ModernUO/Projects/UOContent/Misc/Firewall/Firewall.cs
Kamron Batman c39454137e
feat(network): pluggable connection filters; file blocklist + contribute-first CrowdSec (#2542)
Reshapes IP banning around one idea: **core owns the question, content owns every answer.**

Core gains a single accept-path seam — `IConnectionFilter` — and loses everything that used to implement one. The firewall moves to UOContent, a new file-backed blocklist joins it there, and CrowdSec is repositioned from an in-app enforcer to a contribute-first reporter.

## The seam

```csharp
public interface IConnectionFilter
{
    string Name { get; }
    void Configure();
    void Start(CancellationToken token);
    void Stop();
    bool ShouldDeny(IPAddress address);
}
```

The accept path went from hardcoded branches to one question:

```csharp
else if (ConnectionFilters.ShouldDeny(remoteIP, out var deniedBy))
{
    logger.Debug("{Address} denied by connection filter '{Filter}'", remoteIP, deniedBy);
}
```

Filters register during the Configure sweep. The registry is a plain array walked by an indexed loop — no enumerator, no closure, no allocation — and the first denial short-circuits. An interface dispatch is noise next to the `accept()` syscall, so pluggability costs nothing measurable on the path that has to survive a DDoS.

Whatever a hit implies — persisting, promoting to an OS bouncer, contributing to the ban channel — is the filter's business, not the accept path's.

A filter that throws is **unregistered and the connection fails open**. A filter that faults once faults for every subsequent connection, so leaving it registered means an exception and a log line per accept — exactly the amplification an attacker wants — and a broken filter must not be able to deny everyone either.

This deliberately does **not** reuse `EventSink.InvokeSocketConnect`: that fires later and allocates a `SocketConnectEventArgs` per connection, which is what the accept path avoids for rejected traffic.

## What ships behind it

**`firewall`** (UOContent) — the existing admin-curated set. Collapsed from `Firewall` + `AdminFirewall` + a threaded enforcer into one single-threaded store with **zero concurrency primitives**: the accept path, admin gump, TTL expiry and boot load all run on the game loop. Persists to `Configuration/firewall.json` with automatic migration from the legacy `firewall.cfg`. No behavior change for operators — same namespace, same gump, same commands.

**`blocklist`** (UOContent) — new. Holds a millions-strong list in-app and **demand-pages** hits up to CrowdSec, which promotes them to the OS firewall.

The motivation is concrete: CrowdSec's Windows bouncer cannot load the ~3.9M IPs that 91 community feeds produce, but it handles ~100k fine. So the millions live in-process behind a binary search, and only addresses that *actually connect* get promoted. A `PromotedGuard` suppresses re-reporting an address until the bouncer picks it up.

The list is parsed straight from UTF-8 file bytes with no per-line string allocation, off the game loop, and published as an immutable snapshot swapped through a single `volatile` reference. Reloads yield to world saves.

**`tools/Export-IpBlocklist.ps1`** — the producer. Requires PowerShell 7 and runs on Windows, Linux and macOS; Windows PowerShell 5.1 is refused up front via `#requires`. Merges a thin, non-overlapping feed set into one de-duplicated, bogon-filtered file. Parsing runs in a compiled `Add-Type` hot loop (~1s for ~4M lines instead of minutes). Written to a `.tmp` sibling and swapped with `File.Replace`, so the shard never reads a half-written list, and a total feed outage refuses to overwrite a good list with an empty one. Re-running is idempotent — it exits without downloading anything while the list on disk is younger than `-MinInterval` (default 2h, the anchor feed's own refresh period), so a misconfigured scheduler can't hammer upstream.

## CrowdSec: contribute-first

`IBanReporter` + `BanChannel` fan locally-decided bans out to external systems. `CrowdSecReporter` (UOContent) posts to LAPI `POST /v1/alerts` and retracts via `DELETE /v1/decisions`.

Reporting is **enqueue-only** on the accept path: a bounded, coalescing channel drained off-loop with bounded retry, counted drops on overflow, and a flush on shutdown. Under a DDoS the accept path never does synchronous or lock-contending per-IP work.

### Why not pull decisions from CrowdSec?

The original design streamed decisions into an in-app snapshot and enforced them at the accept gate. That's the wrong layer: by the time the shard sees the connection, the TCP handshake and socket setup are already paid for. `cs-firewall-bouncer` drops the same traffic **at the kernel**, and it's what CrowdSec is built to do. So the shard now contributes what it uniquely knows (rate-limit trips, blocklist hits from real connection attempts) and lets the OS enforce.

The one thing the OS can't do — hold millions of entries on Windows — is exactly what the in-app blocklist covers, and it feeds the same pipeline.

## Threading policy

`CLAUDE.md` rule #3 is rewritten as an explicit three-part policy, with rule #10 restated in tandem:

- Anything touching game state runs **only** on the main loop.
- Heavy work that *needs* game state must be **chunked** across ticks, never threaded.
- Heavy work that does *not* need game state (large-file parse, external I/O) **must** run off-loop **and must yield to world saves**.

Results come back via an immutable snapshot swapped through a single `volatile` reference, or `Core.LoopContext.Post` — never by letting the scheduler decide where heavy work runs. Both new subsystems follow it.

## Shared primitives

`SortedRangeIndex<T> where T : IBinaryInteger<T>` — coalesced disjoint interval arrays plus a binary search. The firewall, the blocklist, and (as of this PR) core's reserved-network tables all use it.

Coalescing is a correctness requirement, not an optimization: multi-feed lists nest CIDRs (`/24` containing a `/32`), and a search that inspects only the rightmost run whose minimum is ≤ the value is sound **only** over disjoint runs. That bug was caught in review and is covered by regression tests.

`IPAddressUtility` collects the allocation-free `IPAddress` ↔ `UInt128` conversions and CIDR parsing that were previously scattered or duplicated.

## Config

| File | Owner | Keys |
|---|---|---|
| `Configuration/bans.json` | core | `reportRateLimitTrips`, `autoBanDuration` |
| `Configuration/blocklist.json` | content | `file`, `reloadInterval`, `reportHits`, `banDuration`, `promoteSuppression` |
| `Configuration/crowdsec.json` | content | `lapiUrl`, `machineId`, `password`, `origin`, `manualBanDuration`, `flushInterval`, `maxQueue` |
| `Configuration/firewall.json` | content | persisted firewall entries (migrated from `firewall.cfg`) |

Everything is inert by default. CrowdSec self-disables without credentials; the blocklist self-disables until its file exists. A shard that changes nothing sees no behavior change.

## Notes for review

- **Core no longer references `Firewall` or `IFirewallEntry` anywhere.** `NetworkUtilities` used to build its reserved-network tables out of `CidrFirewallEntry`, which coupled core to the firewall for something unrelated to banning; those are now a `SortedRangeIndex<UInt128>`, same semantics and public API.
- **`BanChannel.Stop()` no longer persists the firewall** — a contribution coordinator has no business saving an enforcement store. That's the firewall filter's `Stop()`.
- **A dead `whitelisted` parameter was dropped** from the blocklist gate: it was hardcoded `false` at its only call site, and no whitelist concept exists in core.
- **The blocklist filter is an instance, not a static.** The static version forced its tests onto the sequential collection with a reset hook; they now run in parallel.
- `dev-docs/networking-packets.md` documents the seam for content authors, plus a known wart in the `IPAddress` ↔ `UInt128` normalization flagged for a follow-up PR.
- The generator was verified on Linux, macOS and Windows under a temporary CI matrix (since removed). It caught two portability bugs — a Windows-only path separator, and a culture-sensitive duration parse that read `2.5` as `25` on comma-decimal locales and *silently* turned a 2.5h cooldown into 25h — plus a third that made the script unparseable on Windows PowerShell 5.1. The source is ASCII-only for that last reason: `#requires` is only honored once a file parses, so non-ASCII in a BOM-less script produces parse errors instead of the version message.

## Tests

**1344 pass** (782 `Server.Tests`, 562 `UOContent.Tests`). New coverage: filter registry (registration, short-circuit, fault-disable), blocklist parsing/CIDR/coalescing, snapshot reload markers, promote-guard TTL, ban-channel fan-out, CrowdSec alert building/dedup/flush-on-stop, and the generator's output-format contract pinned against the reader.
2026-07-25 11:59:37 -07:00

413 lines
13 KiB
C#

/*************************************************************************
* ModernUO *
* Copyright 2019-2026 - ModernUO Development Team *
* Email: hi@modernuo.com *
* File: Firewall.cs *
* *
* This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify *
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by *
* the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or *
* (at your option) any later version. *
* *
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License *
* along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>. *
*************************************************************************/
using System;
using System.Buffers;
using System.Collections.Generic;
using System.IO;
using System.Net;
using System.Runtime.CompilerServices;
using Server.Collections;
using Server.Json;
using Server.Logging;
namespace Server.Network;
public static class Firewall
{
// Single-threaded: the accept path, admin gump/command, TTL expiry timer, and boot load all run on
// the main game loop. No locks, caches, or version counters are needed. See the ban-channel design doc.
// _entries is the authoritative store (gump/persistence/TTL/command all work against it); _index is a
// derived, rebuild-on-demand SortedRangeIndex used only for the accept-path IsBlocked lookup, shared
// with the same sorted-range binary-search primitive the blocklist uses (see BlocklistSnapshot).
private static readonly List<IFirewallEntry> _entries = [];
// Entries with a TTL: entry -> absolute expiry tick (Core.TickCount). Permanent entries are absent.
private static readonly Dictionary<IFirewallEntry, long> _expiring = [];
private static SortedRangeIndex<UInt128> _index = SortedRangeIndex<UInt128>.Empty;
private static bool _indexDirty;
private static readonly ILogger logger = LogFactory.GetLogger(typeof(Firewall));
private const string _path = "Configuration/firewall.json";
private const string _legacyPath = "firewall.cfg";
private static bool _dirty;
private static bool _configured;
public static int FirewallSetCount => _entries.Count;
public static void ReadFirewallSet(Action<IReadOnlyCollection<IFirewallEntry>> callback) => callback(_entries);
public static bool IsBlocked(IPAddress address)
{
if (_entries.Count == 0)
{
return false;
}
EnsureIndex();
return _index.Contains(address.ToUInt128());
}
// Rebuilds the derived lookup index from the authoritative _entries list, but only when entries have
// changed since the last build. Runs on the main game loop, so the pooled build buffer is single-threaded
// (mt: false); only the two final SortedRangeIndex arrays are heap-allocated.
private static void EnsureIndex()
{
if (!_indexDirty)
{
return;
}
using var ranges = PooledRefList<SortedRangeIndex<UInt128>.Range>.Create(_entries.Count, mt: false);
for (var i = 0; i < _entries.Count; i++)
{
var entry = _entries[i];
ranges.Add(new SortedRangeIndex<UInt128>.Range(entry.MinIpAddress, entry.MaxIpAddress));
}
ranges.Sort(SortedRangeIndex<UInt128>.ByMin);
_index = SortedRangeIndex<UInt128>.Build(ranges.AsSpan());
_indexDirty = false;
}
public static bool Add(IFirewallEntry firewallEntry) => Add(firewallEntry, TimeSpan.Zero);
/// <summary>
/// Adds an entry. <paramref name="ttl"/> &lt;= <see cref="TimeSpan.Zero"/> means permanent. Returns false
/// if the entry was already present.
/// </summary>
// Indexed scan (no closure allocation); firewall lists are small, so O(n) is negligible and this
// stays off the hot path (Add/Remove are admin/boot actions, not the accept path).
private static int IndexOfEntry(IFirewallEntry entry)
{
for (var i = 0; i < _entries.Count; i++)
{
if (_entries[i].CompareTo(entry) == 0)
{
return i;
}
}
return -1;
}
public static bool Add(IFirewallEntry firewallEntry, TimeSpan ttl, bool persist = true)
{
if (firewallEntry == null || IndexOfEntry(firewallEntry) >= 0)
{
return false;
}
_entries.Add(firewallEntry);
if (ttl > TimeSpan.Zero)
{
_expiring[firewallEntry] = Core.TickCount + (long)ttl.TotalMilliseconds;
}
_indexDirty = true;
if (persist)
{
MarkDirty();
}
return true;
}
public static bool Remove(IFirewallEntry entry)
{
if (entry == null)
{
return false;
}
var index = IndexOfEntry(entry);
if (index < 0)
{
return false;
}
// Remove the stored instance from _expiring (not the passed reference), so a value-equal
// entry created elsewhere still clears the TTL bookkeeping.
var stored = _entries[index];
_entries.RemoveAt(index);
_expiring.Remove(stored);
_indexDirty = true;
MarkDirty();
return true;
}
/// <summary>
/// Removes every entry whose TTL has elapsed. Called from the main-thread maintenance timer (Task 2).
/// </summary>
internal static void ExpireEntries(long nowTicks)
{
if (_expiring.Count == 0)
{
return;
}
List<IFirewallEntry> expired = null;
foreach (var (entry, expiresAt) in _expiring)
{
if (expiresAt - nowTicks <= 0)
{
(expired ??= []).Add(entry);
}
}
if (expired == null)
{
return;
}
for (var i = 0; i < expired.Count; i++)
{
var entry = expired[i];
_entries.Remove(entry);
_expiring.Remove(entry);
}
_indexDirty = true;
MarkDirty();
}
[MethodImpl(MethodImplOptions.AggressiveInlining)]
public static IFirewallEntry ToFirewallEntry(object entry) =>
entry switch
{
IFirewallEntry firewallEntry => firewallEntry,
IPAddress address => new SingleIpFirewallEntry(address),
string s => ToFirewallEntry(s),
_ => null
};
public static IFirewallEntry ToFirewallEntry(string entry)
{
if (entry == null)
{
return null;
}
try
{
var rangeSeparator = entry.IndexOf('-');
if (rangeSeparator > -1)
{
return new CidrFirewallEntry(
IPAddress.Parse(entry.AsSpan(0, rangeSeparator)),
IPAddress.Parse(entry.AsSpan(rangeSeparator + 1))
);
}
if (entry.IndexOf('/') > -1)
{
return new CidrFirewallEntry(entry);
}
return new SingleIpFirewallEntry(entry);
}
catch
{
return null;
}
}
public static void Configure()
{
if (_configured)
{
return;
}
_configured = true;
var path = Path.Join(Core.BaseDirectory, _path);
if (File.Exists(path))
{
LoadFrom(JsonConfig.Deserialize<FirewallSettings>(path));
}
else
{
var legacyPath = ResolveLegacyCfgPath();
if (legacyPath != null)
{
MigrateLegacyCfg(legacyPath);
Save(); // materialize firewall.json; the .cfg is no longer read after this
TryMarkLegacyCfgMigrated(legacyPath);
}
}
// Main-thread maintenance: expire TTLs and flush pending writes. No background thread.
Timer.DelayCall(TimeSpan.FromSeconds(30), TimeSpan.FromSeconds(30), Maintenance);
// Expose the set to the accept path. Everything else (gump, commands, persistence) keeps using
// the Firewall API directly; only the per-connection question goes through the filter registry.
ConnectionFilters.Register(FirewallConnectionFilter.Instance);
}
private static void Maintenance()
{
ExpireEntries(Core.TickCount);
if (_dirty)
{
Save();
}
}
private static void MarkDirty() => _dirty = true;
internal static void LoadFrom(FirewallSettings settings)
{
if (settings?.Entries == null)
{
return;
}
// Core.Now: this runs on the game loop, via the Configure sweep.
var now = Core.Now;
var records = settings.Entries;
for (var i = 0; i < records.Length; i++)
{
var record = records[i];
var entry = ToFirewallEntry(record.Value);
if (entry == null)
{
logger.Warning("Ignoring unparseable firewall entry \"{Entry}\"", record.Value);
continue;
}
var ttl = TimeSpan.Zero;
if (record.Expires is { } expires)
{
ttl = expires - now;
if (ttl <= TimeSpan.Zero)
{
continue; // already expired
}
}
Add(entry, ttl, persist: false);
}
}
internal static FirewallSettings ToSettings()
{
// expires is derived below as now + (expiresAtTick - nowTicks), so both operands must come from
// the same instant. Core.Now and Core.TickCount are refreshed together each loop iteration; a
// fresh DateTime.UtcNow here would bake the loop's lag into every persisted expiry.
var now = Core.Now;
var nowTicks = Core.TickCount;
var list = new List<FirewallEntryRecord>(_entries.Count);
for (var i = 0; i < _entries.Count; i++)
{
var entry = _entries[i];
DateTime? expires = null;
if (_expiring.TryGetValue(entry, out var expiresAtTick))
{
expires = now.AddMilliseconds(expiresAtTick - nowTicks);
}
list.Add(new FirewallEntryRecord { Value = entry.ToString(), Expires = expires });
}
return new FirewallSettings { Entries = list.ToArray() };
}
public static void Save()
{
_dirty = false;
var path = Path.Join(Core.BaseDirectory, _path);
var tmp = $"{path}.tmp";
JsonConfig.Serialize(tmp, ToSettings());
File.Move(tmp, path, overwrite: true); // atomic swap
}
/// <summary>
/// Locates the legacy firewall.cfg to migrate. The modern convention is <see cref="Core.BaseDirectory"/>,
/// checked first; the pre-collapse <c>AdminFirewall</c> used a bare relative path (resolved against the
/// process's current working directory), which may differ from <see cref="Core.BaseDirectory"/> when the
/// shard is launched from elsewhere, so that's checked as a fallback. Returns null if neither exists.
/// </summary>
private static string ResolveLegacyCfgPath()
{
var underBaseDirectory = Path.Join(Core.BaseDirectory, _legacyPath);
if (File.Exists(underBaseDirectory))
{
return underBaseDirectory;
}
return File.Exists(_legacyPath) ? _legacyPath : null;
}
private static void MigrateLegacyCfg(string legacyPath)
{
var searchValues = SearchValues.Create("*Xx?");
using var reader = new StreamReader(legacyPath);
while (reader.ReadLine() is { } line)
{
line = line.Trim();
if (line.Length == 0)
{
continue;
}
if (line.AsSpan().ContainsAny(searchValues))
{
logger.Warning("Legacy firewall entry \"{Entry}\" ignored during migration", line);
continue;
}
var entry = ToFirewallEntry(line);
if (entry != null)
{
Add(entry, TimeSpan.Zero, persist: false);
}
}
logger.Information("Migrated {Count} entr(ies) from legacy firewall.cfg to firewall.json", _entries.Count);
}
/// <summary>
/// Renames the migrated <c>.cfg</c> to <c>firewall.cfg.migrated</c> so it isn't re-scanned on the next
/// boot and operators can see it was already migrated. Best-effort: a locked/read-only file must not
/// fail startup, since the migration itself (firewall.json) already succeeded.
/// </summary>
private static void TryMarkLegacyCfgMigrated(string legacyPath)
{
try
{
File.Move(legacyPath, $"{legacyPath}.migrated", overwrite: true);
}
catch (Exception e)
{
logger.Warning(e, "Could not rename migrated legacy firewall file \"{Path}\"", legacyPath);
}
}
internal static void ResetForTesting()
{
_entries.Clear();
_expiring.Clear();
_index = SortedRangeIndex<UInt128>.Empty;
_indexDirty = false;
_configured = false;
}
}