The shard owner, on a Starlink CGNAT address, was blocked by the imported reputation blocklist. The cause was not CrowdSec: the address was a literal line in ip-blocklist.txt, so BlocklistFilter denied it at accept and then promoted it. Clearing the CrowdSec decision could not fix it either, because the file entry re-reports within promoteSuppression of every reconnect. Reputation feeds list shared consumer address space constantly. On CGNAT one public address fronts many subscribers at the same time, so a single abusive customer gets the address listed and everyone else behind it is blocked with them; where leases rotate, a listing says little about whoever holds the address now. So exemptions go where they cost nothing, and escalation is driven by what a connection actually does. GENERATOR (tools/Export-IpBlocklist.ps1) - -AllowlistFile takes multiple paths, subtracted from the merged set before the output is written. Defaults to the operator's own ip-allowlist.txt (created once, never rewritten) plus one generated file per network carve-out. - Subtraction is range-correct: an allowlisted address inside a blocked CIDR splits that CIDR around the hole instead of being ignored. This also fixes -ExcludeAnonymizers, which parsed CIDR entries and then only subtracted singles. - Carve-outs are a table (name, ASN, reason, offline seed) rather than a hardcoded network, so covering another CGNAT provider is one row. -RefreshCarveouts re-fetches from the ASN's current routing announcements and collapses them; -Carveout '' subtracts none. Announcements rather than ownership records, because registry data disagrees with what is routed and caps its result sets. - Editing an allowlist bypasses -MinInterval, so a just-added exemption is not indistinguishable from the allowlist not working. - The shipped starlink carve-out costs ~0.1% of the list. ALLOWLISTS - FileAllowlist reads the same files the generator subtracts, so an operator entry means "leave this address alone" for real. Subtraction alone only covers being BLOCKED; behavioural detections never consult the blocklist, so without this a carve-out was quietly routed around and one scanner behind a shared address was enough to get everyone behind it firewalled. Reading the files also means an entry applies on the next reload rather than the next regeneration. - LoginAllowlist is earned by authenticating, with a 90 day TTL because an address that logged in years ago is a stranger. Its own store rather than Account.LoginIPs, which has no timestamps and cannot be backfilled. An entry is evidence rather than a licence: 10 suppressed contributions in an hour revokes it, and a fresh login forgives the tally. - Both are consulted only AFTER the blocklist has already matched, so a normal accept pays nothing for them and the accept gate stays allowlist-free. - BanExemptions combines them behind BanChannel.IsExempt. Suppresses escalation only; every local defence still applies. BEHAVIOURAL DETECTION - silent-connect (reaped having sent zero bytes) and invalid-seed (a zero seed) are contributed. Both were already disconnected. - ForeignProtocol positively identifies HTTP, TLS and SSH. Asking "is this a good UO client?" cannot work: LoginEncryption.ClientDecrypt is a byte-for-byte stream XOR, so a client with encryption on when the shard expects none sends a structurally perfect connection whose payload is noise. Nothing assumes arrival framing, since TCP has no message boundaries and a rule of the form "these bytes must arrive together" drops real players on poor links. - Keyed on bytes-received rather than elapsed time throughout. A connection that sent something and ran out of time is far more likely a slow link, and banning those makes the player retry, trip the rate limiter, and compound it. - AutoDenylist holds behavioural detections locally for 15 minutes, as an IConnectionFilter plus IBanReporter over one store so engine detection sites never reach into content. Closes the gap where a flood pays for a socket and a NetState per connection while waiting for an OS bouncer, and is the whole defence on a shard running none. Not persisted: a holding pen that survives restarts is a ban without a ban's review. - BanReasons centralises the slugs. IsBehavioral is an opt-in set, not "everything except manual", so a future reason escalates normally instead of silently inheriting an exemption. The first cut of the exemption swallowed manual admin bans; this is why. FIXES - BanConfiguration.Settings was null until Configure() ran while the reap path dereferences it every Slice(), so a harness driving NetState.Slice() directly hit an NRE that looked flaky because it depended on test ordering. - -AllowlistFile was typed [string] while documented and used as a list. LAYOUT AND DOCS Content network code moves out of Misc into UOContent/Network, one concern per folder. Namespaces are untouched, so these are pure file moves. dev-docs/ip-bans-and-allowlists.md documents the subsystem, leading with the operator process for unblocking a player -- including the three things that look sufficient and are not: deleting the CrowdSec decision alone, editing ip-blocklist.txt by hand, and cscli allowlists alone. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
146 lines
5.1 KiB
C#
146 lines
5.1 KiB
C#
/*************************************************************************
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* ModernUO *
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* Copyright 2019-2026 - ModernUO Development Team *
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* Email: hi@modernuo.com *
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* File: ForeignProtocol.cs *
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* *
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* This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify *
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* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by *
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* the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or *
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* (at your option) any later version. *
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* *
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* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License *
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* along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>. *
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*************************************************************************/
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using System;
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namespace Server.Network;
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public enum ForeignProtocolKind
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{
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None,
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Http,
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Tls,
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Ssh
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}
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public enum ForeignProtocolMatch
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{
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None,
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/// <summary>A prefix matched, but more bytes are needed to be sure.</summary>
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Incomplete,
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Confirmed
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}
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/// <summary>
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/// Identifies traffic that is positively some OTHER protocol (HTTP, TLS, SSH), rather than deciding whether
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/// a connection is a good Ultima Online client.
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/// </summary>
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/// <remarks>
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/// The direction matters. A legitimate client with encryption enabled when the shard expects none sends a
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/// structurally correct connection whose payload is noise, because <c>LoginEncryption.ClientDecrypt</c> is a
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/// byte-for-byte stream XOR: length survives, content does not. So "unreadable" cannot mean "hostile", while
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/// "speaks HTTP" safely can. Nothing here assumes arrival framing; see
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/// <c>dev-docs/ip-bans-and-allowlists.md</c>.
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/// </remarks>
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public static class ForeignProtocol
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{
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private const int RequiredBytes = 8;
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private const int MaxTlsRecordLength = 16384;
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public static ForeignProtocolMatch Identify(ReadOnlySpan<byte> buffer, out ForeignProtocolKind kind)
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{
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kind = ForeignProtocolKind.None;
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// Too little to match a prefix; the caller's own short-read handling covers it.
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if (buffer.Length < 4)
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{
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return ForeignProtocolMatch.None;
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}
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var candidate = MatchPrefix(buffer);
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if (candidate == ForeignProtocolKind.None)
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{
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return ForeignProtocolMatch.None;
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}
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if (buffer.Length < RequiredBytes)
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{
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return ForeignProtocolMatch.Incomplete;
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}
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if (!Confirm(buffer, candidate))
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{
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return ForeignProtocolMatch.None;
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}
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kind = candidate;
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return ForeignProtocolMatch.Confirmed;
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}
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private static ForeignProtocolKind MatchPrefix(ReadOnlySpan<byte> buffer)
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{
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// TLS handshake record: content type 0x16, major version 3, minor version 0..4 (SSL 3.0 - TLS 1.3).
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if (buffer[0] == 0x16 && buffer[1] == 0x03 && buffer[2] <= 0x04)
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{
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return ForeignProtocolKind.Tls;
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}
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if (StartsWith(buffer, "SSH-"))
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{
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return ForeignProtocolKind.Ssh;
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}
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// HTTP request methods. Four bytes only selects a candidate; Confirm checks the request line.
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if (StartsWith(buffer, "GET ") || StartsWith(buffer, "POST") || StartsWith(buffer, "HEAD") ||
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StartsWith(buffer, "PUT ") || StartsWith(buffer, "OPTI") || StartsWith(buffer, "DELE") ||
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StartsWith(buffer, "CONN") || StartsWith(buffer, "TRAC") || StartsWith(buffer, "PATC"))
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{
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return ForeignProtocolKind.Http;
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}
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return ForeignProtocolKind.None;
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}
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private static bool Confirm(ReadOnlySpan<byte> buffer, ForeignProtocolKind candidate)
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{
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if (candidate == ForeignProtocolKind.Tls)
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{
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// A seed can collide with the 0x16 0x03 0x0? prefix (that is just the address 22.3.x.x), so
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// require a ClientHello inside a plausible record.
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var recordLength = (buffer[3] << 8) | buffer[4];
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return buffer[5] == 0x01 && recordLength is >= 4 and <= MaxTlsRecordLength;
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}
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// A UO client's fifth byte is a packet id (0x80, 0x91, 0xEF), none of them printable, so requiring
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// the request line to continue in ASCII lets a seed that spells "GET " fall through.
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for (var i = 4; i < buffer.Length && i < 16; i++)
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{
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if (!IsPrintableAscii(buffer[i]))
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{
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return false;
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}
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}
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return true;
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}
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private static bool IsPrintableAscii(byte value) =>
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value is >= 0x20 and <= 0x7E or (byte)'\r' or (byte)'\n' or (byte)'\t';
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private static bool StartsWith(ReadOnlySpan<byte> buffer, string ascii)
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{
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for (var i = 0; i < ascii.Length; i++)
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{
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if (buffer[i] != (byte)ascii[i])
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{
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return false;
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}
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}
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return true;
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}
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}
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