ModernUO/Projects/UOContent/Network/CrowdSec/CrowdSecAlertClient.cs
Kamron Batman 927c87702d
feat(network): allowlist false-positive IPs, escalate on behaviour
The shard owner, on a Starlink CGNAT address, was blocked by the imported
reputation blocklist. The cause was not CrowdSec: the address was a literal line
in ip-blocklist.txt, so BlocklistFilter denied it at accept and then promoted it.
Clearing the CrowdSec decision could not fix it either, because the file entry
re-reports within promoteSuppression of every reconnect.

Reputation feeds list shared consumer address space constantly. On CGNAT one
public address fronts many subscribers at the same time, so a single abusive
customer gets the address listed and everyone else behind it is blocked with
them; where leases rotate, a listing says little about whoever holds the address
now. So exemptions go where they cost nothing, and escalation is driven by what a
connection actually does.

GENERATOR (tools/Export-IpBlocklist.ps1)

- -AllowlistFile takes multiple paths, subtracted from the merged set before the
  output is written. Defaults to the operator's own ip-allowlist.txt (created
  once, never rewritten) plus one generated file per network carve-out.
- Subtraction is range-correct: an allowlisted address inside a blocked CIDR
  splits that CIDR around the hole instead of being ignored. This also fixes
  -ExcludeAnonymizers, which parsed CIDR entries and then only subtracted
  singles.
- Carve-outs are a table (name, ASN, reason, offline seed) rather than a
  hardcoded network, so covering another CGNAT provider is one row.
  -RefreshCarveouts re-fetches from the ASN's current routing announcements and
  collapses them; -Carveout '' subtracts none. Announcements rather than
  ownership records, because registry data disagrees with what is routed and caps
  its result sets.
- Editing an allowlist bypasses -MinInterval, so a just-added exemption is not
  indistinguishable from the allowlist not working.
- The shipped starlink carve-out costs ~0.1% of the list.

ALLOWLISTS

- FileAllowlist reads the same files the generator subtracts, so an operator
  entry means "leave this address alone" for real. Subtraction alone only covers
  being BLOCKED; behavioural detections never consult the blocklist, so without
  this a carve-out was quietly routed around and one scanner behind a shared
  address was enough to get everyone behind it firewalled. Reading the files also
  means an entry applies on the next reload rather than the next regeneration.
- LoginAllowlist is earned by authenticating, with a 90 day TTL because an
  address that logged in years ago is a stranger. Its own store rather than
  Account.LoginIPs, which has no timestamps and cannot be backfilled. An entry is
  evidence rather than a licence: 10 suppressed contributions in an hour revokes
  it, and a fresh login forgives the tally.
- Both are consulted only AFTER the blocklist has already matched, so a normal
  accept pays nothing for them and the accept gate stays allowlist-free.
- BanExemptions combines them behind BanChannel.IsExempt. Suppresses escalation
  only; every local defence still applies.

BEHAVIOURAL DETECTION

- silent-connect (reaped having sent zero bytes) and invalid-seed (a zero seed)
  are contributed. Both were already disconnected.
- ForeignProtocol positively identifies HTTP, TLS and SSH. Asking "is this a good
  UO client?" cannot work: LoginEncryption.ClientDecrypt is a byte-for-byte
  stream XOR, so a client with encryption on when the shard expects none sends a
  structurally perfect connection whose payload is noise. Nothing assumes arrival
  framing, since TCP has no message boundaries and a rule of the form "these
  bytes must arrive together" drops real players on poor links.
- Keyed on bytes-received rather than elapsed time throughout. A connection that
  sent something and ran out of time is far more likely a slow link, and banning
  those makes the player retry, trip the rate limiter, and compound it.
- AutoDenylist holds behavioural detections locally for 15 minutes, as an
  IConnectionFilter plus IBanReporter over one store so engine detection sites
  never reach into content. Closes the gap where a flood pays for a socket and a
  NetState per connection while waiting for an OS bouncer, and is the whole
  defence on a shard running none. Not persisted: a holding pen that survives
  restarts is a ban without a ban's review.
- BanReasons centralises the slugs. IsBehavioral is an opt-in set, not
  "everything except manual", so a future reason escalates normally instead of
  silently inheriting an exemption. The first cut of the exemption swallowed
  manual admin bans; this is why.

FIXES

- BanConfiguration.Settings was null until Configure() ran while the reap path
  dereferences it every Slice(), so a harness driving NetState.Slice() directly
  hit an NRE that looked flaky because it depended on test ordering.
- -AllowlistFile was typed [string] while documented and used as a list.

LAYOUT AND DOCS

Content network code moves out of Misc into UOContent/Network, one concern per
folder. Namespaces are untouched, so these are pure file moves.
dev-docs/ip-bans-and-allowlists.md documents the subsystem, leading with the
operator process for unblocking a player -- including the three things that look
sufficient and are not: deleting the CrowdSec decision alone, editing
ip-blocklist.txt by hand, and cscli allowlists alone.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-30 18:31:34 -07:00

152 lines
6.3 KiB
C#

/*************************************************************************
* ModernUO *
* Copyright 2019-2026 - ModernUO Development Team *
* Email: hi@modernuo.com *
* File: CrowdSecAlertClient.cs *
* *
* This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify *
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by *
* the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or *
* (at your option) any later version. *
* *
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License *
* along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>. *
*************************************************************************/
using System;
using System.Collections.Generic;
using System.Globalization;
using System.Net;
using System.Net.Http;
using System.Net.Http.Headers;
using System.Net.Http.Json;
using System.Text.Json;
using System.Threading;
using System.Threading.Tasks;
namespace Server.Network.Bans.CrowdSec;
/// <summary>Reporter-side LAPI operations, mockable for tests.</summary>
public interface ICrowdSecAlertClient : IDisposable
{
ValueTask PostAlertsAsync(IReadOnlyList<CrowdSecAlert> alerts, CancellationToken token);
ValueTask DeleteDecisionsAsync(string origin, IPAddress ip, CancellationToken token);
}
/// <summary>
/// CrowdSec LAPI watcher client: authenticates with machine credentials and posts/deletes decisions.
/// Holds a JWT refreshed on expiry or a 401.
/// </summary>
public sealed class CrowdSecAlertClient : ICrowdSecAlertClient
{
private static readonly JsonSerializerOptions _jsonOptions = new() { PropertyNameCaseInsensitive = true };
/// <summary>
/// The <c>crowdsec/</c> prefix is load-bearing: LAPI's default watcher profile matches on it and
/// answers 401 for anything else, so this cannot be a plain product string.
/// </summary>
internal const string UserAgent = "crowdsec/ModernUO-watcher-1.0";
private readonly HttpClient _http;
private readonly string _machineId;
private readonly string _password;
private string _token;
private DateTime _tokenExpiresUtc = DateTime.MinValue;
public CrowdSecAlertClient(CrowdSecSettings settings)
{
var baseUri = new Uri(settings.LapiUrl, UriKind.Absolute); // fails loud on malformed url
_http = new HttpClient { BaseAddress = baseUri, Timeout = TimeSpan.FromSeconds(30) };
_http.DefaultRequestHeaders.Add("User-Agent", UserAgent);
_machineId = settings.MachineId;
_password = settings.Password;
}
private async Task EnsureAuthAsync(CancellationToken token)
{
if (_token != null && DateTime.UtcNow < _tokenExpiresUtc - TimeSpan.FromMinutes(1))
{
return;
}
var request = new CrowdSecLoginRequest { MachineId = _machineId, Password = _password };
using var response = await _http.PostAsJsonAsync("/v1/watchers/login", request, _jsonOptions, token)
.ConfigureAwait(false);
response.EnsureSuccessStatusCode();
var login = await response.Content.ReadFromJsonAsync<CrowdSecLoginResponse>(_jsonOptions, token)
.ConfigureAwait(false);
_token = login?.Token ?? throw new InvalidOperationException("CrowdSec login returned no token.");
// LAPI returns an RFC3339 expiry. Parse it invariantly for the same reason we format invariantly:
// the current culture must not decide whether a machine-readable timestamp is understood.
_tokenExpiresUtc = DateTime.TryParse(
login.Expire,
CultureInfo.InvariantCulture,
DateTimeStyles.AdjustToUniversal,
out var exp
) ? exp : DateTime.UtcNow.AddHours(1);
}
private void Authorize(HttpRequestMessage message) =>
message.Headers.Authorization = new AuthenticationHeaderValue("Bearer", _token);
public async ValueTask PostAlertsAsync(IReadOnlyList<CrowdSecAlert> alerts, CancellationToken token)
{
if (alerts.Count == 0)
{
return;
}
await SendWithRetryAsync(() =>
{
var message = new HttpRequestMessage(HttpMethod.Post, "/v1/alerts")
{
Content = JsonContent.Create(alerts, options: _jsonOptions)
};
Authorize(message);
return message;
}, token).ConfigureAwait(false);
}
public async ValueTask DeleteDecisionsAsync(string origin, IPAddress ip, CancellationToken token)
{
var query = BuildDeleteQuery(origin, ip);
await SendWithRetryAsync(() =>
{
var message = new HttpRequestMessage(HttpMethod.Delete, query);
Authorize(message);
return message;
}, token).ConfigureAwait(false);
}
/// <summary>
/// Builds the decisions-delete query string. <paramref name="origin"/> is operator-controlled config
/// (crowdsec.json), so it must be escaped like any other untrusted value going into a URL.
/// </summary>
internal static string BuildDeleteQuery(string origin, IPAddress ip) =>
$"/v1/decisions?origin={Uri.EscapeDataString(origin)}&ip={Uri.EscapeDataString(ip.ToString())}";
private async ValueTask SendWithRetryAsync(Func<HttpRequestMessage> build, CancellationToken token)
{
await EnsureAuthAsync(token).ConfigureAwait(false);
using var first = build();
using var response = await _http.SendAsync(first, token).ConfigureAwait(false);
if (response.StatusCode != HttpStatusCode.Unauthorized)
{
response.EnsureSuccessStatusCode();
return;
}
// Token rejected mid-flight: force a re-login and retry once.
_token = null;
await EnsureAuthAsync(token).ConfigureAwait(false);
using var retry = build();
using var retryResponse = await _http.SendAsync(retry, token).ConfigureAwait(false);
retryResponse.EnsureSuccessStatusCode();
}
public void Dispose() => _http.Dispose();
}