## Why The shard owner, on a Starlink CGNAT address, was blocked by the imported reputation blocklist. The cause was not CrowdSec. The address was a literal line in `ip-blocklist.txt`, so `BlocklistFilter` denied it at accept and then promoted it — and clearing the CrowdSec decision could not fix it either, because the file entry re-reports within `promoteSuppression` of every reconnect attempt. This is structural, not a one-off. Reputation feeds list shared consumer address space constantly: on CGNAT one public address fronts many subscribers **at the same time**, so a single abusive customer gets the address listed and everyone else behind it is blocked with them. Where leases rotate, a listing says little about whoever holds the address now. Around 1,000 Starlink addresses sit in the current list. So exemptions go where they cost nothing, and escalation is driven by what a connection actually does. ## Generator — `tools/Export-IpBlocklist.ps1` `-AllowlistFile` takes multiple paths, subtracted from the merged set before the output is written. Defaults to every `ip-allowlist*.txt` beside the output, merged into one allow set: - `ip-allowlist.txt` — operator exemptions, created once and **never rewritten** - `ip-allowlist-<name>.txt` — a carve-out you built, regenerable and copyable between shards **Subtraction is range-correct.** An allowlisted address inside a blocked CIDR splits that CIDR around the hole rather than being silently ignored. This also fixes `-ExcludeAnonymizers`, which parsed CIDR entries into `$anonCidr` and then only ever subtracted singles. **No carve-out ships.** A carve-out names a real network, and which ones a shard should exempt depends on where its players actually are — so publishing one would make that policy call for every shard and put a specific provider's address space in the repo. The script builds them on request instead: ```powershell .\Export-IpBlocklist.ps1 -AddCarveout starlink -Asn 14593 ``` Carve-outs are **discovered, not configured**: every `ip-allowlist*.txt` beside the output is subtracted, by the generator and by the shard, so a file an admin adds needs no config edit and no code change. Each carries an `asn=` marker in its header, which is how `-RefreshCarveouts` rebuilds it without the script keeping a list of anyone's networks; a hand-written allowlist has no marker and is never rewritten. Prefixes come from **announcements, not ownership records**, because registry data disagrees with what is actually routed and silently caps result sets: ARIN whois returns at most 256 rows and gives per-customer /24s, and `206.83.96.0/19` reads as APNIC in RDAP even though `206.83.96/21` is announced by Starlink. Editing an allowlist bypasses `-MinInterval`, so a just-added exemption isn't indistinguishable from the allowlist not working. A Starlink carve-out, if you build one, costs **~4,300 IPs + ~144 CIDRs of 4.2M (0.10%)**. ## Allowlists **`FileAllowlist`** reads the same files the generator subtracts, so an operator entry means "leave this address alone" for real. Subtraction alone only covers being *blocked*; behavioural detections never consult the blocklist, so without this a carve-out was quietly routed around — one scanner behind a shared address was enough to get everyone behind it contributed and firewalled, with nothing in the shard's own config explaining why. Reading the files also means an entry applies on the next reload rather than the next regeneration, which is what matters when someone is complaining now. **`LoginAllowlist`** is earned by authenticating, with a 90-day TTL because an address that logged in years ago is a stranger. Its own store rather than `Account.LoginIPs`, which has no timestamps and cannot be backfilled. An entry is evidence rather than a licence: 10 suppressed contributions in an hour revokes it, and a fresh login forgives the tally. Both are consulted **only after the blocklist has already matched**, so a normal accept pays nothing for them and the accept gate stays allowlist-free. `BanExemptions` combines them behind `BanChannel.IsExempt` and suppresses escalation only — every local defence still applies. Two limits, both deliberate and documented in the class: `LoginAllowlist` **cannot bootstrap** (an entry is only earned by getting in, so it never repairs an existing false positive), and it is weakest on rotating CGNAT. That is why `FileAllowlist` is the fix for those, and why it is manual. ## Behavioural detection | Reason | Trigger | |---|---| | `silent-connect` | Reaped after 5s having sent **zero bytes** | | `invalid-seed` | Opened with a zero seed | | `foreign-protocol` | Positively identified as HTTP, TLS or SSH | **`ForeignProtocol` inverts the test.** Asking "is this a good UO client?" cannot work: `LoginEncryption.ClientDecrypt` is a byte-for-byte stream XOR, so a legitimate client with encryption enabled when the shard expects none sends a structurally perfect connection whose payload is noise. "Speaks HTTP" is safe where "unreadable" is not — however misconfigured a UO client is, it never sends `GET / HTTP/1.1`. Nothing assumes arrival framing. TCP has no message boundaries, so a rule of the form "these bytes must arrive together" is broken by construction and drops real players on poor links. A prefix match with too few bytes to confirm waits for more. A four-byte seed can legitimately spell `GET ` (the address 71.69.84.32) or `0x16 0x03 0x0?` (22.3.x.x), so confirmation requires the request line to continue in printable ASCII or an actual ClientHello inside a plausible record — a real client's fifth byte is a packet id (`0x80`, `0x91`, `0xEF`), none of them printable, so those collisions fall through. Everything is keyed on **bytes-received rather than elapsed time**. A connection that sent something and ran out of time is far more likely a slow link than an attack, and banning those produces the worst failure mode available: the player retries, trips the rate limiter, and compounds a bad connection into hours of being firewalled off. ## `AutoDenylist` A short-lived local hold (15m) on behavioural detections, as `IConnectionFilter` + `IBanReporter` over one store so the engine detection sites never reach into content. This closes the gap where a flood pays for a socket, buffer and `NetState` slot per connection while waiting for the OS bouncer — the verdicts that matter most are reachable only *after* reading bytes — and it is the entire defence on a shard running no bouncer, which is the default config. Not persisted: a holding pen that survives restarts is a ban without a ban's review. Cost: one dictionary lookup on a usually-empty dict per accept. ## `BanReasons` Centralises the reason slugs. `IsBehavioral` is an **opt-in** set, not "everything except manual", so a future reason escalates normally instead of silently inheriting an exemption or entering a local denylist. This caught a real bug during review: the first cut of the exemption swallowed `manual` admin bans (`Commands.cs`, three sites in `AdminGump`) for any allowlisted address. ## Fixes found in review - **`BanConfiguration.Settings` was null until `Configure()` ran**, while the reap path dereferences it every `Slice()`. A harness driving `NetState.Slice()` directly hit an NRE that presented as flaky because it depended on whether an earlier test had already called `Configure()` — which is why it failed on some CI platforms and not others. Now starts at the record's defaults, with idempotency tracked by a flag; this also removes the same latent NRE from the pre-existing rate-limit path. - **`-AllowlistFile` was typed `[string]`** while documented and used as a list, so passing two paths would have collapsed them into one string. ## Layout and docs Content network code moves out of `Misc/` into `UOContent/Network/`, one concern per folder — `AutoDenylist/`, `Blocklist/`, `CrowdSec/`, `Firewall/`, `LoginAllowlist/`, `Packets/`. **Namespaces are untouched**, so these are pure file moves (git tracks all 16 as renames). `dev-docs/ip-bans-and-allowlists.md` documents the subsystem, leading with the operator process for unblocking a player — including the three things that look sufficient and are not: deleting the CrowdSec decision alone, editing `ip-blocklist.txt` by hand, and `cscli allowlists` alone. `.gitignore` covers the new config files. ## Testing Build clean. **Server.Tests 810 passed**, **UOContent.Tests 637 passed**, zero warnings. This branch adds 38 tests; the rest of the delta is main's, since this is rebased on current `main`. New coverage: TTL boundary and renewal, private-address exclusion, manual-ban-never-exempt, unopted-reason-never-exempt, strike revocation, quiet-window reset, login forgiveness, file-allowlist CIDR coverage, file-allowlist not spending the earned list's strikes, denylist expiry-on-read, cap enforcement, lapsed-entry reclaim, HTTP/TLS/SSH identification, seed-collision fall-through, and encrypted-login-is-not-foreign. Generator verified end-to-end against live feeds: a clean run ships no carve-out, `-AddCarveout starlink -Asn 14593` fetches and collapses 213 prefixes to 115 ranges in 0.1s over 4.2M entries, `-RefreshCarveouts` rediscovers it by its `asn=` marker, a hand-written allowlist is left untouched, and deleting a carve-out drops it rather than having it rewritten. CIDR splitting verified exhaustively: a single-IP hole in a /24 leaves exactly 255 of 256 addresses blocked. ## Operator note Existing installs are unaffected until the generator next runs, which creates `ip-allowlist.txt` and nothing else. To unblock someone: add the address to that file and delete any live CrowdSec decision — the existing ban outlives the config change. The shard picks the entry up on its next reload, so re-running the generator is optional. A shard whose players are on CGNAT (satellite, mobile, or an ISP short on IPv4) will likely also want `-AddCarveout`; see `dev-docs/ip-bans-and-allowlists.md`. ## Also included: a latent CI failure this PR surfaced `fix(tests): serialize test classes that rent through STArrayPool` touches a property-list test file that has nothing to do with this feature. It is here because it was failing macOS CI, and it is trivially cherry-pickable out if you would rather it went to `main` on its own — **which may be the better call, since it is failing `main` today.** CI has since gone green with it applied. `STArrayPool` is single-threaded by design and its bucket cache is a plain `static`, not `[ThreadStatic]`, with a check-then-act initialize in `Return()`: ```csharp var cacheBuckets = _cacheBuckets ?? InitializeBuckets(); ``` Two threads both see null, both initialize, and the loser trips `Debug.Assert(_cacheBuckets is null)`. Anything renting from it has to stay off parallel test threads — which is what the `DisableParallelization` collections are for. - `ObjectPropertyListReentrancyTests` and `ObjectPropertyListNestedBuildTests` (added in #2555) build property lists, which rent the interpolation buffer, but were not in the sequential collection — unlike `PropertyListInvalidationDuringBuildTests` in the same file. This is a **latent failure already on `main`**; it is timing-dependent, so it shows on some platforms and not others. - `AutoDenylistTests` (added here) has the same exposure: its cap tests reach `AutoDenylist.Sweep`, which rents a `PooledRefList` without `mt`. The blocklist tests need no marking because `BlocklistSnapshot.Build` asks for the `mt` pool explicitly. No production change — `STArrayPool` is the right pool on the game loop, where both `Sweep` and the property list actually run. ## Deliberately not included Waiting for a fragmented four-byte seed at `AwaitingSeed`. It looked like a bug but the disconnect is a deliberate defence: only pre-0xEF clients reach it (0xEF goes through `HandlePacket`, which already waits for its 21 bytes), and waiting converts an instant drop into a full 5s slot hold for a client sending one or two bytes, or a loris dribbling a byte every few seconds. Against a fixed 4096-entry `MaxConnections` table that trades capacity that matters for a fragmentation case a reconnect already fixes.
413 lines
13 KiB
C#
413 lines
13 KiB
C#
/*************************************************************************
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* ModernUO *
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* Copyright 2019-2026 - ModernUO Development Team *
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* Email: hi@modernuo.com *
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* File: Firewall.cs *
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* *
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* This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify *
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* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by *
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* the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or *
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* (at your option) any later version. *
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* *
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* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License *
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* along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>. *
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*************************************************************************/
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using System;
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using System.Buffers;
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using System.Collections.Generic;
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using System.IO;
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using System.Net;
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using System.Runtime.CompilerServices;
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using Server.Collections;
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using Server.Json;
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using Server.Logging;
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namespace Server.Network;
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public static class Firewall
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{
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// Single-threaded: the accept path, admin gump/command, TTL expiry timer, and boot load all run on
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// the main game loop. No locks, caches, or version counters are needed. See the ban-channel design doc.
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// _entries is the authoritative store (gump/persistence/TTL/command all work against it); _index is a
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// derived, rebuild-on-demand SortedRangeIndex used only for the accept-path IsBlocked lookup, shared
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// with the same sorted-range binary-search primitive the blocklist uses (see BlocklistSnapshot).
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private static readonly List<IFirewallEntry> _entries = [];
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// Entries with a TTL: entry -> absolute expiry tick (Core.TickCount). Permanent entries are absent.
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private static readonly Dictionary<IFirewallEntry, long> _expiring = [];
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private static SortedRangeIndex<UInt128> _index = SortedRangeIndex<UInt128>.Empty;
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private static bool _indexDirty;
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private static readonly ILogger logger = LogFactory.GetLogger(typeof(Firewall));
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private const string _path = "Configuration/firewall.json";
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private const string _legacyPath = "firewall.cfg";
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private static bool _dirty;
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private static bool _configured;
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public static int FirewallSetCount => _entries.Count;
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public static void ReadFirewallSet(Action<IReadOnlyCollection<IFirewallEntry>> callback) => callback(_entries);
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public static bool IsBlocked(IPAddress address)
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{
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if (_entries.Count == 0)
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{
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return false;
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}
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EnsureIndex();
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return _index.Contains(address.ToUInt128());
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}
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// Rebuilds the derived lookup index from the authoritative _entries list, but only when entries have
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// changed since the last build. Runs on the main game loop, so the pooled build buffer is single-threaded
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// (mt: false); only the two final SortedRangeIndex arrays are heap-allocated.
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private static void EnsureIndex()
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{
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if (!_indexDirty)
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{
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return;
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}
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using var ranges = PooledRefList<SortedRangeIndex<UInt128>.Range>.Create(_entries.Count, mt: false);
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for (var i = 0; i < _entries.Count; i++)
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{
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var entry = _entries[i];
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ranges.Add(new SortedRangeIndex<UInt128>.Range(entry.MinIpAddress, entry.MaxIpAddress));
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}
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ranges.Sort(SortedRangeIndex<UInt128>.ByMin);
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_index = SortedRangeIndex<UInt128>.Build(ranges.AsSpan());
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_indexDirty = false;
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}
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public static bool Add(IFirewallEntry firewallEntry) => Add(firewallEntry, TimeSpan.Zero);
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/// <summary>
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/// Adds an entry. <paramref name="ttl"/> <= <see cref="TimeSpan.Zero"/> means permanent. Returns false
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/// if the entry was already present.
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/// </summary>
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// Indexed scan (no closure allocation); firewall lists are small, so O(n) is negligible and this
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// stays off the hot path (Add/Remove are admin/boot actions, not the accept path).
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private static int IndexOfEntry(IFirewallEntry entry)
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{
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for (var i = 0; i < _entries.Count; i++)
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{
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if (_entries[i].CompareTo(entry) == 0)
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{
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return i;
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}
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}
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return -1;
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}
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public static bool Add(IFirewallEntry firewallEntry, TimeSpan ttl, bool persist = true)
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{
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if (firewallEntry == null || IndexOfEntry(firewallEntry) >= 0)
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{
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return false;
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}
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_entries.Add(firewallEntry);
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if (ttl > TimeSpan.Zero)
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{
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_expiring[firewallEntry] = Core.TickCount + (long)ttl.TotalMilliseconds;
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}
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_indexDirty = true;
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if (persist)
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{
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MarkDirty();
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}
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return true;
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}
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public static bool Remove(IFirewallEntry entry)
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{
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if (entry == null)
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{
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return false;
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}
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var index = IndexOfEntry(entry);
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if (index < 0)
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{
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return false;
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}
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// Remove the stored instance from _expiring (not the passed reference), so a value-equal
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// entry created elsewhere still clears the TTL bookkeeping.
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var stored = _entries[index];
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_entries.RemoveAt(index);
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_expiring.Remove(stored);
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_indexDirty = true;
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MarkDirty();
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return true;
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}
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/// <summary>
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/// Removes every entry whose TTL has elapsed. Called from the main-thread maintenance timer (Task 2).
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/// </summary>
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internal static void ExpireEntries(long nowTicks)
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{
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if (_expiring.Count == 0)
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{
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return;
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}
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List<IFirewallEntry> expired = null;
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foreach (var (entry, expiresAt) in _expiring)
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{
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if (expiresAt - nowTicks <= 0)
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{
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(expired ??= []).Add(entry);
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}
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}
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if (expired == null)
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{
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return;
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}
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for (var i = 0; i < expired.Count; i++)
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{
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var entry = expired[i];
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_entries.Remove(entry);
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_expiring.Remove(entry);
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}
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_indexDirty = true;
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MarkDirty();
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}
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[MethodImpl(MethodImplOptions.AggressiveInlining)]
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public static IFirewallEntry ToFirewallEntry(object entry) =>
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entry switch
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{
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IFirewallEntry firewallEntry => firewallEntry,
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IPAddress address => new SingleIpFirewallEntry(address),
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string s => ToFirewallEntry(s),
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_ => null
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};
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public static IFirewallEntry ToFirewallEntry(string entry)
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{
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if (entry == null)
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{
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return null;
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}
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try
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{
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var rangeSeparator = entry.IndexOf('-');
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if (rangeSeparator > -1)
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{
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return new CidrFirewallEntry(
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IPAddress.Parse(entry.AsSpan(0, rangeSeparator)),
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IPAddress.Parse(entry.AsSpan(rangeSeparator + 1))
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);
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}
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if (entry.IndexOf('/') > -1)
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{
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return new CidrFirewallEntry(entry);
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}
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return new SingleIpFirewallEntry(entry);
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}
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catch
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{
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return null;
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}
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}
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public static void Configure()
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{
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if (_configured)
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{
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return;
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}
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_configured = true;
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var path = Path.Join(Core.BaseDirectory, _path);
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if (File.Exists(path))
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{
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LoadFrom(JsonConfig.Deserialize<FirewallSettings>(path));
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}
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else
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{
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var legacyPath = ResolveLegacyCfgPath();
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if (legacyPath != null)
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{
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MigrateLegacyCfg(legacyPath);
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Save(); // materialize firewall.json; the .cfg is no longer read after this
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TryMarkLegacyCfgMigrated(legacyPath);
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}
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}
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// Main-thread maintenance: expire TTLs and flush pending writes. No background thread.
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Timer.DelayCall(TimeSpan.FromSeconds(30), TimeSpan.FromSeconds(30), Maintenance);
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// Expose the set to the accept path. Everything else (gump, commands, persistence) keeps using
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// the Firewall API directly; only the per-connection question goes through the filter registry.
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ConnectionFilters.Register(FirewallConnectionFilter.Instance);
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}
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private static void Maintenance()
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{
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ExpireEntries(Core.TickCount);
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if (_dirty)
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{
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Save();
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}
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}
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private static void MarkDirty() => _dirty = true;
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internal static void LoadFrom(FirewallSettings settings)
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{
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if (settings?.Entries == null)
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{
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return;
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}
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// Core.Now: this runs on the game loop, via the Configure sweep.
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var now = Core.Now;
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var records = settings.Entries;
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for (var i = 0; i < records.Length; i++)
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{
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var record = records[i];
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var entry = ToFirewallEntry(record.Value);
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if (entry == null)
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{
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logger.Warning("Ignoring unparseable firewall entry \"{Entry}\"", record.Value);
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continue;
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}
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var ttl = TimeSpan.Zero;
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if (record.Expires is { } expires)
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{
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ttl = expires - now;
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if (ttl <= TimeSpan.Zero)
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{
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continue; // already expired
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}
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}
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Add(entry, ttl, persist: false);
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}
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}
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internal static FirewallSettings ToSettings()
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{
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// expires is derived below as now + (expiresAtTick - nowTicks), so both operands must come from
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// the same instant. Core.Now and Core.TickCount are refreshed together each loop iteration; a
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// fresh DateTime.UtcNow here would bake the loop's lag into every persisted expiry.
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var now = Core.Now;
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var nowTicks = Core.TickCount;
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var list = new List<FirewallEntryRecord>(_entries.Count);
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for (var i = 0; i < _entries.Count; i++)
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{
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var entry = _entries[i];
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DateTime? expires = null;
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if (_expiring.TryGetValue(entry, out var expiresAtTick))
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{
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expires = now.AddMilliseconds(expiresAtTick - nowTicks);
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}
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list.Add(new FirewallEntryRecord { Value = entry.ToString(), Expires = expires });
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}
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return new FirewallSettings { Entries = list.ToArray() };
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}
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public static void Save()
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{
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_dirty = false;
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var path = Path.Join(Core.BaseDirectory, _path);
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var tmp = $"{path}.tmp";
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JsonConfig.Serialize(tmp, ToSettings());
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File.Move(tmp, path, overwrite: true); // atomic swap
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}
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/// <summary>
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/// Locates the legacy firewall.cfg to migrate. The modern convention is <see cref="Core.BaseDirectory"/>,
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/// checked first; the pre-collapse <c>AdminFirewall</c> used a bare relative path (resolved against the
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/// process's current working directory), which may differ from <see cref="Core.BaseDirectory"/> when the
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/// shard is launched from elsewhere, so that's checked as a fallback. Returns null if neither exists.
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/// </summary>
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private static string ResolveLegacyCfgPath()
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{
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var underBaseDirectory = Path.Join(Core.BaseDirectory, _legacyPath);
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if (File.Exists(underBaseDirectory))
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{
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return underBaseDirectory;
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}
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return File.Exists(_legacyPath) ? _legacyPath : null;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
private static void MigrateLegacyCfg(string legacyPath)
|
|
{
|
|
var searchValues = SearchValues.Create("*Xx?");
|
|
|
|
using var reader = new StreamReader(legacyPath);
|
|
while (reader.ReadLine() is { } line)
|
|
{
|
|
line = line.Trim();
|
|
if (line.Length == 0)
|
|
{
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (line.AsSpan().ContainsAny(searchValues))
|
|
{
|
|
logger.Warning("Legacy firewall entry \"{Entry}\" ignored during migration", line);
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
var entry = ToFirewallEntry(line);
|
|
if (entry != null)
|
|
{
|
|
Add(entry, TimeSpan.Zero, persist: false);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
logger.Information("Migrated {Count} entr(ies) from legacy firewall.cfg to firewall.json", _entries.Count);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/// <summary>
|
|
/// Renames the migrated <c>.cfg</c> to <c>firewall.cfg.migrated</c> so it isn't re-scanned on the next
|
|
/// boot and operators can see it was already migrated. Best-effort: a locked/read-only file must not
|
|
/// fail startup, since the migration itself (firewall.json) already succeeded.
|
|
/// </summary>
|
|
private static void TryMarkLegacyCfgMigrated(string legacyPath)
|
|
{
|
|
try
|
|
{
|
|
File.Move(legacyPath, $"{legacyPath}.migrated", overwrite: true);
|
|
}
|
|
catch (Exception e)
|
|
{
|
|
logger.Warning(e, "Could not rename migrated legacy firewall file \"{Path}\"", legacyPath);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
internal static void ResetForTesting()
|
|
{
|
|
_entries.Clear();
|
|
_expiring.Clear();
|
|
_index = SortedRangeIndex<UInt128>.Empty;
|
|
_indexDirty = false;
|
|
_configured = false;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|