to Task.Run, which has no Func<ValueTask> overload, so a
// ValueTask would bind to Task.Run<TResult> and yield a Task<ValueTask> that completes at the first
// await rather than when the loop exits.
private async Task DrainLoop(CancellationToken token)
{
var reader = _queue.Reader;
while (!token.IsCancellationRequested)
{
try
{
if (!await reader.WaitToReadAsync(token).ConfigureAwait(false))
{
return;
}
// Coalesce a burst before flushing.
await Task.Delay(_settings.FlushInterval, token).ConfigureAwait(false);
List<ReportItem> reports = [];
List<ReportItem> retracts = [];
while (reader.TryRead(out var item))
{
(item.Retract ? retracts : reports).Add(item);
}
if (reports.Count > 0)
{
var alerts = BuildAlerts(reports, _settings, DateTime.UtcNow);
if (!await SendWithBoundedRetryAsync(() => _client.PostAlertsAsync(alerts, token), token)
.ConfigureAwait(false))
{
RecordSendFailure(alerts.Count);
}
}
for (var i = 0; i < retracts.Count; i++)
{
var ip = retracts[i].Ip;
if (!await SendWithBoundedRetryAsync(() => _client.DeleteDecisionsAsync(_settings.Origin, ip, token), token)
.ConfigureAwait(false))
{
RecordSendFailure(1);
}
}
}
catch (OperationCanceledException)
{
return;
}
catch (Exception e)
{
// Contribution is auxiliary: log and keep draining. Never crash the shard.
logger.Warning(e, "CrowdSec contribution flush failed; dropped this batch");
}
}
}
/// <summary>
/// Up to 3 attempts (1 initial + 2 retries) backing off 1s then 2s, for transient LAPI failures
/// (network blips, 5xx). Backoff uses <see cref="Task.Delay"/> so it never blocks the thread, and a
/// cancellation during it propagates so the drain loop exits cleanly. Returns false rather than
/// throwing once attempts are exhausted, so the caller counts the drop and keeps draining.
/// </summary>
private static async ValueTask<bool> SendWithBoundedRetryAsync(Func<ValueTask> send, CancellationToken token)
{
for (var attempt = 0; ; attempt++)
{
try
{
await send().ConfigureAwait(false);
return true;
}
catch (OperationCanceledException)
{
throw;
}
catch (Exception e)
{
if (attempt >= _retryDelays.Length)
{
logger.Warning(e, "CrowdSec send failed after {Attempts} attempt(s); giving up", attempt + 1);
return false;
}
var delay = _retryDelays[attempt];
logger.Warning(e, "CrowdSec send failed (attempt {Attempt}); retrying in {Delay}", attempt + 1, delay);
await Task.Delay(delay, token).ConfigureAwait(false);
}
}
}
private void RecordSendFailure(int itemCount)
{
var total = Interlocked.Increment(ref _sendFailures);
logger.Warning(
"CrowdSec contribution batch dropped after retries ({Items} item(s)); total dropped batches: {Total}",
itemCount,
total
);
}
/// <summary>Coalesces items by IP (last write wins) and builds one alert per unique address.</summary>
internal static List<CrowdSecAlert> BuildAlerts(IEnumerable<ReportItem> items, CrowdSecSettings settings, DateTime nowUtc)
{
Dictionary<string, ReportItem> byIp = [];
foreach (var item in items)
{
byIp[item.Ip.ToString()] = item;
}
var timestamp = FormatTimestamp(nowUtc);
var alerts = new List<CrowdSecAlert>(byIp.Count);
foreach (var (value, item) in byIp)
{
var ttl = item.Reason == BanReasons.Manual || item.Ttl <= TimeSpan.Zero ? settings.ManualBanDuration : item.Ttl;
var scenario = $"{settings.Origin}/{item.Reason}";
alerts.Add(new CrowdSecAlert
{
Scenario = scenario,
Message = $"ModernUO {item.Reason} ban for {value}",
StartAt = timestamp,
StopAt = timestamp,
Source = new CrowdSecSource { Scope = "Ip", Value = value },
Decisions =
[
new CrowdSecDecisionDto
{
Origin = settings.Origin,
Type = "ban",
Scope = "Ip",
Value = value,
Duration = FormatDuration(ttl),
Scenario = scenario
}
]
});
}
return alerts;
}
/// <summary>
/// ISO8601/RFC3339 UTC timestamp for <c>start_at</c>/<c>stop_at</c>. LAPI parses these with Go's
/// <c>time.RFC3339</c> and answers 500 when the parse fails, so the format must be culture-independent:
/// ':' is the *time separator* specifier in a custom .NET format string, and a shard running under a
/// culture like fi-FI would otherwise emit "T12.34.56.789Z". InvariantCulture also pins the Gregorian
/// calendar, which non-Gregorian cultures (th-TH, ar-SA) would otherwise shift the year for.
/// </summary>
internal static string FormatTimestamp(DateTime time) =>
(time.Kind == DateTimeKind.Utc ? time : time.ToUniversalTime())
.ToString("yyyy-MM-ddTHH:mm:ss.fffZ", CultureInfo.InvariantCulture);
/// <summary>CrowdSec accepts Go durations; whole seconds are unambiguous and sufficient.</summary>
internal static string FormatDuration(TimeSpan ttl)
{
var seconds = (long)ttl.TotalSeconds;
return $"{Math.Max(1, seconds)}s";
}
}