The shard owner, on a Starlink CGNAT address, was blocked by the imported reputation blocklist. The cause was not CrowdSec: the address was a literal line in ip-blocklist.txt, so BlocklistFilter denied it at accept and then promoted it. Clearing the CrowdSec decision could not fix it either, because the file entry re-reports within promoteSuppression of every reconnect. Reputation feeds list shared consumer address space constantly. On CGNAT one public address fronts many subscribers at the same time, so a single abusive customer gets the address listed and everyone else behind it is blocked with them; where leases rotate, a listing says little about whoever holds the address now. So exemptions go where they cost nothing, and escalation is driven by what a connection actually does. GENERATOR (tools/Export-IpBlocklist.ps1) - -AllowlistFile takes multiple paths, subtracted from the merged set before the output is written. Defaults to the operator's own ip-allowlist.txt (created once, never rewritten) plus one generated file per network carve-out. - Subtraction is range-correct: an allowlisted address inside a blocked CIDR splits that CIDR around the hole instead of being ignored. This also fixes -ExcludeAnonymizers, which parsed CIDR entries and then only subtracted singles. - Carve-outs are a table (name, ASN, reason, offline seed) rather than a hardcoded network, so covering another CGNAT provider is one row. -RefreshCarveouts re-fetches from the ASN's current routing announcements and collapses them; -Carveout '' subtracts none. Announcements rather than ownership records, because registry data disagrees with what is routed and caps its result sets. - Editing an allowlist bypasses -MinInterval, so a just-added exemption is not indistinguishable from the allowlist not working. - The shipped starlink carve-out costs ~0.1% of the list. ALLOWLISTS - FileAllowlist reads the same files the generator subtracts, so an operator entry means "leave this address alone" for real. Subtraction alone only covers being BLOCKED; behavioural detections never consult the blocklist, so without this a carve-out was quietly routed around and one scanner behind a shared address was enough to get everyone behind it firewalled. Reading the files also means an entry applies on the next reload rather than the next regeneration. - LoginAllowlist is earned by authenticating, with a 90 day TTL because an address that logged in years ago is a stranger. Its own store rather than Account.LoginIPs, which has no timestamps and cannot be backfilled. An entry is evidence rather than a licence: 10 suppressed contributions in an hour revokes it, and a fresh login forgives the tally. - Both are consulted only AFTER the blocklist has already matched, so a normal accept pays nothing for them and the accept gate stays allowlist-free. - BanExemptions combines them behind BanChannel.IsExempt. Suppresses escalation only; every local defence still applies. BEHAVIOURAL DETECTION - silent-connect (reaped having sent zero bytes) and invalid-seed (a zero seed) are contributed. Both were already disconnected. - ForeignProtocol positively identifies HTTP, TLS and SSH. Asking "is this a good UO client?" cannot work: LoginEncryption.ClientDecrypt is a byte-for-byte stream XOR, so a client with encryption on when the shard expects none sends a structurally perfect connection whose payload is noise. Nothing assumes arrival framing, since TCP has no message boundaries and a rule of the form "these bytes must arrive together" drops real players on poor links. - Keyed on bytes-received rather than elapsed time throughout. A connection that sent something and ran out of time is far more likely a slow link, and banning those makes the player retry, trip the rate limiter, and compound it. - AutoDenylist holds behavioural detections locally for 15 minutes, as an IConnectionFilter plus IBanReporter over one store so engine detection sites never reach into content. Closes the gap where a flood pays for a socket and a NetState per connection while waiting for an OS bouncer, and is the whole defence on a shard running none. Not persisted: a holding pen that survives restarts is a ban without a ban's review. - BanReasons centralises the slugs. IsBehavioral is an opt-in set, not "everything except manual", so a future reason escalates normally instead of silently inheriting an exemption. The first cut of the exemption swallowed manual admin bans; this is why. FIXES - BanConfiguration.Settings was null until Configure() ran while the reap path dereferences it every Slice(), so a harness driving NetState.Slice() directly hit an NRE that looked flaky because it depended on test ordering. - -AllowlistFile was typed [string] while documented and used as a list. LAYOUT AND DOCS Content network code moves out of Misc into UOContent/Network, one concern per folder. Namespaces are untouched, so these are pure file moves. dev-docs/ip-bans-and-allowlists.md documents the subsystem, leading with the operator process for unblocking a player -- including the three things that look sufficient and are not: deleting the CrowdSec decision alone, editing ip-blocklist.txt by hand, and cscli allowlists alone. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
96 lines
2.8 KiB
C#
96 lines
2.8 KiB
C#
using System;
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using System.Collections.Generic;
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using System.Net;
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using System.Threading;
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using Server.Network.Bans;
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using Xunit;
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namespace Server.Tests.Network.Bans;
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public class BanChannelTests
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{
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private sealed class FakeReporter : IBanReporter
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{
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public readonly List<(IPAddress ip, TimeSpan ttl, string reason)> Reports = [];
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public readonly List<IPAddress> Retractions = [];
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public bool ThrowOnReport;
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public string Name => "fake";
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public bool CanRetract => true;
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public void Register() { }
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public void Start(CancellationToken token) { }
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public void Stop() { }
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public void Report(IPAddress address, TimeSpan ttl, string reason)
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{
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if (ThrowOnReport)
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{
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throw new InvalidOperationException("boom");
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}
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Reports.Add((address, ttl, reason));
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}
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public void Retract(IPAddress address) => Retractions.Add(address);
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}
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[Fact]
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public void Report_FansOutToAllReporters()
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{
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var a = new FakeReporter();
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var b = new FakeReporter();
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BanChannel.ConfigureForTesting([a, b]);
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BanChannel.Report(IPAddress.Parse("1.2.3.4"), TimeSpan.FromHours(1), "rate-limit");
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Assert.Single(a.Reports);
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Assert.Single(b.Reports);
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Assert.Equal("rate-limit", a.Reports[0].reason);
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}
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[Fact]
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public void Report_SwallowsReporterException()
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{
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var bad = new FakeReporter { ThrowOnReport = true };
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var good = new FakeReporter();
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BanChannel.ConfigureForTesting([bad, good]);
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BanChannel.Report(IPAddress.Parse("1.2.3.4"), TimeSpan.FromHours(1), "manual");
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Assert.Single(good.Reports); // the throwing reporter does not block the others
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}
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[Fact]
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public void Report_SuppressedForExemptAddress()
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{
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var reporter = new FakeReporter();
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BanChannel.ConfigureForTesting([reporter]);
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var exempt = IPAddress.Parse("203.0.113.7");
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BanChannel.IsExempt = (ip, _) => ip.Equals(exempt);
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try
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{
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BanChannel.Report(exempt, TimeSpan.FromHours(1), "rate-limit");
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Assert.Empty(reporter.Reports); // escalation suppressed; the local gate already acted
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BanChannel.Report(IPAddress.Parse("203.0.113.8"), TimeSpan.FromHours(1), "rate-limit");
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Assert.Single(reporter.Reports); // everyone else is still contributed
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}
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finally
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{
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BanChannel.IsExempt = null;
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}
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}
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[Fact]
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public void Retract_ReachesRetractCapableReporters()
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{
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var a = new FakeReporter();
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BanChannel.ConfigureForTesting([a]);
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BanChannel.Retract(IPAddress.Parse("9.9.9.9"));
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Assert.Single(a.Retractions);
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}
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}
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