The shard owner, on a Starlink CGNAT address, was blocked by the imported reputation blocklist. The cause was not CrowdSec: the address was a literal line in ip-blocklist.txt, so BlocklistFilter denied it at accept and then promoted it. Clearing the CrowdSec decision could not fix it either, because the file entry re-reports within promoteSuppression of every reconnect. Reputation feeds list shared consumer address space constantly. On CGNAT one public address fronts many subscribers at the same time, so a single abusive customer gets the address listed and everyone else behind it is blocked with them; where leases rotate, a listing says little about whoever holds the address now. So exemptions go where they cost nothing, and escalation is driven by what a connection actually does. GENERATOR (tools/Export-IpBlocklist.ps1) - -AllowlistFile takes multiple paths, subtracted from the merged set before the output is written. Defaults to the operator's own ip-allowlist.txt (created once, never rewritten) plus one generated file per network carve-out. - Subtraction is range-correct: an allowlisted address inside a blocked CIDR splits that CIDR around the hole instead of being ignored. This also fixes -ExcludeAnonymizers, which parsed CIDR entries and then only subtracted singles. - Carve-outs are a table (name, ASN, reason, offline seed) rather than a hardcoded network, so covering another CGNAT provider is one row. -RefreshCarveouts re-fetches from the ASN's current routing announcements and collapses them; -Carveout '' subtracts none. Announcements rather than ownership records, because registry data disagrees with what is routed and caps its result sets. - Editing an allowlist bypasses -MinInterval, so a just-added exemption is not indistinguishable from the allowlist not working. - The shipped starlink carve-out costs ~0.1% of the list. ALLOWLISTS - FileAllowlist reads the same files the generator subtracts, so an operator entry means "leave this address alone" for real. Subtraction alone only covers being BLOCKED; behavioural detections never consult the blocklist, so without this a carve-out was quietly routed around and one scanner behind a shared address was enough to get everyone behind it firewalled. Reading the files also means an entry applies on the next reload rather than the next regeneration. - LoginAllowlist is earned by authenticating, with a 90 day TTL because an address that logged in years ago is a stranger. Its own store rather than Account.LoginIPs, which has no timestamps and cannot be backfilled. An entry is evidence rather than a licence: 10 suppressed contributions in an hour revokes it, and a fresh login forgives the tally. - Both are consulted only AFTER the blocklist has already matched, so a normal accept pays nothing for them and the accept gate stays allowlist-free. - BanExemptions combines them behind BanChannel.IsExempt. Suppresses escalation only; every local defence still applies. BEHAVIOURAL DETECTION - silent-connect (reaped having sent zero bytes) and invalid-seed (a zero seed) are contributed. Both were already disconnected. - ForeignProtocol positively identifies HTTP, TLS and SSH. Asking "is this a good UO client?" cannot work: LoginEncryption.ClientDecrypt is a byte-for-byte stream XOR, so a client with encryption on when the shard expects none sends a structurally perfect connection whose payload is noise. Nothing assumes arrival framing, since TCP has no message boundaries and a rule of the form "these bytes must arrive together" drops real players on poor links. - Keyed on bytes-received rather than elapsed time throughout. A connection that sent something and ran out of time is far more likely a slow link, and banning those makes the player retry, trip the rate limiter, and compound it. - AutoDenylist holds behavioural detections locally for 15 minutes, as an IConnectionFilter plus IBanReporter over one store so engine detection sites never reach into content. Closes the gap where a flood pays for a socket and a NetState per connection while waiting for an OS bouncer, and is the whole defence on a shard running none. Not persisted: a holding pen that survives restarts is a ban without a ban's review. - BanReasons centralises the slugs. IsBehavioral is an opt-in set, not "everything except manual", so a future reason escalates normally instead of silently inheriting an exemption. The first cut of the exemption swallowed manual admin bans; this is why. FIXES - BanConfiguration.Settings was null until Configure() ran while the reap path dereferences it every Slice(), so a harness driving NetState.Slice() directly hit an NRE that looked flaky because it depended on test ordering. - -AllowlistFile was typed [string] while documented and used as a list. LAYOUT AND DOCS Content network code moves out of Misc into UOContent/Network, one concern per folder. Namespaces are untouched, so these are pure file moves. dev-docs/ip-bans-and-allowlists.md documents the subsystem, leading with the operator process for unblocking a player -- including the three things that look sufficient and are not: deleting the CrowdSec decision alone, editing ip-blocklist.txt by hand, and cscli allowlists alone. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
152 lines
6.3 KiB
C#
152 lines
6.3 KiB
C#
/*************************************************************************
|
|
* ModernUO *
|
|
* Copyright 2019-2026 - ModernUO Development Team *
|
|
* Email: hi@modernuo.com *
|
|
* File: CrowdSecAlertClient.cs *
|
|
* *
|
|
* This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify *
|
|
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by *
|
|
* the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or *
|
|
* (at your option) any later version. *
|
|
* *
|
|
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License *
|
|
* along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>. *
|
|
*************************************************************************/
|
|
|
|
using System;
|
|
using System.Collections.Generic;
|
|
using System.Globalization;
|
|
using System.Net;
|
|
using System.Net.Http;
|
|
using System.Net.Http.Headers;
|
|
using System.Net.Http.Json;
|
|
using System.Text.Json;
|
|
using System.Threading;
|
|
using System.Threading.Tasks;
|
|
|
|
namespace Server.Network.Bans.CrowdSec;
|
|
|
|
/// <summary>Reporter-side LAPI operations, mockable for tests.</summary>
|
|
public interface ICrowdSecAlertClient : IDisposable
|
|
{
|
|
ValueTask PostAlertsAsync(IReadOnlyList<CrowdSecAlert> alerts, CancellationToken token);
|
|
ValueTask DeleteDecisionsAsync(string origin, IPAddress ip, CancellationToken token);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/// <summary>
|
|
/// CrowdSec LAPI watcher client: authenticates with machine credentials and posts/deletes decisions.
|
|
/// Holds a JWT refreshed on expiry or a 401.
|
|
/// </summary>
|
|
public sealed class CrowdSecAlertClient : ICrowdSecAlertClient
|
|
{
|
|
private static readonly JsonSerializerOptions _jsonOptions = new() { PropertyNameCaseInsensitive = true };
|
|
|
|
/// <summary>
|
|
/// The <c>crowdsec/</c> prefix is load-bearing: LAPI's default watcher profile matches on it and
|
|
/// answers 401 for anything else, so this cannot be a plain product string.
|
|
/// </summary>
|
|
internal const string UserAgent = "crowdsec/ModernUO-watcher-1.0";
|
|
|
|
private readonly HttpClient _http;
|
|
private readonly string _machineId;
|
|
private readonly string _password;
|
|
|
|
private string _token;
|
|
private DateTime _tokenExpiresUtc = DateTime.MinValue;
|
|
|
|
public CrowdSecAlertClient(CrowdSecSettings settings)
|
|
{
|
|
var baseUri = new Uri(settings.LapiUrl, UriKind.Absolute); // fails loud on malformed url
|
|
_http = new HttpClient { BaseAddress = baseUri, Timeout = TimeSpan.FromSeconds(30) };
|
|
_http.DefaultRequestHeaders.Add("User-Agent", UserAgent);
|
|
_machineId = settings.MachineId;
|
|
_password = settings.Password;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
private async Task EnsureAuthAsync(CancellationToken token)
|
|
{
|
|
if (_token != null && DateTime.UtcNow < _tokenExpiresUtc - TimeSpan.FromMinutes(1))
|
|
{
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
var request = new CrowdSecLoginRequest { MachineId = _machineId, Password = _password };
|
|
using var response = await _http.PostAsJsonAsync("/v1/watchers/login", request, _jsonOptions, token)
|
|
.ConfigureAwait(false);
|
|
response.EnsureSuccessStatusCode();
|
|
|
|
var login = await response.Content.ReadFromJsonAsync<CrowdSecLoginResponse>(_jsonOptions, token)
|
|
.ConfigureAwait(false);
|
|
_token = login?.Token ?? throw new InvalidOperationException("CrowdSec login returned no token.");
|
|
|
|
// LAPI returns an RFC3339 expiry. Parse it invariantly for the same reason we format invariantly:
|
|
// the current culture must not decide whether a machine-readable timestamp is understood.
|
|
_tokenExpiresUtc = DateTime.TryParse(
|
|
login.Expire,
|
|
CultureInfo.InvariantCulture,
|
|
DateTimeStyles.AdjustToUniversal,
|
|
out var exp
|
|
) ? exp : DateTime.UtcNow.AddHours(1);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
private void Authorize(HttpRequestMessage message) =>
|
|
message.Headers.Authorization = new AuthenticationHeaderValue("Bearer", _token);
|
|
|
|
public async ValueTask PostAlertsAsync(IReadOnlyList<CrowdSecAlert> alerts, CancellationToken token)
|
|
{
|
|
if (alerts.Count == 0)
|
|
{
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
await SendWithRetryAsync(() =>
|
|
{
|
|
var message = new HttpRequestMessage(HttpMethod.Post, "/v1/alerts")
|
|
{
|
|
Content = JsonContent.Create(alerts, options: _jsonOptions)
|
|
};
|
|
Authorize(message);
|
|
return message;
|
|
}, token).ConfigureAwait(false);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
public async ValueTask DeleteDecisionsAsync(string origin, IPAddress ip, CancellationToken token)
|
|
{
|
|
var query = BuildDeleteQuery(origin, ip);
|
|
await SendWithRetryAsync(() =>
|
|
{
|
|
var message = new HttpRequestMessage(HttpMethod.Delete, query);
|
|
Authorize(message);
|
|
return message;
|
|
}, token).ConfigureAwait(false);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/// <summary>
|
|
/// Builds the decisions-delete query string. <paramref name="origin"/> is operator-controlled config
|
|
/// (crowdsec.json), so it must be escaped like any other untrusted value going into a URL.
|
|
/// </summary>
|
|
internal static string BuildDeleteQuery(string origin, IPAddress ip) =>
|
|
$"/v1/decisions?origin={Uri.EscapeDataString(origin)}&ip={Uri.EscapeDataString(ip.ToString())}";
|
|
|
|
private async ValueTask SendWithRetryAsync(Func<HttpRequestMessage> build, CancellationToken token)
|
|
{
|
|
await EnsureAuthAsync(token).ConfigureAwait(false);
|
|
|
|
using var first = build();
|
|
using var response = await _http.SendAsync(first, token).ConfigureAwait(false);
|
|
if (response.StatusCode != HttpStatusCode.Unauthorized)
|
|
{
|
|
response.EnsureSuccessStatusCode();
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Token rejected mid-flight: force a re-login and retry once.
|
|
_token = null;
|
|
await EnsureAuthAsync(token).ConfigureAwait(false);
|
|
using var retry = build();
|
|
using var retryResponse = await _http.SendAsync(retry, token).ConfigureAwait(false);
|
|
retryResponse.EnsureSuccessStatusCode();
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
public void Dispose() => _http.Dispose();
|
|
}
|