## Problem
Contributing a ban to CrowdSec failed against a real LAPI — `POST /v1/alerts` answered **500**, and depending on the shard's locale, auth answered **401**. Three independent defects, each sufficient on its own.
## Fixes
**`scenario_hash` / `scenario_version` were never serialized.** LAPI dereferences both unconditionally when persisting an alert, so omitting them is a nil deref and a 500 rather than a validation error. Both are now emitted with the values a watcher without a hub scenario is expected to send (`""` and `"1.0"`).
**`start_at`/`stop_at` were formatted without an `IFormatProvider`.** `:` is the time separator *specifier* in a custom .NET format string, not a literal — a shard running under a culture like `fi-FI` emitted `T15.04.05.123Z`, which Go's `time.RFC3339` rejects, producing another 500. Non-Gregorian cultures (`th-TH`, `ar-SA`) would also shift the year. Formatting is now pinned to `InvariantCulture` in `FormatTimestamp`, which additionally converts non-UTC input — the trailing `Z` is a literal and was previously an unchecked claim.
**The `User-Agent` was a plain product string.** LAPI's default watcher profile matches the `crowdsec/` prefix and answers 401 without it, so the header is a protocol constraint, not cosmetic. It is now an `internal const` carrying that reason.
Also fixed, same root cause as the timestamp bug: the login-expiry parse used a bare `DateTime.TryParse` on LAPI's RFC3339 `expire`. Under a mismatched culture that silently fails and falls back to a fabricated `UtcNow + 1h`, pushing re-auth past the real expiry and costing a 401-relogin round trip on every send.
`capacity` now defaults to `1` instead of `0`, matching the one-decision-per-alert shape actually being sent.
## Note on scope
The two 500 causes are independent. On an `en-US` shard only the missing scenario fields were biting; the date bug was latent and would have surfaced as an unexplained regression the first time someone ran a shard under a European locale.
## Verification
The emitted payload is field-for-field identical to a hand-verified request that a live LAPI accepts:
```json
[
{
"scenario": "modernuo/rate-limit",
"scenario_hash": "",
"scenario_version": "1.0",
"message": "ModernUO rate-limit ban for 192.0.2.123",
"events_count": 1,
"start_at": "2026-07-27T15:04:05.123Z",
"stop_at": "2026-07-27T15:04:05.123Z",
"capacity": 1,
"leakspeed": "0s",
"simulated": false,
"events": [],
"remediation": true,
"source": { "scope": "Ip", "value": "192.0.2.123" },
"decisions": [
{
"origin": "modernuo",
"type": "ban",
"scope": "Ip",
"value": "192.0.2.123",
"duration": "300s",
"scenario": "modernuo/rate-limit"
}
]
}
]
```
Regression tests assert the required scenario fields on the **serialized JSON** rather than the DTO — the DTO is not what goes on the wire — and cover the timestamp as a `[Theory]` across `fi-FI`/`th-TH`/`ar-SA`.
`dotnet test --filter "FullyQualifiedName~CrowdSec"` → **21/21 passed**, build clean with 0 warnings.
152 lines
6.3 KiB
C#
152 lines
6.3 KiB
C#
/*************************************************************************
|
|
* ModernUO *
|
|
* Copyright 2019-2026 - ModernUO Development Team *
|
|
* Email: hi@modernuo.com *
|
|
* File: CrowdSecAlertClient.cs *
|
|
* *
|
|
* This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify *
|
|
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by *
|
|
* the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or *
|
|
* (at your option) any later version. *
|
|
* *
|
|
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License *
|
|
* along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>. *
|
|
*************************************************************************/
|
|
|
|
using System;
|
|
using System.Collections.Generic;
|
|
using System.Globalization;
|
|
using System.Net;
|
|
using System.Net.Http;
|
|
using System.Net.Http.Headers;
|
|
using System.Net.Http.Json;
|
|
using System.Text.Json;
|
|
using System.Threading;
|
|
using System.Threading.Tasks;
|
|
|
|
namespace Server.Network.Bans.CrowdSec;
|
|
|
|
/// <summary>Reporter-side LAPI operations, mockable for tests.</summary>
|
|
public interface ICrowdSecAlertClient : IDisposable
|
|
{
|
|
ValueTask PostAlertsAsync(IReadOnlyList<CrowdSecAlert> alerts, CancellationToken token);
|
|
ValueTask DeleteDecisionsAsync(string origin, IPAddress ip, CancellationToken token);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/// <summary>
|
|
/// CrowdSec LAPI watcher client: authenticates with machine credentials and posts/deletes decisions.
|
|
/// Holds a JWT refreshed on expiry or a 401.
|
|
/// </summary>
|
|
public sealed class CrowdSecAlertClient : ICrowdSecAlertClient
|
|
{
|
|
private static readonly JsonSerializerOptions _jsonOptions = new() { PropertyNameCaseInsensitive = true };
|
|
|
|
/// <summary>
|
|
/// The <c>crowdsec/</c> prefix is load-bearing: LAPI's default watcher profile matches on it and
|
|
/// answers 401 for anything else, so this cannot be a plain product string.
|
|
/// </summary>
|
|
internal const string UserAgent = "crowdsec/ModernUO-watcher-1.0";
|
|
|
|
private readonly HttpClient _http;
|
|
private readonly string _machineId;
|
|
private readonly string _password;
|
|
|
|
private string _token;
|
|
private DateTime _tokenExpiresUtc = DateTime.MinValue;
|
|
|
|
public CrowdSecAlertClient(CrowdSecSettings settings)
|
|
{
|
|
var baseUri = new Uri(settings.LapiUrl, UriKind.Absolute); // fails loud on malformed url
|
|
_http = new HttpClient { BaseAddress = baseUri, Timeout = TimeSpan.FromSeconds(30) };
|
|
_http.DefaultRequestHeaders.Add("User-Agent", UserAgent);
|
|
_machineId = settings.MachineId;
|
|
_password = settings.Password;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
private async Task EnsureAuthAsync(CancellationToken token)
|
|
{
|
|
if (_token != null && DateTime.UtcNow < _tokenExpiresUtc - TimeSpan.FromMinutes(1))
|
|
{
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
var request = new CrowdSecLoginRequest { MachineId = _machineId, Password = _password };
|
|
using var response = await _http.PostAsJsonAsync("/v1/watchers/login", request, _jsonOptions, token)
|
|
.ConfigureAwait(false);
|
|
response.EnsureSuccessStatusCode();
|
|
|
|
var login = await response.Content.ReadFromJsonAsync<CrowdSecLoginResponse>(_jsonOptions, token)
|
|
.ConfigureAwait(false);
|
|
_token = login?.Token ?? throw new InvalidOperationException("CrowdSec login returned no token.");
|
|
|
|
// LAPI returns an RFC3339 expiry. Parse it invariantly for the same reason we format invariantly:
|
|
// the current culture must not decide whether a machine-readable timestamp is understood.
|
|
_tokenExpiresUtc = DateTime.TryParse(
|
|
login.Expire,
|
|
CultureInfo.InvariantCulture,
|
|
DateTimeStyles.AdjustToUniversal,
|
|
out var exp
|
|
) ? exp : DateTime.UtcNow.AddHours(1);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
private void Authorize(HttpRequestMessage message) =>
|
|
message.Headers.Authorization = new AuthenticationHeaderValue("Bearer", _token);
|
|
|
|
public async ValueTask PostAlertsAsync(IReadOnlyList<CrowdSecAlert> alerts, CancellationToken token)
|
|
{
|
|
if (alerts.Count == 0)
|
|
{
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
await SendWithRetryAsync(() =>
|
|
{
|
|
var message = new HttpRequestMessage(HttpMethod.Post, "/v1/alerts")
|
|
{
|
|
Content = JsonContent.Create(alerts, options: _jsonOptions)
|
|
};
|
|
Authorize(message);
|
|
return message;
|
|
}, token).ConfigureAwait(false);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
public async ValueTask DeleteDecisionsAsync(string origin, IPAddress ip, CancellationToken token)
|
|
{
|
|
var query = BuildDeleteQuery(origin, ip);
|
|
await SendWithRetryAsync(() =>
|
|
{
|
|
var message = new HttpRequestMessage(HttpMethod.Delete, query);
|
|
Authorize(message);
|
|
return message;
|
|
}, token).ConfigureAwait(false);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/// <summary>
|
|
/// Builds the decisions-delete query string. <paramref name="origin"/> is operator-controlled config
|
|
/// (crowdsec.json), so it must be escaped like any other untrusted value going into a URL.
|
|
/// </summary>
|
|
internal static string BuildDeleteQuery(string origin, IPAddress ip) =>
|
|
$"/v1/decisions?origin={Uri.EscapeDataString(origin)}&ip={Uri.EscapeDataString(ip.ToString())}";
|
|
|
|
private async ValueTask SendWithRetryAsync(Func<HttpRequestMessage> build, CancellationToken token)
|
|
{
|
|
await EnsureAuthAsync(token).ConfigureAwait(false);
|
|
|
|
using var first = build();
|
|
using var response = await _http.SendAsync(first, token).ConfigureAwait(false);
|
|
if (response.StatusCode != HttpStatusCode.Unauthorized)
|
|
{
|
|
response.EnsureSuccessStatusCode();
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Token rejected mid-flight: force a re-login and retry once.
|
|
_token = null;
|
|
await EnsureAuthAsync(token).ConfigureAwait(false);
|
|
using var retry = build();
|
|
using var retryResponse = await _http.SendAsync(retry, token).ConfigureAwait(false);
|
|
retryResponse.EnsureSuccessStatusCode();
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
public void Dispose() => _http.Dispose();
|
|
}
|