ModernUO/Projects/UOContent.Tests/Tests/Network/AutoDenylist/AutoDenylistTests.cs
Kamron Batman 2dbaa87377
feat: make the blocklist and manual allowlist opt-in; cut the ban subsystem's on-loop cost (#2577)
Two features ran on every shard out of the box, each polling on its own 60s timer for files most shards never generate, neither ever asked for. Fixing that turned into untangling why they shared a config file — and then into the on-loop cost of the three lists behind them.

## Before / after

Measured on the shipped defaults. On-loop numbers are what freezes the world; the tick budget is 8 ms.

| | before | after |
|---|---:|---:|
| Blocklist poll on a shard with no list | every 60s, forever | **none** (opt-in) |
| Manual allowlist poll on a shard with no carve-outs | every 60s, forever | **none** (opt-in) |
| Promote-guard sweep timer | leaked on `Stop()` | stopped, and only started when hits are reported |
| Login allowlist flush, on-loop | O(n) walk + 2 arrays **every 60s**, LOH past ~5,300 entries | reused buffers, **hourly**, zero steady-state allocation |
| Auto-denylist, accept path | 9.1 ns/call | **6.1 ns/call** |
| Auto-denylist, sustained flood at cap (60k rejected) | 26.7 ms | **9.3 ms** |
| Auto-denylist, flood end — **worst single call** | 9.49 ms | **0.05 ms** |
| Auto-denylist cap | 65,536 (stranding 9,895 slots) | **324,449** (exact `HashSet` capacity, ~19 MB) |

The auto-denylist row that matters is the third: the on-loop stall at flood end drops **190×**, because retiring lapsed holds is now the number expiring rather than the number held.

## Why this design

It is built for the shape of attack these shards actually see: **hundreds to a few thousand connections per second**, occasionally tens of thousands, sustained over minutes rather than delivered instantly. Against that shape the cap now covers the whole observed range (50k–250k distinct sources) in memory, and the work of expiring them spreads across the accept calls that were already happening.

There is one case this design is *worse* at than the old one: if every held entry lapses within the same millisecond, retiring them costs ~10.7 ms against the old ~8.9 ms, because the ring's random-access set removals lose to a sequential dictionary scan. Reaching it requires an entire flood to arrive inside one millisecond. **A shard absorbing 324,449 connections in a millisecond is finished at the accept path no matter what this list does** — that is the point where the answer is upstream security and scrubbing (an L4 proxy, edge filtering, a bouncer at the kernel), not a data structure in the game loop. We chose the design that fits the attacks we see and degrades honestly past them, rather than over-engineering for one we do not.

## Blocklist — now opt-in

`BlocklistFilter.Start` only bailed when `_path == null`, which needs `file` to be empty. The default is `"Configuration/ip-blocklist.txt"`, so on any default install both `Task.Run(PollLoop)` and a recurring `SweepGuard` timer started unconditionally, logging *"Blocklist inert: no list at …; polling every 60s"* and then doing exactly that forever.

Adds `"enabled"`, default `false`, using the `_enabled = s.Enabled && <preconditions>` idiom already in `LoginAllowlist` and `AutoDenylist`. **Upgrade is deliberately loud**: a missing key binds to the default, so `LogWhyDisabled()` splits three cases and a shard with a list on disk but no `enabled` key gets a **Warning**, not silence.

## `FileAllowlist` → `ManualAllowlist`, with its own config

Moves to `Configuration/ip-allowlist.json` (`enabled` default `false`, `files`, `reloadInterval`) and into `Network/ManualAllowlist/`, mirroring `Network/LoginAllowlist/`.

It was never a sub-feature of the blocklist. `ManualAllowlist.Contains` has two callers:

| Caller | Could anything else do it? |
|---|---|
| `BlocklistFilter.Evaluate` | **Yes** — the generator already subtracts these files at generation time |
| `BanExemptions.IsExempt` | **No** — sole mechanism for suppressing behavioural ban contributions |

The second reaches `BanChannel.IsExempt` with no blocklist in the path. A shard running **no blocklist** still needs this so the admin's own IP isn't auto-banned by rate-limit detection, so a shared flag couldn't express it — the implication is asymmetric. They still work together via a startup warning when the blocklist is on and the allowlist is not.

On the name: "File" described the storage. The distinction from `LoginAllowlist` is **provenance** — declared by an operator versus earned by authenticating — and "Manual" matches `BanReasons.Manual`. `allowlistFiles` is removed from `BlocklistSettings` outright; blocklists have not shipped long enough for anyone to have set it.

## Login allowlist flush

`Flush()` allocated two arrays sized to the live entry count and copied the whole dictionary into them **on the game loop**, every 60s. `UInt128` is 16 bytes, so past ~5,300 entries that first array was an LOH allocation once a minute, forever. The file write was already off-loop; the walk was not.

Static buffers grown geometrically; the writer owns them until it posts completion back through `Core.LoopContext`, so `_writing`/`_dirty` stay loop state (rule #10). Interval → 1 hour against a 90-day TTL. Clean shutdown writes synchronously via `EventSink.Shutdown`; `HandleClosed` skips `InvokeShutdown` when crashed, so the crash path subscribes separately and only writes when it is actually on the loop thread. Also fixes a pre-existing hole where `_dirty` was cleared *before* the write, so a failed write dropped entries despite the comment promising a retry.

## Auto-denylist: expiry ring

Reclaiming lapsed holds was O(entries held) — every cap-triggered reclaim during a flood walked the whole dictionary to find the few that expired, and `_warnedFull` suppressed the log, not the work.

A hold is **never refreshed** now: the first detection sets the expiry, later ones leave it. That makes insertion order equal to expiry order, so a ring of the same keys is sorted by construction and retiring stops at the first live record. Nothing is lost — the rate limiter runs *ahead* of the connection filters (`NetState.Network.cs`) and reports to the ban channel, so a flooder whose hold lapses is re-held on its next attempt.

Because the ring carries the expiry, the membership side only answers "present?", so it is a `HashSet` — measured at **36 B/slot against the dictionary's 52**. `HashSet` and `Dictionary` share `HashHelpers`, so the from-empty capacity progression is identical (36,353 → 75,431 → 156,437 → 324,449 → 672,827) and the cap still lands on one exactly. The ring is parallel `UInt128[]`/`long[]` rather than an array of structs — `UInt128` forces 16-byte alignment, so a packed pair costs 32 bytes where these cost 24, and the drain reads only the `long[]`.

Rejected after measuring: splitting the drain into a scan loop plus a removal loop (inside noise — both issue N hash removes, and the pointer math was never the bottleneck), and `Dictionary<UInt128,bool>` with tombstoning instead of removal (10% slower *and* unbounded, which breaks the cap).

## Testing

Build clean, 0 warnings. **1,530 tests pass** — 708 UOContent, 822 Server.

Tests were reworked rather than patched: the refresh test inverts to `Repeat_detection_does_not_extend_the_hold`, the obsolete sweep-throttle test is deleted along with the throttle, and four were added for the ring — set/ring parity, release-then-re-hold not being retired by the stale record, exact fill of a non-power-of-two cap, and the moved allowlist config's casing contract. The throttle test added mid-PR was verified to fail without its fix before being deleted.

One commit is comments only (verified: a diff filtered of `//` lines is empty), removing development narration — a `"(Task 2)"` plan reference, `"matching the per-feature JSON config pattern used by X"` across four loaders, a duplicated threading note — and repointing `Firewall` at `dev-docs/ip-bans-and-allowlists.md` instead of a "ban-channel design doc" that does not exist.

Note `Distribution/Configuration/blocklist.json` is gitignored (`.gitignore:14`) and generated from the record defaults on first boot, so the record default *is* the shipped default.
2026-08-13 23:22:35 -07:00

206 lines
7.8 KiB
C#

/*************************************************************************
* ModernUO *
* Copyright 2019-2026 - ModernUO Development Team *
* Email: hi@modernuo.com *
* File: AutoDenylistTests.cs *
* *
* This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify *
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by *
* the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or *
* (at your option) any later version. *
* *
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License *
* along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>. *
*************************************************************************/
using System.Net;
using Server.Network;
using Server.Network.Bans;
using Xunit;
namespace Server.Tests.Network.AutoDenylists;
// Static store, so every test resets it first and none may run alongside another.
// Addresses come from TEST-NET-2 (198.51.100.0/24).
[Collection("Sequential UOContent Tests")]
public class AutoDenylistTests
{
private const long DurationMs = 900_000; // 15 minutes, the shipped default
private const long Now = 1_000_000;
private static void Reset(bool enabled = true, int maxEntries = 1024) =>
AutoDenylist.LoadForTesting(enabled, DurationMs, maxEntries);
[Fact]
public void Behavioral_detection_is_held_then_lapses()
{
Reset();
var ip = IPAddress.Parse("198.51.100.10");
Assert.True(AutoDenylist.Hold(ip, BanReasons.InvalidSeed, Now));
Assert.True(AutoDenylist.IsDenied(ip, Now));
Assert.True(AutoDenylist.IsDenied(ip, Now + DurationMs - 1));
// Expiry is decided on read, so the hold lapses without waiting for a sweep.
Assert.False(AutoDenylist.IsDenied(ip, Now + DurationMs));
}
[Fact]
public void Manual_and_list_verdicts_are_not_held()
{
Reset();
var manual = IPAddress.Parse("198.51.100.11");
var listed = IPAddress.Parse("198.51.100.12");
// A manual ban belongs in the firewall; a blocklist match is enforced by the blocklist's own filter.
Assert.False(AutoDenylist.Hold(manual, BanReasons.Manual, Now));
Assert.False(AutoDenylist.Hold(listed, BanReasons.Blocklist, Now));
Assert.False(AutoDenylist.IsDenied(manual, Now));
Assert.False(AutoDenylist.IsDenied(listed, Now));
Assert.Equal(0, AutoDenylist.Count);
}
// Not refreshed on purpose: it is what keeps insertion order equal to expiry order, so retiring lapsed
// entries costs the number expiring instead of the number held. A flooder whose hold lapses trips the
// rate limiter on its next attempt -- which runs ahead of the connection filters -- and is held again.
[Fact]
public void Repeat_detection_does_not_extend_the_hold()
{
Reset();
var ip = IPAddress.Parse("198.51.100.13");
AutoDenylist.Hold(ip, BanReasons.SilentConnect, Now);
AutoDenylist.Hold(ip, BanReasons.SilentConnect, Now + DurationMs - 1);
Assert.Equal(1, AutoDenylist.Count); // no duplicate
Assert.True(AutoDenylist.IsDenied(ip, Now + DurationMs - 1));
Assert.False(AutoDenylist.IsDenied(ip, Now + DurationMs + 1)); // lapses from the FIRST detection
}
// The ring carries the expiry and the set carries membership; if they ever disagree, an address is
// either denied forever or retired early.
[Fact]
public void Ring_and_set_stay_in_step()
{
Reset(maxEntries: 4);
for (var i = 0; i < 8; i++)
{
AutoDenylist.Hold(IPAddress.Parse($"198.51.100.{70 + i}"), BanReasons.InvalidSeed, Now);
}
Assert.Equal(4, AutoDenylist.Count);
Assert.Equal(AutoDenylist.Count, AutoDenylist.RingCount);
AutoDenylist.Release(IPAddress.Parse("198.51.100.71"));
Assert.Equal(3, AutoDenylist.Count);
Assert.Equal(AutoDenylist.Count, AutoDenylist.RingCount);
AutoDenylist.Drain(Now + DurationMs + 1);
Assert.Equal(0, AutoDenylist.Count);
Assert.Equal(0, AutoDenylist.RingCount);
}
// The ring grows in doublings but is capped at maxEntries, which is not a power of two. Filling exactly
// to it must land on the last slot rather than off the end.
[Fact]
public void Ring_fills_exactly_to_a_non_power_of_two_cap()
{
Reset(maxEntries: 100);
for (var i = 0; i < 120; i++)
{
AutoDenylist.Hold(IPAddress.Parse($"198.51.100.{i}"), BanReasons.InvalidSeed, Now);
}
Assert.Equal(100, AutoDenylist.Count);
Assert.Equal(100, AutoDenylist.RingCount);
// And the whole ring still drains, so no slot was stranded by a wrapped write.
AutoDenylist.Drain(Now + DurationMs + 1);
Assert.Equal(0, AutoDenylist.Count);
Assert.Equal(0, AutoDenylist.RingCount);
}
// Releasing leaves no ring record behind, so a re-detection is not retired by the old one.
[Fact]
public void Release_then_re_hold_is_not_retired_by_the_stale_record()
{
Reset();
var ip = IPAddress.Parse("198.51.100.15");
AutoDenylist.Hold(ip, BanReasons.RateLimit, Now);
AutoDenylist.Release(ip);
var later = Now + DurationMs - 1;
AutoDenylist.Hold(ip, BanReasons.RateLimit, later);
// The first hold's expiry has passed; the second must survive it.
Assert.True(AutoDenylist.IsDenied(ip, Now + DurationMs + 1));
Assert.Equal(1, AutoDenylist.RingCount);
}
[Fact]
public void Release_drops_the_hold_immediately()
{
Reset();
var ip = IPAddress.Parse("198.51.100.14");
AutoDenylist.Hold(ip, BanReasons.RateLimit, Now);
AutoDenylist.Release(ip);
Assert.False(AutoDenylist.IsDenied(ip, Now));
}
[Fact]
public void Cap_is_enforced_so_a_distinct_source_flood_cannot_grow_it()
{
Reset(maxEntries: 4);
for (var i = 0; i < 10; i++)
{
AutoDenylist.Hold(IPAddress.Parse($"198.51.100.{100 + i}"), BanReasons.InvalidSeed, Now);
}
Assert.Equal(4, AutoDenylist.Count);
// The first four are still held; the rest were disconnected by their gate but not tracked.
Assert.True(AutoDenylist.IsDenied(IPAddress.Parse("198.51.100.100"), Now));
Assert.False(AutoDenylist.IsDenied(IPAddress.Parse("198.51.100.109"), Now));
}
[Fact]
public void Reaching_the_cap_reclaims_lapsed_entries_first()
{
Reset(maxEntries: 2);
AutoDenylist.Hold(IPAddress.Parse("198.51.100.20"), BanReasons.InvalidSeed, Now);
AutoDenylist.Hold(IPAddress.Parse("198.51.100.21"), BanReasons.InvalidSeed, Now);
// Once those two have lapsed, a new detection sweeps them out rather than being refused.
var later = Now + DurationMs + 1;
Assert.True(AutoDenylist.Hold(IPAddress.Parse("198.51.100.22"), BanReasons.InvalidSeed, later));
Assert.True(AutoDenylist.IsDenied(IPAddress.Parse("198.51.100.22"), later));
}
[Fact]
public void Disabled_store_denies_nobody()
{
Reset(enabled: false);
var ip = IPAddress.Parse("198.51.100.30");
Assert.False(AutoDenylist.Hold(ip, BanReasons.InvalidSeed, Now));
Assert.False(AutoDenylist.IsDenied(ip, Now));
}
[Fact]
public void Null_address_is_handled()
{
Reset();
Assert.False(AutoDenylist.Hold(null, BanReasons.InvalidSeed, Now));
Assert.False(AutoDenylist.IsDenied(null, Now));
}
}