The shard owner, on a Starlink CGNAT address, was blocked by the imported reputation blocklist. The cause was not CrowdSec: the address was a literal line in ip-blocklist.txt, so BlocklistFilter denied it at accept and then promoted it. Clearing the CrowdSec decision could not fix it either, because the file entry re-reports within promoteSuppression of every reconnect. Reputation feeds list shared consumer address space constantly. On CGNAT one public address fronts many subscribers at the same time, so a single abusive customer gets the address listed and everyone else behind it is blocked with them; where leases rotate, a listing says little about whoever holds the address now. So exemptions go where they cost nothing, and escalation is driven by what a connection actually does. GENERATOR (tools/Export-IpBlocklist.ps1) - -AllowlistFile takes multiple paths, subtracted from the merged set before the output is written. Defaults to the operator's own ip-allowlist.txt (created once, never rewritten) plus one generated file per network carve-out. - Subtraction is range-correct: an allowlisted address inside a blocked CIDR splits that CIDR around the hole instead of being ignored. This also fixes -ExcludeAnonymizers, which parsed CIDR entries and then only subtracted singles. - Carve-outs are a table (name, ASN, reason, offline seed) rather than a hardcoded network, so covering another CGNAT provider is one row. -RefreshCarveouts re-fetches from the ASN's current routing announcements and collapses them; -Carveout '' subtracts none. Announcements rather than ownership records, because registry data disagrees with what is routed and caps its result sets. - Editing an allowlist bypasses -MinInterval, so a just-added exemption is not indistinguishable from the allowlist not working. - The shipped starlink carve-out costs ~0.1% of the list. ALLOWLISTS - FileAllowlist reads the same files the generator subtracts, so an operator entry means "leave this address alone" for real. Subtraction alone only covers being BLOCKED; behavioural detections never consult the blocklist, so without this a carve-out was quietly routed around and one scanner behind a shared address was enough to get everyone behind it firewalled. Reading the files also means an entry applies on the next reload rather than the next regeneration. - LoginAllowlist is earned by authenticating, with a 90 day TTL because an address that logged in years ago is a stranger. Its own store rather than Account.LoginIPs, which has no timestamps and cannot be backfilled. An entry is evidence rather than a licence: 10 suppressed contributions in an hour revokes it, and a fresh login forgives the tally. - Both are consulted only AFTER the blocklist has already matched, so a normal accept pays nothing for them and the accept gate stays allowlist-free. - BanExemptions combines them behind BanChannel.IsExempt. Suppresses escalation only; every local defence still applies. BEHAVIOURAL DETECTION - silent-connect (reaped having sent zero bytes) and invalid-seed (a zero seed) are contributed. Both were already disconnected. - ForeignProtocol positively identifies HTTP, TLS and SSH. Asking "is this a good UO client?" cannot work: LoginEncryption.ClientDecrypt is a byte-for-byte stream XOR, so a client with encryption on when the shard expects none sends a structurally perfect connection whose payload is noise. Nothing assumes arrival framing, since TCP has no message boundaries and a rule of the form "these bytes must arrive together" drops real players on poor links. - Keyed on bytes-received rather than elapsed time throughout. A connection that sent something and ran out of time is far more likely a slow link, and banning those makes the player retry, trip the rate limiter, and compound it. - AutoDenylist holds behavioural detections locally for 15 minutes, as an IConnectionFilter plus IBanReporter over one store so engine detection sites never reach into content. Closes the gap where a flood pays for a socket and a NetState per connection while waiting for an OS bouncer, and is the whole defence on a shard running none. Not persisted: a holding pen that survives restarts is a ban without a ban's review. - BanReasons centralises the slugs. IsBehavioral is an opt-in set, not "everything except manual", so a future reason escalates normally instead of silently inheriting an exemption. The first cut of the exemption swallowed manual admin bans; this is why. FIXES - BanConfiguration.Settings was null until Configure() ran while the reap path dereferences it every Slice(), so a harness driving NetState.Slice() directly hit an NRE that looked flaky because it depended on test ordering. - -AllowlistFile was typed [string] while documented and used as a list. LAYOUT AND DOCS Content network code moves out of Misc into UOContent/Network, one concern per folder. Namespaces are untouched, so these are pure file moves. dev-docs/ip-bans-and-allowlists.md documents the subsystem, leading with the operator process for unblocking a player -- including the three things that look sufficient and are not: deleting the CrowdSec decision alone, editing ip-blocklist.txt by hand, and cscli allowlists alone. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
411 lines
15 KiB
C#
411 lines
15 KiB
C#
/*************************************************************************
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* ModernUO *
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* Copyright 2019-2026 - ModernUO Development Team *
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* Email: hi@modernuo.com *
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* File: CrowdSecReporter.cs *
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* *
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* This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify *
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* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by *
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* the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or *
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* (at your option) any later version. *
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* *
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* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License *
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* along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>. *
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*************************************************************************/
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using System;
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using System.Collections.Generic;
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using System.Globalization;
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using System.Net;
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using System.Threading;
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using System.Threading.Channels;
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using System.Threading.Tasks;
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using Server.Logging;
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namespace Server.Network.Bans.CrowdSec;
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/// <summary>
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/// Contributes locally-decided bans to CrowdSec via the LAPI alerts API. Non-blocking on the accept
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/// path: <see cref="Report"/> enqueues onto a bounded, drop-on-overflow channel drained by a single
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/// background task that coalesces by IP and POSTs batched alerts.
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/// </summary>
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public sealed class CrowdSecReporter : IBanReporter
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{
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private static readonly ILogger logger = LogFactory.GetLogger(typeof(CrowdSecReporter));
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internal readonly record struct ReportItem(IPAddress Ip, TimeSpan Ttl, string Reason, bool Retract);
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// Bounded retry for transient LAPI failures during a drain send (network blips, 5xx). Distinct from
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// CrowdSecAlertClient.SendWithRetryAsync's single 401-relogin retry, which is an auth concern.
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private static readonly TimeSpan[] _retryDelays = [TimeSpan.FromSeconds(1), TimeSpan.FromSeconds(2)];
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private ICrowdSecAlertClient _client;
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private CrowdSecSettings _settings;
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private Channel<ReportItem> _queue;
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private CancellationTokenSource _cts;
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private Task _drainTask;
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private int _dropped;
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private int _sendFailures;
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public CrowdSecReporter()
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{
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}
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// Test/embedding ctor with an injected client + settings.
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internal CrowdSecReporter(ICrowdSecAlertClient client, CrowdSecSettings settings)
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{
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_client = client;
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_settings = settings;
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_queue = CreateQueue(settings.MaxQueue);
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}
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public string Name => "crowdsec";
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public bool CanRetract => true;
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public int DroppedCount => _dropped;
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/// <summary>
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/// Batches ultimately dropped after the bounded transient-retry in <see cref="DrainLoop"/> gave up.
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/// Distinct from <see cref="DroppedCount"/> (queue-overflow drops on the accept path): this counts
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/// sustained LAPI outages so operators can see contribution loss instead of it being silent.
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/// </summary>
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public int SendFailureCount => _sendFailures;
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/// <summary>The drain loop's task, so tests can assert it stays alive until the loop exits.</summary>
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internal Task DrainTaskForTesting => _drainTask;
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public static void Configure()
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{
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BanChannel.Register(new CrowdSecReporter());
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}
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public void Register()
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{
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CrowdSecConfiguration.Load();
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_settings ??= CrowdSecConfiguration.Settings;
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}
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public void Start(CancellationToken token)
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{
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if (!_settings.ReportingEnabled)
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{
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logger.Information("CrowdSec reporter disabled (machineId/password empty in crowdsec.json)");
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return;
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}
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_client ??= new CrowdSecAlertClient(_settings);
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_queue ??= CreateQueue(_settings.MaxQueue);
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_cts = CancellationTokenSource.CreateLinkedTokenSource(token);
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_drainTask = Task.Run(() => DrainLoop(_cts.Token), _cts.Token);
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}
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public void Stop()
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{
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_cts?.Cancel();
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// The flush below reads a SingleReader channel, so wait for the drain to actually exit first.
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var drainExited = true;
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try
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{
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// Wait(timeout) is false only on timeout; a throw means faulted/cancelled, which is still exited.
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drainExited = _drainTask == null || _drainTask.Wait(TimeSpan.FromSeconds(2));
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}
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catch
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{
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// Ignored: a faulted wait means the drain has completed and released the channel.
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}
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_cts?.Dispose();
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_cts = null;
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if (drainExited)
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{
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FlushRemainingOnStop();
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}
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_client?.Dispose();
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_drainTask = null;
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}
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/// <summary>
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/// Best-effort bounded flush of whatever is still queued at shutdown. Blocking is correct here — the
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/// loop has stopped ticking — but must not happen on the loop thread: <see cref="Stop"/> runs where
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/// <c>SynchronizationContext.Current</c> is the <c>EventLoopContext</c>, and a captured continuation
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/// would be posted to a queue nothing pumps any more. <see cref="Task.Run(Func{Task})"/> keeps the
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/// chain on the pool; the bounded wait caps a wedged send at a few seconds of shutdown.
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/// </summary>
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private void FlushRemainingOnStop()
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{
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if (_queue == null || _client == null)
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{
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return;
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}
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_queue.Writer.TryComplete();
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List<ReportItem> reports = [];
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List<ReportItem> retracts = [];
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while (_queue.Reader.TryRead(out var item))
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{
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(item.Retract ? retracts : reports).Add(item);
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}
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if (reports.Count == 0 && retracts.Count == 0)
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{
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return;
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}
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try
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{
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if (!Task.Run(() => FlushRemainingOnStopAsync(reports, retracts)).Wait(TimeSpan.FromSeconds(4)))
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{
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logger.Warning(
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"CrowdSec flush-on-stop timed out; {Count} item(s) not contributed",
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reports.Count + retracts.Count
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);
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}
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}
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catch (Exception e)
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{
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logger.Warning(e, "CrowdSec flush-on-stop failed");
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}
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}
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/// <summary>
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/// Uses a fresh token, not the drain loop's already-cancelled one, which would fail every send
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/// immediately. Reports go as one deduped batch; retracts go as individual DELETEs so an admin's
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/// unban propagates on a clean shutdown. Leftovers self-heal via
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/// <see cref="CrowdSecSettings.ManualBanDuration"/>.
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/// </summary>
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private async Task FlushRemainingOnStopAsync(List<ReportItem> reports, List<ReportItem> retracts)
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{
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using var flushCts = new CancellationTokenSource(TimeSpan.FromSeconds(3));
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if (reports.Count > 0)
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{
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var alerts = BuildAlerts(reports, _settings, DateTime.UtcNow);
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try
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{
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await _client.PostAlertsAsync(alerts, flushCts.Token).ConfigureAwait(false);
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}
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catch (Exception e)
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{
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logger.Warning(e, "CrowdSec flush-on-stop reports failed");
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RecordSendFailure(alerts.Count);
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}
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}
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HashSet<string> seen = [];
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for (var i = 0; i < retracts.Count; i++)
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{
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if (flushCts.IsCancellationRequested)
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{
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break; // out of budget; the rest self-heal via ManualBanDuration
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}
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var ip = retracts[i].Ip;
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if (!seen.Add(ip.ToString()))
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{
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continue;
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}
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try
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{
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await _client.DeleteDecisionsAsync(_settings.Origin, ip, flushCts.Token).ConfigureAwait(false);
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}
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catch (Exception e)
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{
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logger.Warning(e, "CrowdSec flush-on-stop retract failed for {Address}", ip);
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RecordSendFailure(1);
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}
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}
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}
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public void Report(IPAddress address, TimeSpan ttl, string reason) =>
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Enqueue(new ReportItem(address, ttl, reason, false));
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public void Retract(IPAddress address) =>
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Enqueue(new ReportItem(address, TimeSpan.Zero, "retract", true));
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private void Enqueue(ReportItem item)
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{
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if (_queue == null || !_queue.Writer.TryWrite(item))
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{
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Interlocked.Increment(ref _dropped);
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}
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}
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// FullMode.Wait (the default) makes TryWrite return false immediately when the channel is full
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// instead of blocking the caller — exactly the non-blocking drop-on-overflow behavior the accept
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// path requires. DropWrite would silently discard the new item and always report success, which
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// would make overflow undetectable.
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private static Channel<ReportItem> CreateQueue(int capacity) =>
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Channel.CreateBounded<ReportItem>(new BoundedChannelOptions(Math.Max(1, capacity))
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{
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FullMode = BoundedChannelFullMode.Wait,
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SingleReader = true
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});
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// Must return Task: Start() passes this to Task.Run, which has no Func<ValueTask> overload, so a
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// ValueTask would bind to Task.Run<TResult> and yield a Task<ValueTask> that completes at the first
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// await rather than when the loop exits.
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private async Task DrainLoop(CancellationToken token)
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{
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var reader = _queue.Reader;
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while (!token.IsCancellationRequested)
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{
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try
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{
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if (!await reader.WaitToReadAsync(token).ConfigureAwait(false))
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{
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return;
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}
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// Coalesce a burst before flushing.
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await Task.Delay(_settings.FlushInterval, token).ConfigureAwait(false);
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List<ReportItem> reports = [];
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List<ReportItem> retracts = [];
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while (reader.TryRead(out var item))
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{
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(item.Retract ? retracts : reports).Add(item);
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}
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if (reports.Count > 0)
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{
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var alerts = BuildAlerts(reports, _settings, DateTime.UtcNow);
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if (!await SendWithBoundedRetryAsync(() => _client.PostAlertsAsync(alerts, token), token)
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.ConfigureAwait(false))
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{
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RecordSendFailure(alerts.Count);
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}
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}
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for (var i = 0; i < retracts.Count; i++)
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{
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var ip = retracts[i].Ip;
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if (!await SendWithBoundedRetryAsync(() => _client.DeleteDecisionsAsync(_settings.Origin, ip, token), token)
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.ConfigureAwait(false))
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{
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RecordSendFailure(1);
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}
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}
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}
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catch (OperationCanceledException)
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{
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return;
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}
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catch (Exception e)
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{
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// Contribution is auxiliary: log and keep draining. Never crash the shard.
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logger.Warning(e, "CrowdSec contribution flush failed; dropped this batch");
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}
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}
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}
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/// <summary>
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/// Sends with up to 3 attempts total (1 initial + 2 retries), backing off 1s then 2s between
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/// attempts, for transient LAPI failures (network blips, 5xx). Backoff uses <see cref="Task.Delay"/>
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/// so it never blocks the thread; a cancellation during backoff propagates as
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/// <see cref="OperationCanceledException"/> so the drain loop exits cleanly. Returns false (never
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/// throws for a send failure) once attempts are exhausted, so the caller can count the drop and keep
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/// draining instead of losing the rest of the batch/queue.
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/// </summary>
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private static async ValueTask<bool> SendWithBoundedRetryAsync(Func<ValueTask> send, CancellationToken token)
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{
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for (var attempt = 0; ; attempt++)
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{
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try
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{
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await send().ConfigureAwait(false);
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return true;
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}
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catch (OperationCanceledException)
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{
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throw;
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}
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catch (Exception e)
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{
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if (attempt >= _retryDelays.Length)
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{
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logger.Warning(e, "CrowdSec send failed after {Attempts} attempt(s); giving up", attempt + 1);
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return false;
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}
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var delay = _retryDelays[attempt];
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logger.Warning(e, "CrowdSec send failed (attempt {Attempt}); retrying in {Delay}", attempt + 1, delay);
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await Task.Delay(delay, token).ConfigureAwait(false);
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}
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}
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}
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private void RecordSendFailure(int itemCount)
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{
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var total = Interlocked.Increment(ref _sendFailures);
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logger.Warning(
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"CrowdSec contribution batch dropped after retries ({Items} item(s)); total dropped batches: {Total}",
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itemCount,
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total
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);
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}
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/// <summary>Coalesces items by IP (last write wins) and builds one alert per unique address.</summary>
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internal static List<CrowdSecAlert> BuildAlerts(IEnumerable<ReportItem> items, CrowdSecSettings settings, DateTime nowUtc)
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{
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Dictionary<string, ReportItem> byIp = [];
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foreach (var item in items)
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{
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byIp[item.Ip.ToString()] = item;
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}
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var timestamp = FormatTimestamp(nowUtc);
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var alerts = new List<CrowdSecAlert>(byIp.Count);
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foreach (var (value, item) in byIp)
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{
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var ttl = item.Reason == BanReasons.Manual || item.Ttl <= TimeSpan.Zero ? settings.ManualBanDuration : item.Ttl;
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var scenario = $"{settings.Origin}/{item.Reason}";
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alerts.Add(new CrowdSecAlert
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{
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Scenario = scenario,
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Message = $"ModernUO {item.Reason} ban for {value}",
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StartAt = timestamp,
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StopAt = timestamp,
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Source = new CrowdSecSource { Scope = "Ip", Value = value },
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Decisions =
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[
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new CrowdSecDecisionDto
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{
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Origin = settings.Origin,
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Type = "ban",
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Scope = "Ip",
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Value = value,
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Duration = FormatDuration(ttl),
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Scenario = scenario
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}
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]
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});
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}
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return alerts;
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}
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/// <summary>
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/// ISO8601/RFC3339 UTC timestamp for <c>start_at</c>/<c>stop_at</c>. LAPI parses these with Go's
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/// <c>time.RFC3339</c> and answers 500 when the parse fails, so the format must be culture-independent:
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/// ':' is the *time separator* specifier in a custom .NET format string, and a shard running under a
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/// culture like fi-FI would otherwise emit "T12.34.56.789Z". InvariantCulture also pins the Gregorian
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/// calendar, which non-Gregorian cultures (th-TH, ar-SA) would otherwise shift the year for.
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/// </summary>
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internal static string FormatTimestamp(DateTime time) =>
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(time.Kind == DateTimeKind.Utc ? time : time.ToUniversalTime())
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.ToString("yyyy-MM-ddTHH:mm:ss.fffZ", CultureInfo.InvariantCulture);
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/// <summary>CrowdSec accepts Go durations; whole seconds are unambiguous and sufficient.</summary>
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internal static string FormatDuration(TimeSpan ttl)
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{
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var seconds = (long)ttl.TotalSeconds;
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return $"{Math.Max(1, seconds)}s";
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}
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}
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