ModernUO/Projects/Server/Network/Bans/BanConfiguration.cs
Kamron Batman 927c87702d
feat(network): allowlist false-positive IPs, escalate on behaviour
The shard owner, on a Starlink CGNAT address, was blocked by the imported
reputation blocklist. The cause was not CrowdSec: the address was a literal line
in ip-blocklist.txt, so BlocklistFilter denied it at accept and then promoted it.
Clearing the CrowdSec decision could not fix it either, because the file entry
re-reports within promoteSuppression of every reconnect.

Reputation feeds list shared consumer address space constantly. On CGNAT one
public address fronts many subscribers at the same time, so a single abusive
customer gets the address listed and everyone else behind it is blocked with
them; where leases rotate, a listing says little about whoever holds the address
now. So exemptions go where they cost nothing, and escalation is driven by what a
connection actually does.

GENERATOR (tools/Export-IpBlocklist.ps1)

- -AllowlistFile takes multiple paths, subtracted from the merged set before the
  output is written. Defaults to the operator's own ip-allowlist.txt (created
  once, never rewritten) plus one generated file per network carve-out.
- Subtraction is range-correct: an allowlisted address inside a blocked CIDR
  splits that CIDR around the hole instead of being ignored. This also fixes
  -ExcludeAnonymizers, which parsed CIDR entries and then only subtracted
  singles.
- Carve-outs are a table (name, ASN, reason, offline seed) rather than a
  hardcoded network, so covering another CGNAT provider is one row.
  -RefreshCarveouts re-fetches from the ASN's current routing announcements and
  collapses them; -Carveout '' subtracts none. Announcements rather than
  ownership records, because registry data disagrees with what is routed and caps
  its result sets.
- Editing an allowlist bypasses -MinInterval, so a just-added exemption is not
  indistinguishable from the allowlist not working.
- The shipped starlink carve-out costs ~0.1% of the list.

ALLOWLISTS

- FileAllowlist reads the same files the generator subtracts, so an operator
  entry means "leave this address alone" for real. Subtraction alone only covers
  being BLOCKED; behavioural detections never consult the blocklist, so without
  this a carve-out was quietly routed around and one scanner behind a shared
  address was enough to get everyone behind it firewalled. Reading the files also
  means an entry applies on the next reload rather than the next regeneration.
- LoginAllowlist is earned by authenticating, with a 90 day TTL because an
  address that logged in years ago is a stranger. Its own store rather than
  Account.LoginIPs, which has no timestamps and cannot be backfilled. An entry is
  evidence rather than a licence: 10 suppressed contributions in an hour revokes
  it, and a fresh login forgives the tally.
- Both are consulted only AFTER the blocklist has already matched, so a normal
  accept pays nothing for them and the accept gate stays allowlist-free.
- BanExemptions combines them behind BanChannel.IsExempt. Suppresses escalation
  only; every local defence still applies.

BEHAVIOURAL DETECTION

- silent-connect (reaped having sent zero bytes) and invalid-seed (a zero seed)
  are contributed. Both were already disconnected.
- ForeignProtocol positively identifies HTTP, TLS and SSH. Asking "is this a good
  UO client?" cannot work: LoginEncryption.ClientDecrypt is a byte-for-byte
  stream XOR, so a client with encryption on when the shard expects none sends a
  structurally perfect connection whose payload is noise. Nothing assumes arrival
  framing, since TCP has no message boundaries and a rule of the form "these
  bytes must arrive together" drops real players on poor links.
- Keyed on bytes-received rather than elapsed time throughout. A connection that
  sent something and ran out of time is far more likely a slow link, and banning
  those makes the player retry, trip the rate limiter, and compound it.
- AutoDenylist holds behavioural detections locally for 15 minutes, as an
  IConnectionFilter plus IBanReporter over one store so engine detection sites
  never reach into content. Closes the gap where a flood pays for a socket and a
  NetState per connection while waiting for an OS bouncer, and is the whole
  defence on a shard running none. Not persisted: a holding pen that survives
  restarts is a ban without a ban's review.
- BanReasons centralises the slugs. IsBehavioral is an opt-in set, not
  "everything except manual", so a future reason escalates normally instead of
  silently inheriting an exemption. The first cut of the exemption swallowed
  manual admin bans; this is why.

FIXES

- BanConfiguration.Settings was null until Configure() ran while the reap path
  dereferences it every Slice(), so a harness driving NetState.Slice() directly
  hit an NRE that looked flaky because it depended on test ordering.
- -AllowlistFile was typed [string] while documented and used as a list.

LAYOUT AND DOCS

Content network code moves out of Misc into UOContent/Network, one concern per
folder. Namespaces are untouched, so these are pure file moves.
dev-docs/ip-bans-and-allowlists.md documents the subsystem, leading with the
operator process for unblocking a player -- including the three things that look
sufficient and are not: deleting the CrowdSec decision alone, editing
ip-blocklist.txt by hand, and cscli allowlists alone.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-30 18:31:34 -07:00

98 lines
3.9 KiB
C#

/*************************************************************************
* ModernUO *
* Copyright 2019-2026 - ModernUO Development Team *
* Email: hi@modernuo.com *
* File: BanConfiguration.cs *
* *
* This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify *
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by *
* the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or *
* (at your option) any later version. *
* *
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License *
* along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>. *
*************************************************************************/
using System;
using System.IO;
using System.Text.Json.Serialization;
using Server.Json;
namespace Server.Network.Bans;
/// <summary>
/// Loads the <see cref="BanSettings"/> from <c>Configuration/bans.json</c> (matching the per-feature
/// JSON config pattern used by <c>AssistantConfiguration</c>). Loaded once; a missing file writes a
/// local-only, fail-open template so operators have something to edit.
/// </summary>
public static class BanConfiguration
{
private const string _path = "Configuration/bans.json";
private static bool _loaded;
/// <summary>
/// Never null: the accept and reap paths read this per connection, including before <see cref="Configure"/>
/// has run (a harness driving <c>NetState.Slice</c> directly), so it starts at the record's defaults.
/// </summary>
public static BanSettings Settings { get; private set; } = new();
public static void Configure()
{
// Idempotent; flagged rather than null-checked because Settings is non-null from the start.
if (_loaded)
{
return;
}
_loaded = true;
var path = Path.Join(Core.BaseDirectory, _path);
if (File.Exists(path))
{
Settings = JsonConfig.Deserialize<BanSettings>(path);
}
else
{
Settings = new BanSettings
{
ReportRateLimitTrips = true,
AutoBanDuration = TimeSpan.FromHours(4)
};
Save();
}
}
private static void Save()
{
JsonConfig.Serialize(Path.Join(Core.BaseDirectory, _path), Settings);
}
}
/// <summary>Ban-channel policy: which reporters receive contributions, and how auto-detections are handled.</summary>
public record BanSettings
{
/// <summary>Whether IP rate-limiter trips are contributed to reporters. They never enter the local firewall set.</summary>
[JsonPropertyName("reportRateLimitTrips")]
public bool ReportRateLimitTrips { get; set; } = true;
/// <summary>Duration reported for an auto-detected (rate-limit) ban.</summary>
[JsonPropertyName("autoBanDuration")]
public TimeSpan AutoBanDuration { get; set; } = TimeSpan.FromHours(4);
/// <summary>
/// Whether behavioural detections are contributed to reporters. Those connections are disconnected either
/// way; this only controls escalation.
/// </summary>
/// <remarks>
/// Keyed on bytes-received, never elapsed time: a connection that sent something and ran out of time is
/// far more likely a slow link than an attack. See <c>dev-docs/ip-bans-and-allowlists.md</c>.
/// </remarks>
[JsonPropertyName("reportBadConnects")]
public bool ReportBadConnects { get; set; } = true;
[JsonPropertyName("badConnectDuration")]
public TimeSpan BadConnectDuration { get; set; } = TimeSpan.FromHours(4);
}