ModernUO/Projects/UOContent/Misc/CrowdSec/CrowdSecAlertClient.cs
Kamron Batman 967ddf48fa
fix(crowdsec): send a payload LAPI accepts (500 on alerts, 401 on auth) (#2553)
## Problem

Contributing a ban to CrowdSec failed against a real LAPI — `POST /v1/alerts` answered **500**, and depending on the shard's locale, auth answered **401**. Three independent defects, each sufficient on its own.

## Fixes

**`scenario_hash` / `scenario_version` were never serialized.** LAPI dereferences both unconditionally when persisting an alert, so omitting them is a nil deref and a 500 rather than a validation error. Both are now emitted with the values a watcher without a hub scenario is expected to send (`""` and `"1.0"`).

**`start_at`/`stop_at` were formatted without an `IFormatProvider`.** `:` is the time separator *specifier* in a custom .NET format string, not a literal — a shard running under a culture like `fi-FI` emitted `T15.04.05.123Z`, which Go's `time.RFC3339` rejects, producing another 500. Non-Gregorian cultures (`th-TH`, `ar-SA`) would also shift the year. Formatting is now pinned to `InvariantCulture` in `FormatTimestamp`, which additionally converts non-UTC input — the trailing `Z` is a literal and was previously an unchecked claim.

**The `User-Agent` was a plain product string.** LAPI's default watcher profile matches the `crowdsec/` prefix and answers 401 without it, so the header is a protocol constraint, not cosmetic. It is now an `internal const` carrying that reason.

Also fixed, same root cause as the timestamp bug: the login-expiry parse used a bare `DateTime.TryParse` on LAPI's RFC3339 `expire`. Under a mismatched culture that silently fails and falls back to a fabricated `UtcNow + 1h`, pushing re-auth past the real expiry and costing a 401-relogin round trip on every send.

`capacity` now defaults to `1` instead of `0`, matching the one-decision-per-alert shape actually being sent.

## Note on scope

The two 500 causes are independent. On an `en-US` shard only the missing scenario fields were biting; the date bug was latent and would have surfaced as an unexplained regression the first time someone ran a shard under a European locale.

## Verification

The emitted payload is field-for-field identical to a hand-verified request that a live LAPI accepts:

```json
[
  {
    "scenario": "modernuo/rate-limit",
    "scenario_hash": "",
    "scenario_version": "1.0",
    "message": "ModernUO rate-limit ban for 192.0.2.123",
    "events_count": 1,
    "start_at": "2026-07-27T15:04:05.123Z",
    "stop_at": "2026-07-27T15:04:05.123Z",
    "capacity": 1,
    "leakspeed": "0s",
    "simulated": false,
    "events": [],
    "remediation": true,
    "source": { "scope": "Ip", "value": "192.0.2.123" },
    "decisions": [
      {
        "origin": "modernuo",
        "type": "ban",
        "scope": "Ip",
        "value": "192.0.2.123",
        "duration": "300s",
        "scenario": "modernuo/rate-limit"
      }
    ]
  }
]
```

Regression tests assert the required scenario fields on the **serialized JSON** rather than the DTO — the DTO is not what goes on the wire — and cover the timestamp as a `[Theory]` across `fi-FI`/`th-TH`/`ar-SA`.

`dotnet test --filter "FullyQualifiedName~CrowdSec"` → **21/21 passed**, build clean with 0 warnings.
2026-07-27 23:31:37 -07:00

152 lines
6.3 KiB
C#

/*************************************************************************
* ModernUO *
* Copyright 2019-2026 - ModernUO Development Team *
* Email: hi@modernuo.com *
* File: CrowdSecAlertClient.cs *
* *
* This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify *
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by *
* the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or *
* (at your option) any later version. *
* *
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License *
* along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>. *
*************************************************************************/
using System;
using System.Collections.Generic;
using System.Globalization;
using System.Net;
using System.Net.Http;
using System.Net.Http.Headers;
using System.Net.Http.Json;
using System.Text.Json;
using System.Threading;
using System.Threading.Tasks;
namespace Server.Network.Bans.CrowdSec;
/// <summary>Reporter-side LAPI operations, mockable for tests.</summary>
public interface ICrowdSecAlertClient : IDisposable
{
ValueTask PostAlertsAsync(IReadOnlyList<CrowdSecAlert> alerts, CancellationToken token);
ValueTask DeleteDecisionsAsync(string origin, IPAddress ip, CancellationToken token);
}
/// <summary>
/// CrowdSec LAPI watcher client: authenticates with machine credentials and posts/deletes decisions.
/// Holds a JWT refreshed on expiry or a 401.
/// </summary>
public sealed class CrowdSecAlertClient : ICrowdSecAlertClient
{
private static readonly JsonSerializerOptions _jsonOptions = new() { PropertyNameCaseInsensitive = true };
/// <summary>
/// The <c>crowdsec/</c> prefix is load-bearing: LAPI's default watcher profile matches on it and
/// answers 401 for anything else, so this cannot be a plain product string.
/// </summary>
internal const string UserAgent = "crowdsec/ModernUO-watcher-1.0";
private readonly HttpClient _http;
private readonly string _machineId;
private readonly string _password;
private string _token;
private DateTime _tokenExpiresUtc = DateTime.MinValue;
public CrowdSecAlertClient(CrowdSecSettings settings)
{
var baseUri = new Uri(settings.LapiUrl, UriKind.Absolute); // fails loud on malformed url
_http = new HttpClient { BaseAddress = baseUri, Timeout = TimeSpan.FromSeconds(30) };
_http.DefaultRequestHeaders.Add("User-Agent", UserAgent);
_machineId = settings.MachineId;
_password = settings.Password;
}
private async Task EnsureAuthAsync(CancellationToken token)
{
if (_token != null && DateTime.UtcNow < _tokenExpiresUtc - TimeSpan.FromMinutes(1))
{
return;
}
var request = new CrowdSecLoginRequest { MachineId = _machineId, Password = _password };
using var response = await _http.PostAsJsonAsync("/v1/watchers/login", request, _jsonOptions, token)
.ConfigureAwait(false);
response.EnsureSuccessStatusCode();
var login = await response.Content.ReadFromJsonAsync<CrowdSecLoginResponse>(_jsonOptions, token)
.ConfigureAwait(false);
_token = login?.Token ?? throw new InvalidOperationException("CrowdSec login returned no token.");
// LAPI returns an RFC3339 expiry. Parse it invariantly for the same reason we format invariantly:
// the current culture must not decide whether a machine-readable timestamp is understood.
_tokenExpiresUtc = DateTime.TryParse(
login.Expire,
CultureInfo.InvariantCulture,
DateTimeStyles.AdjustToUniversal,
out var exp
) ? exp : DateTime.UtcNow.AddHours(1);
}
private void Authorize(HttpRequestMessage message) =>
message.Headers.Authorization = new AuthenticationHeaderValue("Bearer", _token);
public async ValueTask PostAlertsAsync(IReadOnlyList<CrowdSecAlert> alerts, CancellationToken token)
{
if (alerts.Count == 0)
{
return;
}
await SendWithRetryAsync(() =>
{
var message = new HttpRequestMessage(HttpMethod.Post, "/v1/alerts")
{
Content = JsonContent.Create(alerts, options: _jsonOptions)
};
Authorize(message);
return message;
}, token).ConfigureAwait(false);
}
public async ValueTask DeleteDecisionsAsync(string origin, IPAddress ip, CancellationToken token)
{
var query = BuildDeleteQuery(origin, ip);
await SendWithRetryAsync(() =>
{
var message = new HttpRequestMessage(HttpMethod.Delete, query);
Authorize(message);
return message;
}, token).ConfigureAwait(false);
}
/// <summary>
/// Builds the decisions-delete query string. <paramref name="origin"/> is operator-controlled config
/// (crowdsec.json), so it must be escaped like any other untrusted value going into a URL.
/// </summary>
internal static string BuildDeleteQuery(string origin, IPAddress ip) =>
$"/v1/decisions?origin={Uri.EscapeDataString(origin)}&ip={Uri.EscapeDataString(ip.ToString())}";
private async ValueTask SendWithRetryAsync(Func<HttpRequestMessage> build, CancellationToken token)
{
await EnsureAuthAsync(token).ConfigureAwait(false);
using var first = build();
using var response = await _http.SendAsync(first, token).ConfigureAwait(false);
if (response.StatusCode != HttpStatusCode.Unauthorized)
{
response.EnsureSuccessStatusCode();
return;
}
// Token rejected mid-flight: force a re-login and retry once.
_token = null;
await EnsureAuthAsync(token).ConfigureAwait(false);
using var retry = build();
using var retryResponse = await _http.SendAsync(retry, token).ConfigureAwait(false);
retryResponse.EnsureSuccessStatusCode();
}
public void Dispose() => _http.Dispose();
}