ModernUO/Projects/UOContent/Misc/CrowdSec/CrowdSecReporter.cs
Kamron Batman bd44ef4026
fix(crowdsec): send a payload LAPI accepts (500 on alerts, 401 on auth)
Contributing a ban to CrowdSec failed against a real LAPI. Three independent
defects, each sufficient on its own:

scenario_hash / scenario_version were never serialized. LAPI dereferences both
unconditionally when persisting an alert, so omitting them is a nil deref and a
500 rather than a validation error. Both are now emitted with the values a
watcher without a hub scenario is expected to send ("" and "1.0").

start_at/stop_at were formatted without an IFormatProvider. ':' is the time
separator *specifier* in a custom .NET format string, not a literal, so a shard
running under a culture like fi-FI emitted "T15.04.05.123Z" -- which Go's
time.RFC3339 rejects, producing another 500. Non-Gregorian cultures (th-TH,
ar-SA) would also shift the year. Formatting is now pinned to InvariantCulture
in FormatTimestamp, which additionally converts non-UTC input, since the
trailing 'Z' is a literal and was previously an unchecked claim.

The User-Agent was a plain product string. LAPI's default watcher profile
matches the "crowdsec/" prefix and answers 401 without it, so the header is a
protocol constraint; it is now an internal const carrying that reason.

Also fixes the same culture bug in the login-expiry parse: a bare
DateTime.TryParse on LAPI's RFC3339 expire silently fails under a mismatched
culture and falls back to a fabricated UtcNow+1h, pushing re-auth past the real
expiry and costing a 401-relogin round trip on every send.

capacity now defaults to 1 instead of 0, matching the one-decision-per-alert
shape actually being sent.

The resulting payload is field-for-field identical to a hand-verified request
that LAPI accepts. Regression tests assert the required scenario fields on the
serialized JSON rather than the DTO, since the DTO is not what goes on the
wire, and cover the timestamp across fi-FI/th-TH/ar-SA.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-27 23:30:32 -07:00

411 lines
15 KiB
C#

/*************************************************************************
* ModernUO *
* Copyright 2019-2026 - ModernUO Development Team *
* Email: hi@modernuo.com *
* File: CrowdSecReporter.cs *
* *
* This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify *
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by *
* the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or *
* (at your option) any later version. *
* *
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License *
* along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>. *
*************************************************************************/
using System;
using System.Collections.Generic;
using System.Globalization;
using System.Net;
using System.Threading;
using System.Threading.Channels;
using System.Threading.Tasks;
using Server.Logging;
namespace Server.Network.Bans.CrowdSec;
/// <summary>
/// Contributes locally-decided bans to CrowdSec via the LAPI alerts API. Non-blocking on the accept
/// path: <see cref="Report"/> enqueues onto a bounded, drop-on-overflow channel drained by a single
/// background task that coalesces by IP and POSTs batched alerts.
/// </summary>
public sealed class CrowdSecReporter : IBanReporter
{
private static readonly ILogger logger = LogFactory.GetLogger(typeof(CrowdSecReporter));
internal readonly record struct ReportItem(IPAddress Ip, TimeSpan Ttl, string Reason, bool Retract);
// Bounded retry for transient LAPI failures during a drain send (network blips, 5xx). Distinct from
// CrowdSecAlertClient.SendWithRetryAsync's single 401-relogin retry, which is an auth concern.
private static readonly TimeSpan[] _retryDelays = [TimeSpan.FromSeconds(1), TimeSpan.FromSeconds(2)];
private ICrowdSecAlertClient _client;
private CrowdSecSettings _settings;
private Channel<ReportItem> _queue;
private CancellationTokenSource _cts;
private Task _drainTask;
private int _dropped;
private int _sendFailures;
public CrowdSecReporter()
{
}
// Test/embedding ctor with an injected client + settings.
internal CrowdSecReporter(ICrowdSecAlertClient client, CrowdSecSettings settings)
{
_client = client;
_settings = settings;
_queue = CreateQueue(settings.MaxQueue);
}
public string Name => "crowdsec";
public bool CanRetract => true;
public int DroppedCount => _dropped;
/// <summary>
/// Batches ultimately dropped after the bounded transient-retry in <see cref="DrainLoop"/> gave up.
/// Distinct from <see cref="DroppedCount"/> (queue-overflow drops on the accept path): this counts
/// sustained LAPI outages so operators can see contribution loss instead of it being silent.
/// </summary>
public int SendFailureCount => _sendFailures;
/// <summary>The drain loop's task, so tests can assert it stays alive until the loop exits.</summary>
internal Task DrainTaskForTesting => _drainTask;
public static void Configure()
{
BanChannel.Register(new CrowdSecReporter());
}
public void Register()
{
CrowdSecConfiguration.Load();
_settings ??= CrowdSecConfiguration.Settings;
}
public void Start(CancellationToken token)
{
if (!_settings.ReportingEnabled)
{
logger.Information("CrowdSec reporter disabled (machineId/password empty in crowdsec.json)");
return;
}
_client ??= new CrowdSecAlertClient(_settings);
_queue ??= CreateQueue(_settings.MaxQueue);
_cts = CancellationTokenSource.CreateLinkedTokenSource(token);
_drainTask = Task.Run(() => DrainLoop(_cts.Token), _cts.Token);
}
public void Stop()
{
_cts?.Cancel();
// The flush below reads a SingleReader channel, so wait for the drain to actually exit first.
var drainExited = true;
try
{
// Wait(timeout) is false only on timeout; a throw means faulted/cancelled, which is still exited.
drainExited = _drainTask == null || _drainTask.Wait(TimeSpan.FromSeconds(2));
}
catch
{
// Ignored: a faulted wait means the drain has completed and released the channel.
}
_cts?.Dispose();
_cts = null;
if (drainExited)
{
FlushRemainingOnStop();
}
_client?.Dispose();
_drainTask = null;
}
/// <summary>
/// Best-effort bounded flush of whatever is still queued at shutdown. Blocking is correct here — the
/// loop has stopped ticking — but must not happen on the loop thread: <see cref="Stop"/> runs where
/// <c>SynchronizationContext.Current</c> is the <c>EventLoopContext</c>, and a captured continuation
/// would be posted to a queue nothing pumps any more. <see cref="Task.Run(Func{Task})"/> keeps the
/// chain on the pool; the bounded wait caps a wedged send at a few seconds of shutdown.
/// </summary>
private void FlushRemainingOnStop()
{
if (_queue == null || _client == null)
{
return;
}
_queue.Writer.TryComplete();
List<ReportItem> reports = [];
List<ReportItem> retracts = [];
while (_queue.Reader.TryRead(out var item))
{
(item.Retract ? retracts : reports).Add(item);
}
if (reports.Count == 0 && retracts.Count == 0)
{
return;
}
try
{
if (!Task.Run(() => FlushRemainingOnStopAsync(reports, retracts)).Wait(TimeSpan.FromSeconds(4)))
{
logger.Warning(
"CrowdSec flush-on-stop timed out; {Count} item(s) not contributed",
reports.Count + retracts.Count
);
}
}
catch (Exception e)
{
logger.Warning(e, "CrowdSec flush-on-stop failed");
}
}
/// <summary>
/// Uses a fresh token, not the drain loop's already-cancelled one, which would fail every send
/// immediately. Reports go as one deduped batch; retracts go as individual DELETEs so an admin's
/// unban propagates on a clean shutdown. Leftovers self-heal via
/// <see cref="CrowdSecSettings.ManualBanDuration"/>.
/// </summary>
private async Task FlushRemainingOnStopAsync(List<ReportItem> reports, List<ReportItem> retracts)
{
using var flushCts = new CancellationTokenSource(TimeSpan.FromSeconds(3));
if (reports.Count > 0)
{
var alerts = BuildAlerts(reports, _settings, DateTime.UtcNow);
try
{
await _client.PostAlertsAsync(alerts, flushCts.Token).ConfigureAwait(false);
}
catch (Exception e)
{
logger.Warning(e, "CrowdSec flush-on-stop reports failed");
RecordSendFailure(alerts.Count);
}
}
HashSet<string> seen = [];
for (var i = 0; i < retracts.Count; i++)
{
if (flushCts.IsCancellationRequested)
{
break; // out of budget; the rest self-heal via ManualBanDuration
}
var ip = retracts[i].Ip;
if (!seen.Add(ip.ToString()))
{
continue;
}
try
{
await _client.DeleteDecisionsAsync(_settings.Origin, ip, flushCts.Token).ConfigureAwait(false);
}
catch (Exception e)
{
logger.Warning(e, "CrowdSec flush-on-stop retract failed for {Address}", ip);
RecordSendFailure(1);
}
}
}
public void Report(IPAddress address, TimeSpan ttl, string reason) =>
Enqueue(new ReportItem(address, ttl, reason, false));
public void Retract(IPAddress address) =>
Enqueue(new ReportItem(address, TimeSpan.Zero, "retract", true));
private void Enqueue(ReportItem item)
{
if (_queue == null || !_queue.Writer.TryWrite(item))
{
Interlocked.Increment(ref _dropped);
}
}
// FullMode.Wait (the default) makes TryWrite return false immediately when the channel is full
// instead of blocking the caller — exactly the non-blocking drop-on-overflow behavior the accept
// path requires. DropWrite would silently discard the new item and always report success, which
// would make overflow undetectable.
private static Channel<ReportItem> CreateQueue(int capacity) =>
Channel.CreateBounded<ReportItem>(new BoundedChannelOptions(Math.Max(1, capacity))
{
FullMode = BoundedChannelFullMode.Wait,
SingleReader = true
});
// Must return Task: Start() passes this to Task.Run, which has no Func<ValueTask> overload, so a
// ValueTask would bind to Task.Run<TResult> and yield a Task<ValueTask> that completes at the first
// await rather than when the loop exits.
private async Task DrainLoop(CancellationToken token)
{
var reader = _queue.Reader;
while (!token.IsCancellationRequested)
{
try
{
if (!await reader.WaitToReadAsync(token).ConfigureAwait(false))
{
return;
}
// Coalesce a burst before flushing.
await Task.Delay(_settings.FlushInterval, token).ConfigureAwait(false);
List<ReportItem> reports = [];
List<ReportItem> retracts = [];
while (reader.TryRead(out var item))
{
(item.Retract ? retracts : reports).Add(item);
}
if (reports.Count > 0)
{
var alerts = BuildAlerts(reports, _settings, DateTime.UtcNow);
if (!await SendWithBoundedRetryAsync(() => _client.PostAlertsAsync(alerts, token), token)
.ConfigureAwait(false))
{
RecordSendFailure(alerts.Count);
}
}
for (var i = 0; i < retracts.Count; i++)
{
var ip = retracts[i].Ip;
if (!await SendWithBoundedRetryAsync(() => _client.DeleteDecisionsAsync(_settings.Origin, ip, token), token)
.ConfigureAwait(false))
{
RecordSendFailure(1);
}
}
}
catch (OperationCanceledException)
{
return;
}
catch (Exception e)
{
// Contribution is auxiliary: log and keep draining. Never crash the shard.
logger.Warning(e, "CrowdSec contribution flush failed; dropped this batch");
}
}
}
/// <summary>
/// Sends with up to 3 attempts total (1 initial + 2 retries), backing off 1s then 2s between
/// attempts, for transient LAPI failures (network blips, 5xx). Backoff uses <see cref="Task.Delay"/>
/// so it never blocks the thread; a cancellation during backoff propagates as
/// <see cref="OperationCanceledException"/> so the drain loop exits cleanly. Returns false (never
/// throws for a send failure) once attempts are exhausted, so the caller can count the drop and keep
/// draining instead of losing the rest of the batch/queue.
/// </summary>
private static async ValueTask<bool> SendWithBoundedRetryAsync(Func<ValueTask> send, CancellationToken token)
{
for (var attempt = 0; ; attempt++)
{
try
{
await send().ConfigureAwait(false);
return true;
}
catch (OperationCanceledException)
{
throw;
}
catch (Exception e)
{
if (attempt >= _retryDelays.Length)
{
logger.Warning(e, "CrowdSec send failed after {Attempts} attempt(s); giving up", attempt + 1);
return false;
}
var delay = _retryDelays[attempt];
logger.Warning(e, "CrowdSec send failed (attempt {Attempt}); retrying in {Delay}", attempt + 1, delay);
await Task.Delay(delay, token).ConfigureAwait(false);
}
}
}
private void RecordSendFailure(int itemCount)
{
var total = Interlocked.Increment(ref _sendFailures);
logger.Warning(
"CrowdSec contribution batch dropped after retries ({Items} item(s)); total dropped batches: {Total}",
itemCount,
total
);
}
/// <summary>Coalesces items by IP (last write wins) and builds one alert per unique address.</summary>
internal static List<CrowdSecAlert> BuildAlerts(IEnumerable<ReportItem> items, CrowdSecSettings settings, DateTime nowUtc)
{
Dictionary<string, ReportItem> byIp = [];
foreach (var item in items)
{
byIp[item.Ip.ToString()] = item;
}
var timestamp = FormatTimestamp(nowUtc);
var alerts = new List<CrowdSecAlert>(byIp.Count);
foreach (var (value, item) in byIp)
{
var ttl = item.Reason == "manual" || item.Ttl <= TimeSpan.Zero ? settings.ManualBanDuration : item.Ttl;
var scenario = $"{settings.Origin}/{item.Reason}";
alerts.Add(new CrowdSecAlert
{
Scenario = scenario,
Message = $"ModernUO {item.Reason} ban for {value}",
StartAt = timestamp,
StopAt = timestamp,
Source = new CrowdSecSource { Scope = "Ip", Value = value },
Decisions =
[
new CrowdSecDecisionDto
{
Origin = settings.Origin,
Type = "ban",
Scope = "Ip",
Value = value,
Duration = FormatDuration(ttl),
Scenario = scenario
}
]
});
}
return alerts;
}
/// <summary>
/// ISO8601/RFC3339 UTC timestamp for <c>start_at</c>/<c>stop_at</c>. LAPI parses these with Go's
/// <c>time.RFC3339</c> and answers 500 when the parse fails, so the format must be culture-independent:
/// ':' is the *time separator* specifier in a custom .NET format string, and a shard running under a
/// culture like fi-FI would otherwise emit "T12.34.56.789Z". InvariantCulture also pins the Gregorian
/// calendar, which non-Gregorian cultures (th-TH, ar-SA) would otherwise shift the year for.
/// </summary>
internal static string FormatTimestamp(DateTime time) =>
(time.Kind == DateTimeKind.Utc ? time : time.ToUniversalTime())
.ToString("yyyy-MM-ddTHH:mm:ss.fffZ", CultureInfo.InvariantCulture);
/// <summary>CrowdSec accepts Go durations; whole seconds are unambiguous and sufficient.</summary>
internal static string FormatDuration(TimeSpan ttl)
{
var seconds = (long)ttl.TotalSeconds;
return $"{Math.Max(1, seconds)}s";
}
}