ModernUO/Projects/UOContent/Network/CrowdSec/CrowdSecReporter.cs
Kamron Batman 927c87702d
feat(network): allowlist false-positive IPs, escalate on behaviour
The shard owner, on a Starlink CGNAT address, was blocked by the imported
reputation blocklist. The cause was not CrowdSec: the address was a literal line
in ip-blocklist.txt, so BlocklistFilter denied it at accept and then promoted it.
Clearing the CrowdSec decision could not fix it either, because the file entry
re-reports within promoteSuppression of every reconnect.

Reputation feeds list shared consumer address space constantly. On CGNAT one
public address fronts many subscribers at the same time, so a single abusive
customer gets the address listed and everyone else behind it is blocked with
them; where leases rotate, a listing says little about whoever holds the address
now. So exemptions go where they cost nothing, and escalation is driven by what a
connection actually does.

GENERATOR (tools/Export-IpBlocklist.ps1)

- -AllowlistFile takes multiple paths, subtracted from the merged set before the
  output is written. Defaults to the operator's own ip-allowlist.txt (created
  once, never rewritten) plus one generated file per network carve-out.
- Subtraction is range-correct: an allowlisted address inside a blocked CIDR
  splits that CIDR around the hole instead of being ignored. This also fixes
  -ExcludeAnonymizers, which parsed CIDR entries and then only subtracted
  singles.
- Carve-outs are a table (name, ASN, reason, offline seed) rather than a
  hardcoded network, so covering another CGNAT provider is one row.
  -RefreshCarveouts re-fetches from the ASN's current routing announcements and
  collapses them; -Carveout '' subtracts none. Announcements rather than
  ownership records, because registry data disagrees with what is routed and caps
  its result sets.
- Editing an allowlist bypasses -MinInterval, so a just-added exemption is not
  indistinguishable from the allowlist not working.
- The shipped starlink carve-out costs ~0.1% of the list.

ALLOWLISTS

- FileAllowlist reads the same files the generator subtracts, so an operator
  entry means "leave this address alone" for real. Subtraction alone only covers
  being BLOCKED; behavioural detections never consult the blocklist, so without
  this a carve-out was quietly routed around and one scanner behind a shared
  address was enough to get everyone behind it firewalled. Reading the files also
  means an entry applies on the next reload rather than the next regeneration.
- LoginAllowlist is earned by authenticating, with a 90 day TTL because an
  address that logged in years ago is a stranger. Its own store rather than
  Account.LoginIPs, which has no timestamps and cannot be backfilled. An entry is
  evidence rather than a licence: 10 suppressed contributions in an hour revokes
  it, and a fresh login forgives the tally.
- Both are consulted only AFTER the blocklist has already matched, so a normal
  accept pays nothing for them and the accept gate stays allowlist-free.
- BanExemptions combines them behind BanChannel.IsExempt. Suppresses escalation
  only; every local defence still applies.

BEHAVIOURAL DETECTION

- silent-connect (reaped having sent zero bytes) and invalid-seed (a zero seed)
  are contributed. Both were already disconnected.
- ForeignProtocol positively identifies HTTP, TLS and SSH. Asking "is this a good
  UO client?" cannot work: LoginEncryption.ClientDecrypt is a byte-for-byte
  stream XOR, so a client with encryption on when the shard expects none sends a
  structurally perfect connection whose payload is noise. Nothing assumes arrival
  framing, since TCP has no message boundaries and a rule of the form "these
  bytes must arrive together" drops real players on poor links.
- Keyed on bytes-received rather than elapsed time throughout. A connection that
  sent something and ran out of time is far more likely a slow link, and banning
  those makes the player retry, trip the rate limiter, and compound it.
- AutoDenylist holds behavioural detections locally for 15 minutes, as an
  IConnectionFilter plus IBanReporter over one store so engine detection sites
  never reach into content. Closes the gap where a flood pays for a socket and a
  NetState per connection while waiting for an OS bouncer, and is the whole
  defence on a shard running none. Not persisted: a holding pen that survives
  restarts is a ban without a ban's review.
- BanReasons centralises the slugs. IsBehavioral is an opt-in set, not
  "everything except manual", so a future reason escalates normally instead of
  silently inheriting an exemption. The first cut of the exemption swallowed
  manual admin bans; this is why.

FIXES

- BanConfiguration.Settings was null until Configure() ran while the reap path
  dereferences it every Slice(), so a harness driving NetState.Slice() directly
  hit an NRE that looked flaky because it depended on test ordering.
- -AllowlistFile was typed [string] while documented and used as a list.

LAYOUT AND DOCS

Content network code moves out of Misc into UOContent/Network, one concern per
folder. Namespaces are untouched, so these are pure file moves.
dev-docs/ip-bans-and-allowlists.md documents the subsystem, leading with the
operator process for unblocking a player -- including the three things that look
sufficient and are not: deleting the CrowdSec decision alone, editing
ip-blocklist.txt by hand, and cscli allowlists alone.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-30 18:31:34 -07:00

411 lines
15 KiB
C#

/*************************************************************************
* ModernUO *
* Copyright 2019-2026 - ModernUO Development Team *
* Email: hi@modernuo.com *
* File: CrowdSecReporter.cs *
* *
* This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify *
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by *
* the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or *
* (at your option) any later version. *
* *
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License *
* along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>. *
*************************************************************************/
using System;
using System.Collections.Generic;
using System.Globalization;
using System.Net;
using System.Threading;
using System.Threading.Channels;
using System.Threading.Tasks;
using Server.Logging;
namespace Server.Network.Bans.CrowdSec;
/// <summary>
/// Contributes locally-decided bans to CrowdSec via the LAPI alerts API. Non-blocking on the accept
/// path: <see cref="Report"/> enqueues onto a bounded, drop-on-overflow channel drained by a single
/// background task that coalesces by IP and POSTs batched alerts.
/// </summary>
public sealed class CrowdSecReporter : IBanReporter
{
private static readonly ILogger logger = LogFactory.GetLogger(typeof(CrowdSecReporter));
internal readonly record struct ReportItem(IPAddress Ip, TimeSpan Ttl, string Reason, bool Retract);
// Bounded retry for transient LAPI failures during a drain send (network blips, 5xx). Distinct from
// CrowdSecAlertClient.SendWithRetryAsync's single 401-relogin retry, which is an auth concern.
private static readonly TimeSpan[] _retryDelays = [TimeSpan.FromSeconds(1), TimeSpan.FromSeconds(2)];
private ICrowdSecAlertClient _client;
private CrowdSecSettings _settings;
private Channel<ReportItem> _queue;
private CancellationTokenSource _cts;
private Task _drainTask;
private int _dropped;
private int _sendFailures;
public CrowdSecReporter()
{
}
// Test/embedding ctor with an injected client + settings.
internal CrowdSecReporter(ICrowdSecAlertClient client, CrowdSecSettings settings)
{
_client = client;
_settings = settings;
_queue = CreateQueue(settings.MaxQueue);
}
public string Name => "crowdsec";
public bool CanRetract => true;
public int DroppedCount => _dropped;
/// <summary>
/// Batches ultimately dropped after the bounded transient-retry in <see cref="DrainLoop"/> gave up.
/// Distinct from <see cref="DroppedCount"/> (queue-overflow drops on the accept path): this counts
/// sustained LAPI outages so operators can see contribution loss instead of it being silent.
/// </summary>
public int SendFailureCount => _sendFailures;
/// <summary>The drain loop's task, so tests can assert it stays alive until the loop exits.</summary>
internal Task DrainTaskForTesting => _drainTask;
public static void Configure()
{
BanChannel.Register(new CrowdSecReporter());
}
public void Register()
{
CrowdSecConfiguration.Load();
_settings ??= CrowdSecConfiguration.Settings;
}
public void Start(CancellationToken token)
{
if (!_settings.ReportingEnabled)
{
logger.Information("CrowdSec reporter disabled (machineId/password empty in crowdsec.json)");
return;
}
_client ??= new CrowdSecAlertClient(_settings);
_queue ??= CreateQueue(_settings.MaxQueue);
_cts = CancellationTokenSource.CreateLinkedTokenSource(token);
_drainTask = Task.Run(() => DrainLoop(_cts.Token), _cts.Token);
}
public void Stop()
{
_cts?.Cancel();
// The flush below reads a SingleReader channel, so wait for the drain to actually exit first.
var drainExited = true;
try
{
// Wait(timeout) is false only on timeout; a throw means faulted/cancelled, which is still exited.
drainExited = _drainTask == null || _drainTask.Wait(TimeSpan.FromSeconds(2));
}
catch
{
// Ignored: a faulted wait means the drain has completed and released the channel.
}
_cts?.Dispose();
_cts = null;
if (drainExited)
{
FlushRemainingOnStop();
}
_client?.Dispose();
_drainTask = null;
}
/// <summary>
/// Best-effort bounded flush of whatever is still queued at shutdown. Blocking is correct here — the
/// loop has stopped ticking — but must not happen on the loop thread: <see cref="Stop"/> runs where
/// <c>SynchronizationContext.Current</c> is the <c>EventLoopContext</c>, and a captured continuation
/// would be posted to a queue nothing pumps any more. <see cref="Task.Run(Func{Task})"/> keeps the
/// chain on the pool; the bounded wait caps a wedged send at a few seconds of shutdown.
/// </summary>
private void FlushRemainingOnStop()
{
if (_queue == null || _client == null)
{
return;
}
_queue.Writer.TryComplete();
List<ReportItem> reports = [];
List<ReportItem> retracts = [];
while (_queue.Reader.TryRead(out var item))
{
(item.Retract ? retracts : reports).Add(item);
}
if (reports.Count == 0 && retracts.Count == 0)
{
return;
}
try
{
if (!Task.Run(() => FlushRemainingOnStopAsync(reports, retracts)).Wait(TimeSpan.FromSeconds(4)))
{
logger.Warning(
"CrowdSec flush-on-stop timed out; {Count} item(s) not contributed",
reports.Count + retracts.Count
);
}
}
catch (Exception e)
{
logger.Warning(e, "CrowdSec flush-on-stop failed");
}
}
/// <summary>
/// Uses a fresh token, not the drain loop's already-cancelled one, which would fail every send
/// immediately. Reports go as one deduped batch; retracts go as individual DELETEs so an admin's
/// unban propagates on a clean shutdown. Leftovers self-heal via
/// <see cref="CrowdSecSettings.ManualBanDuration"/>.
/// </summary>
private async Task FlushRemainingOnStopAsync(List<ReportItem> reports, List<ReportItem> retracts)
{
using var flushCts = new CancellationTokenSource(TimeSpan.FromSeconds(3));
if (reports.Count > 0)
{
var alerts = BuildAlerts(reports, _settings, DateTime.UtcNow);
try
{
await _client.PostAlertsAsync(alerts, flushCts.Token).ConfigureAwait(false);
}
catch (Exception e)
{
logger.Warning(e, "CrowdSec flush-on-stop reports failed");
RecordSendFailure(alerts.Count);
}
}
HashSet<string> seen = [];
for (var i = 0; i < retracts.Count; i++)
{
if (flushCts.IsCancellationRequested)
{
break; // out of budget; the rest self-heal via ManualBanDuration
}
var ip = retracts[i].Ip;
if (!seen.Add(ip.ToString()))
{
continue;
}
try
{
await _client.DeleteDecisionsAsync(_settings.Origin, ip, flushCts.Token).ConfigureAwait(false);
}
catch (Exception e)
{
logger.Warning(e, "CrowdSec flush-on-stop retract failed for {Address}", ip);
RecordSendFailure(1);
}
}
}
public void Report(IPAddress address, TimeSpan ttl, string reason) =>
Enqueue(new ReportItem(address, ttl, reason, false));
public void Retract(IPAddress address) =>
Enqueue(new ReportItem(address, TimeSpan.Zero, "retract", true));
private void Enqueue(ReportItem item)
{
if (_queue == null || !_queue.Writer.TryWrite(item))
{
Interlocked.Increment(ref _dropped);
}
}
// FullMode.Wait (the default) makes TryWrite return false immediately when the channel is full
// instead of blocking the caller — exactly the non-blocking drop-on-overflow behavior the accept
// path requires. DropWrite would silently discard the new item and always report success, which
// would make overflow undetectable.
private static Channel<ReportItem> CreateQueue(int capacity) =>
Channel.CreateBounded<ReportItem>(new BoundedChannelOptions(Math.Max(1, capacity))
{
FullMode = BoundedChannelFullMode.Wait,
SingleReader = true
});
// Must return Task: Start() passes this to Task.Run, which has no Func<ValueTask> overload, so a
// ValueTask would bind to Task.Run<TResult> and yield a Task<ValueTask> that completes at the first
// await rather than when the loop exits.
private async Task DrainLoop(CancellationToken token)
{
var reader = _queue.Reader;
while (!token.IsCancellationRequested)
{
try
{
if (!await reader.WaitToReadAsync(token).ConfigureAwait(false))
{
return;
}
// Coalesce a burst before flushing.
await Task.Delay(_settings.FlushInterval, token).ConfigureAwait(false);
List<ReportItem> reports = [];
List<ReportItem> retracts = [];
while (reader.TryRead(out var item))
{
(item.Retract ? retracts : reports).Add(item);
}
if (reports.Count > 0)
{
var alerts = BuildAlerts(reports, _settings, DateTime.UtcNow);
if (!await SendWithBoundedRetryAsync(() => _client.PostAlertsAsync(alerts, token), token)
.ConfigureAwait(false))
{
RecordSendFailure(alerts.Count);
}
}
for (var i = 0; i < retracts.Count; i++)
{
var ip = retracts[i].Ip;
if (!await SendWithBoundedRetryAsync(() => _client.DeleteDecisionsAsync(_settings.Origin, ip, token), token)
.ConfigureAwait(false))
{
RecordSendFailure(1);
}
}
}
catch (OperationCanceledException)
{
return;
}
catch (Exception e)
{
// Contribution is auxiliary: log and keep draining. Never crash the shard.
logger.Warning(e, "CrowdSec contribution flush failed; dropped this batch");
}
}
}
/// <summary>
/// Sends with up to 3 attempts total (1 initial + 2 retries), backing off 1s then 2s between
/// attempts, for transient LAPI failures (network blips, 5xx). Backoff uses <see cref="Task.Delay"/>
/// so it never blocks the thread; a cancellation during backoff propagates as
/// <see cref="OperationCanceledException"/> so the drain loop exits cleanly. Returns false (never
/// throws for a send failure) once attempts are exhausted, so the caller can count the drop and keep
/// draining instead of losing the rest of the batch/queue.
/// </summary>
private static async ValueTask<bool> SendWithBoundedRetryAsync(Func<ValueTask> send, CancellationToken token)
{
for (var attempt = 0; ; attempt++)
{
try
{
await send().ConfigureAwait(false);
return true;
}
catch (OperationCanceledException)
{
throw;
}
catch (Exception e)
{
if (attempt >= _retryDelays.Length)
{
logger.Warning(e, "CrowdSec send failed after {Attempts} attempt(s); giving up", attempt + 1);
return false;
}
var delay = _retryDelays[attempt];
logger.Warning(e, "CrowdSec send failed (attempt {Attempt}); retrying in {Delay}", attempt + 1, delay);
await Task.Delay(delay, token).ConfigureAwait(false);
}
}
}
private void RecordSendFailure(int itemCount)
{
var total = Interlocked.Increment(ref _sendFailures);
logger.Warning(
"CrowdSec contribution batch dropped after retries ({Items} item(s)); total dropped batches: {Total}",
itemCount,
total
);
}
/// <summary>Coalesces items by IP (last write wins) and builds one alert per unique address.</summary>
internal static List<CrowdSecAlert> BuildAlerts(IEnumerable<ReportItem> items, CrowdSecSettings settings, DateTime nowUtc)
{
Dictionary<string, ReportItem> byIp = [];
foreach (var item in items)
{
byIp[item.Ip.ToString()] = item;
}
var timestamp = FormatTimestamp(nowUtc);
var alerts = new List<CrowdSecAlert>(byIp.Count);
foreach (var (value, item) in byIp)
{
var ttl = item.Reason == BanReasons.Manual || item.Ttl <= TimeSpan.Zero ? settings.ManualBanDuration : item.Ttl;
var scenario = $"{settings.Origin}/{item.Reason}";
alerts.Add(new CrowdSecAlert
{
Scenario = scenario,
Message = $"ModernUO {item.Reason} ban for {value}",
StartAt = timestamp,
StopAt = timestamp,
Source = new CrowdSecSource { Scope = "Ip", Value = value },
Decisions =
[
new CrowdSecDecisionDto
{
Origin = settings.Origin,
Type = "ban",
Scope = "Ip",
Value = value,
Duration = FormatDuration(ttl),
Scenario = scenario
}
]
});
}
return alerts;
}
/// <summary>
/// ISO8601/RFC3339 UTC timestamp for <c>start_at</c>/<c>stop_at</c>. LAPI parses these with Go's
/// <c>time.RFC3339</c> and answers 500 when the parse fails, so the format must be culture-independent:
/// ':' is the *time separator* specifier in a custom .NET format string, and a shard running under a
/// culture like fi-FI would otherwise emit "T12.34.56.789Z". InvariantCulture also pins the Gregorian
/// calendar, which non-Gregorian cultures (th-TH, ar-SA) would otherwise shift the year for.
/// </summary>
internal static string FormatTimestamp(DateTime time) =>
(time.Kind == DateTimeKind.Utc ? time : time.ToUniversalTime())
.ToString("yyyy-MM-ddTHH:mm:ss.fffZ", CultureInfo.InvariantCulture);
/// <summary>CrowdSec accepts Go durations; whole seconds are unambiguous and sufficient.</summary>
internal static string FormatDuration(TimeSpan ttl)
{
var seconds = (long)ttl.TotalSeconds;
return $"{Math.Max(1, seconds)}s";
}
}