ModernUO/Projects/Server/Network/ForeignProtocol.cs
Kamron Batman 927c87702d
feat(network): allowlist false-positive IPs, escalate on behaviour
The shard owner, on a Starlink CGNAT address, was blocked by the imported
reputation blocklist. The cause was not CrowdSec: the address was a literal line
in ip-blocklist.txt, so BlocklistFilter denied it at accept and then promoted it.
Clearing the CrowdSec decision could not fix it either, because the file entry
re-reports within promoteSuppression of every reconnect.

Reputation feeds list shared consumer address space constantly. On CGNAT one
public address fronts many subscribers at the same time, so a single abusive
customer gets the address listed and everyone else behind it is blocked with
them; where leases rotate, a listing says little about whoever holds the address
now. So exemptions go where they cost nothing, and escalation is driven by what a
connection actually does.

GENERATOR (tools/Export-IpBlocklist.ps1)

- -AllowlistFile takes multiple paths, subtracted from the merged set before the
  output is written. Defaults to the operator's own ip-allowlist.txt (created
  once, never rewritten) plus one generated file per network carve-out.
- Subtraction is range-correct: an allowlisted address inside a blocked CIDR
  splits that CIDR around the hole instead of being ignored. This also fixes
  -ExcludeAnonymizers, which parsed CIDR entries and then only subtracted
  singles.
- Carve-outs are a table (name, ASN, reason, offline seed) rather than a
  hardcoded network, so covering another CGNAT provider is one row.
  -RefreshCarveouts re-fetches from the ASN's current routing announcements and
  collapses them; -Carveout '' subtracts none. Announcements rather than
  ownership records, because registry data disagrees with what is routed and caps
  its result sets.
- Editing an allowlist bypasses -MinInterval, so a just-added exemption is not
  indistinguishable from the allowlist not working.
- The shipped starlink carve-out costs ~0.1% of the list.

ALLOWLISTS

- FileAllowlist reads the same files the generator subtracts, so an operator
  entry means "leave this address alone" for real. Subtraction alone only covers
  being BLOCKED; behavioural detections never consult the blocklist, so without
  this a carve-out was quietly routed around and one scanner behind a shared
  address was enough to get everyone behind it firewalled. Reading the files also
  means an entry applies on the next reload rather than the next regeneration.
- LoginAllowlist is earned by authenticating, with a 90 day TTL because an
  address that logged in years ago is a stranger. Its own store rather than
  Account.LoginIPs, which has no timestamps and cannot be backfilled. An entry is
  evidence rather than a licence: 10 suppressed contributions in an hour revokes
  it, and a fresh login forgives the tally.
- Both are consulted only AFTER the blocklist has already matched, so a normal
  accept pays nothing for them and the accept gate stays allowlist-free.
- BanExemptions combines them behind BanChannel.IsExempt. Suppresses escalation
  only; every local defence still applies.

BEHAVIOURAL DETECTION

- silent-connect (reaped having sent zero bytes) and invalid-seed (a zero seed)
  are contributed. Both were already disconnected.
- ForeignProtocol positively identifies HTTP, TLS and SSH. Asking "is this a good
  UO client?" cannot work: LoginEncryption.ClientDecrypt is a byte-for-byte
  stream XOR, so a client with encryption on when the shard expects none sends a
  structurally perfect connection whose payload is noise. Nothing assumes arrival
  framing, since TCP has no message boundaries and a rule of the form "these
  bytes must arrive together" drops real players on poor links.
- Keyed on bytes-received rather than elapsed time throughout. A connection that
  sent something and ran out of time is far more likely a slow link, and banning
  those makes the player retry, trip the rate limiter, and compound it.
- AutoDenylist holds behavioural detections locally for 15 minutes, as an
  IConnectionFilter plus IBanReporter over one store so engine detection sites
  never reach into content. Closes the gap where a flood pays for a socket and a
  NetState per connection while waiting for an OS bouncer, and is the whole
  defence on a shard running none. Not persisted: a holding pen that survives
  restarts is a ban without a ban's review.
- BanReasons centralises the slugs. IsBehavioral is an opt-in set, not
  "everything except manual", so a future reason escalates normally instead of
  silently inheriting an exemption. The first cut of the exemption swallowed
  manual admin bans; this is why.

FIXES

- BanConfiguration.Settings was null until Configure() ran while the reap path
  dereferences it every Slice(), so a harness driving NetState.Slice() directly
  hit an NRE that looked flaky because it depended on test ordering.
- -AllowlistFile was typed [string] while documented and used as a list.

LAYOUT AND DOCS

Content network code moves out of Misc into UOContent/Network, one concern per
folder. Namespaces are untouched, so these are pure file moves.
dev-docs/ip-bans-and-allowlists.md documents the subsystem, leading with the
operator process for unblocking a player -- including the three things that look
sufficient and are not: deleting the CrowdSec decision alone, editing
ip-blocklist.txt by hand, and cscli allowlists alone.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-30 18:31:34 -07:00

146 lines
5.1 KiB
C#

/*************************************************************************
* ModernUO *
* Copyright 2019-2026 - ModernUO Development Team *
* Email: hi@modernuo.com *
* File: ForeignProtocol.cs *
* *
* This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify *
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by *
* the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or *
* (at your option) any later version. *
* *
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License *
* along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>. *
*************************************************************************/
using System;
namespace Server.Network;
public enum ForeignProtocolKind
{
None,
Http,
Tls,
Ssh
}
public enum ForeignProtocolMatch
{
None,
/// <summary>A prefix matched, but more bytes are needed to be sure.</summary>
Incomplete,
Confirmed
}
/// <summary>
/// Identifies traffic that is positively some OTHER protocol (HTTP, TLS, SSH), rather than deciding whether
/// a connection is a good Ultima Online client.
/// </summary>
/// <remarks>
/// The direction matters. A legitimate client with encryption enabled when the shard expects none sends a
/// structurally correct connection whose payload is noise, because <c>LoginEncryption.ClientDecrypt</c> is a
/// byte-for-byte stream XOR: length survives, content does not. So "unreadable" cannot mean "hostile", while
/// "speaks HTTP" safely can. Nothing here assumes arrival framing; see
/// <c>dev-docs/ip-bans-and-allowlists.md</c>.
/// </remarks>
public static class ForeignProtocol
{
private const int RequiredBytes = 8;
private const int MaxTlsRecordLength = 16384;
public static ForeignProtocolMatch Identify(ReadOnlySpan<byte> buffer, out ForeignProtocolKind kind)
{
kind = ForeignProtocolKind.None;
// Too little to match a prefix; the caller's own short-read handling covers it.
if (buffer.Length < 4)
{
return ForeignProtocolMatch.None;
}
var candidate = MatchPrefix(buffer);
if (candidate == ForeignProtocolKind.None)
{
return ForeignProtocolMatch.None;
}
if (buffer.Length < RequiredBytes)
{
return ForeignProtocolMatch.Incomplete;
}
if (!Confirm(buffer, candidate))
{
return ForeignProtocolMatch.None;
}
kind = candidate;
return ForeignProtocolMatch.Confirmed;
}
private static ForeignProtocolKind MatchPrefix(ReadOnlySpan<byte> buffer)
{
// TLS handshake record: content type 0x16, major version 3, minor version 0..4 (SSL 3.0 - TLS 1.3).
if (buffer[0] == 0x16 && buffer[1] == 0x03 && buffer[2] <= 0x04)
{
return ForeignProtocolKind.Tls;
}
if (StartsWith(buffer, "SSH-"))
{
return ForeignProtocolKind.Ssh;
}
// HTTP request methods. Four bytes only selects a candidate; Confirm checks the request line.
if (StartsWith(buffer, "GET ") || StartsWith(buffer, "POST") || StartsWith(buffer, "HEAD") ||
StartsWith(buffer, "PUT ") || StartsWith(buffer, "OPTI") || StartsWith(buffer, "DELE") ||
StartsWith(buffer, "CONN") || StartsWith(buffer, "TRAC") || StartsWith(buffer, "PATC"))
{
return ForeignProtocolKind.Http;
}
return ForeignProtocolKind.None;
}
private static bool Confirm(ReadOnlySpan<byte> buffer, ForeignProtocolKind candidate)
{
if (candidate == ForeignProtocolKind.Tls)
{
// A seed can collide with the 0x16 0x03 0x0? prefix (that is just the address 22.3.x.x), so
// require a ClientHello inside a plausible record.
var recordLength = (buffer[3] << 8) | buffer[4];
return buffer[5] == 0x01 && recordLength is >= 4 and <= MaxTlsRecordLength;
}
// A UO client's fifth byte is a packet id (0x80, 0x91, 0xEF), none of them printable, so requiring
// the request line to continue in ASCII lets a seed that spells "GET " fall through.
for (var i = 4; i < buffer.Length && i < 16; i++)
{
if (!IsPrintableAscii(buffer[i]))
{
return false;
}
}
return true;
}
private static bool IsPrintableAscii(byte value) =>
value is >= 0x20 and <= 0x7E or (byte)'\r' or (byte)'\n' or (byte)'\t';
private static bool StartsWith(ReadOnlySpan<byte> buffer, string ascii)
{
for (var i = 0; i < ascii.Length; i++)
{
if (buffer[i] != (byte)ascii[i])
{
return false;
}
}
return true;
}
}