## Why
An Argon2 verify is **~8.9 ms of frozen world per login attempt** — more than half a 16 ms frame. Failed attempts cost exactly the same as successful ones, by design, so a credential-stuffing flood is a full-cost stall per packet without needing valid credentials. `SetPassword` derives a hash too, so `[password`, the admin gump and account creation each pay the same.
## What the measurement says
Off-loading does not delete the cost, it relocates it. Three things stay on the loop:
| Component | Measured |
|---|---:|
| Inline verify (today) | **8.92 ms** |
| Dispatch to the worker | 210 ns |
| Drain the continuation off `LoopContext` | 13 ns |
| Loop's own work slowed by shared-L3 eviction | **0.05 – 5.44 ms** |
Net gain **3.5 – 8.9 ms** of on-loop time per login. Harness in `ModernUO-Benchmarks` (`Benchmarks/Argon2OffLoop/`): it models the loop as a dependent-load pointer chase swept across working-set sizes, which is an upper bound on cache-latency sensitivity, and copies `EventLoopContext` so the hand-off cost is the real one.
Two results shaped the design:
- **The contention tax peaks in the middle of the working-set range**, not at the top — 5.44 ms at 8 MiB (a quarter of this chip's L3), but 0.76 ms at 30 MiB and 0.10 ms at 256 KiB. A tiny hot set has nothing in L3 to lose; a huge one is already DRAM-bound.
- **Per-login tax falls as concurrency rises** (5.44 → 2.56 → 1.60 ms at 1/2/4 hashers) while *total* loop damage rises. Contention is shared, not additive, so a login rush is not the disaster case — a single login is.
## Why exactly one worker
It is load-bearing three times over, which is also why it must not quietly become a pool:
- **Cost bound.** Off-loop loses to inline only if a hash steals ~82% of the loop's throughput. One hasher contending for one core leaves the loop ~50%. **A single background hasher cannot cost the loop more than the inline verify under any scheduling regime**, which is what lets the measurement hold on hardware we cannot inspect — AMD, VPS, oversubscribed VM. Four hashers drop the loop to ~20% and break it.
- **Memory.** Exactly one hashing arena is live at a time whatever the login volume.
- **Ordering.** Writes apply in dispatch order *only* because a single thread drains FIFO. A second worker would need ordering reintroduced; `WritesApplyInDispatchOrder` fails if that happens.
Throughput is ~110 verifies/sec. Only loop time matters, not login latency, so head-of-line blocking during a rush costs nothing.
## Making every protection safe off-thread
The worker was initially Argon2-only. That was the right call for the wrong reason — it was blamed on Argon2's salt RNG, which is a stateless syscall wrapper and was never a problem. The real blockers were elsewhere, and both are fixed at the source:
| Protection | Was | Now |
|---|---|---|
| MD5/SHA1/SHA2 | shared `HashAlgorithm.ComputeHash`, which carries the running digest across `HashCore`/`HashFinal` through process-wide singletons | static `HashData` into a `stackalloc` span — no state, no allocation, identical bytes |
| PBKDF2 | `Utility.RandomMinMax` → shared `System.Random`, thread-unsafe *and* game state | `RandomNumberGenerator.GetInt32`, matching the salt beside it |
| Argon2 | already safe (`Verify` is static + stackalloc) | unchanged, singleton reused |
Literal digests are pinned in a test **before** the change and still pass after it. These are compared as strings against every account database, so any casing or encoding drift would lock out every SHA and MD5 account at once.
With all three safe, the worker no longer knows which algorithm it runs and the dispatch conditions collapse to "is off-loop available".
## Correctness
- **Phrase derivation** moves to `AccountSecurity.DerivePhrase`, so verification (stored algorithm's rule) and rehash (target algorithm's rule) cannot disagree. Deriving with the wrong one is the shape of the lockout fixed in #2562.
- **Liveness** is checked at dequeue *and* at apply — a connection can drop while queued or while the result sits in the loop queue. A job with no connection attached, such as an admin password change, runs regardless.
- **Queue overflow rejects** a login rather than verifying inline; steering work back onto the loop is what a flood wants. A password change instead falls back to hashing inline, because unlike a login it must not be dropped.
- **Shutdown and crash** both just stop the thread, and pending jobs are dropped. No save is initiated once shutdown begins — saving is the operator's choice up front, via the admin gump's save/no-save variants, and `WaitForWriteCompletion` honours one already in flight — so a write applied during teardown would reach no disk. The crash path needs its own subscription because `HandleClosed` skips `InvokeShutdown` when crashed.
## Bounding
`MaxPending` is 4096 — a backstop, not a flood defense. `SentFirstPacket` holds a connection to one pending verify and the engine caps connections at 4096, so the queue is already bounded by construction and this can only trip if that invariant breaks. A cap low enough to blunt an attack would reject real players first; during a mass reconnect they *are* the queue. Flood defense belongs at the connection layer.
The real DoS improvement is elsewhere: today every attempt stalls the world, and after this a flood occupies one core while the loop keeps ticking.
## Gate
Release builds on 4+ cores. Below that there is no spare core to move work to, so off-loading buys nothing by construction; `DEBUG` is excluded because dev boxes and test shards have few logins. Both modes call the same code — the gate only chooses where it runs.
## Engine change
One property, `AccountLoginEventArgs.Deferred`, so a subscriber can say "no verdict yet". `EventSink.AccountLogin` is `Action<...>` with no continuation, and the packet handler replies in the same call. Approved separately since it touches `Projects/Server/`.
## Docs
`dev-docs/threading-model.md` and the threading skill gain a vetted-workers section. The forbidden-patterns table bans `new Thread`, `ConcurrentQueue<T>`, `Interlocked` and `volatile` in `UOContent`, and its exceptions covered only `Projects/Server/` — the existing Advanced Search fan-out already sat outside it. The new section leads with proving the need (measure on-loop time, not wall-clock; gate on core count; record the measurement), keeps game logic on the loop via chunking, and documents the hand-off protocol in both directions.
## Testing
698 UOContent tests, 810 Server tests, Release build clean.
Covered: verify and rehash outcomes, phrase rules for SHA1/SHA2 vs Argon2, stored-format stability for MD5/SHA1/SHA2, jobs with no connection attached, and dispatch ordering through the real queue. The liveness and ordering guards are mutation-verified.
## What
- Bind the login auth id to the account **and** origin address that earned it, make it a CSPRNG draw, expire it after two minutes, and spend it only once its owner presents it.
- Skip the password verify on `GameLogin` (0x91) when the presented id vouches for the submitted username and address.
## Why
A full client login hashes the password twice — `AccountLogin` (0x80) and then `GameLogin` (0x91). At the current Argon2 parameters that is **most of a 16 ms frame each, on the single-threaded game loop**, for every login attempt.
The second verify is redundant. `GameLogin` already requires an id from `_authIDWindow`, and that window is only populated by `GenerateAuthID`, called from `PlayServer` — reachable only after 0x80 has already authenticated the account **in this same process**. ModernUO Gateway has its own auth-id passing mechanism and is out of scope here.
## Why the id needed hardening first
Skipping the verify promotes the id from a correlation token to a bearer token, and it was not one:
- drawn from `Utility.Random` → `BuiltInRng`, a non-cryptographic PRNG
- bound to nothing — `AuthIDPersistence` carried only `Age` and `Version`
- never expiring; `Age` was only read to pick an eviction victim
A guessed id got you nothing while the password was still checked. Without that check it would have been an account takeover, so the id is now a CSPRNG draw, single-use, two-minute TTL, and bound to both the account and the origin address.
What remains is observing a live id on the client's network or machine — which the server cannot defend against under any design, and which already yields the password itself, since the client transmits it in the same handshake.
Network switching mid-login is deliberately unsupported.
## Behaviour
A full verify was always required before this change, and ids never expired, so every "before" is a password check.
| Case | Before | After |
|---|---|---|
| Id absent | Disconnect | Disconnect |
| Address mismatch | Verify | **Disconnect** |
| Account mismatch | Verify | **Disconnect** |
| Expired | Verify | **Verify** |
| Id vouches | Verify | **Skip** |
No case grants access the previous code would have denied. Expiry deliberately falls back to the verify rather than disconnecting — a player can idle, and turning that into a lockout would be a regression for no gain.
## Look, then take
An id is not consumed until the presenter has shown it is theirs. Removing it first would let anyone who lands on a live id burn it, and its owner would arrive to `"Unable to find auth id."` and have to log in again over a packet they had no part in.
The **address is compared before the account**, so a guesser from anywhere else is rejected before a username is ever looked at. That is what makes it safe to leave the id in place on a mismatch: there is no username-enumeration risk to trade against, and the only presenter who could enumerate is already on the victim's own address.
## The window is not a cap
It was 128 entries with the oldest evicted to make room. That is a cap on *concurrent logins*, not a resource bound: 800 people picking a server at once would have live ids discarded and those clients would arrive to `"Unable to find auth id."` — a failed login caused by nothing except other people logging in.
Issuing now sweeps expired entries and lets the window grow if everything in it is still live. Unbounded is safe here: an entry costs a **successful** password verify to create and dies after two minutes, so its size tracks logins genuinely in flight.
Removing an id when its connection drops is not an option, and this was checked rather than assumed — `NetState.cs:787` disconnects the login connection *deliberately*, immediately after the id is issued, and that disconnect is never cancelled. Surviving it is the whole purpose of the id. Expiry is the only correct reclamation.
## Handshake hardening
Choosing a server queues a disconnect, but the queue drains on the *next* slice, so a client pipelining into the same recv buffer can reach the handshake handlers again. Two had no do-once guard:
- `LoginServerSeed` (0xEF) now rejects when `state.Seeded` is already set.
- `PlayServer` (0xA0) now rejects when `state.AuthId != 0` — otherwise a connection that had already spent its id would be handed the spent one back.
Issuing is also idempotent (`EnsureAuthId`), so a connection holds exactly one id by construction and an orphan is impossible rather than something to clean up. The login state machine itself is untouched.
Also fixes a fall-through: the "Unable to find auth id" branch disconnected without returning, then continued with a default entry and nulled `state.Version`.
## Testing
`ConsumeAuthId` is a seam with no `NetState` dependency, so the auth decision is tested directly: vouching, account mismatch, address mismatch, case-insensitive usernames, IPv4-mapped-IPv6, unknown ids, single-use by the owner, **a rejected attempt leaving the id redeemable**, expiry-into-verify, and an 800-id login rush that must evict nobody. Expiry is driven by moving `Core._now`, not by waiting. Every new clause was verified to discriminate by removing it and confirming only its own tests fail.
## Cost
Halves the per-login game-loop cost. This does not make hashing cheaper or move it off the loop — that is gated on a measurement described in `docs/handoffs/2026-08-07-off-loop-argon2-hashing.md`.
## Summary
Server-side movement throttle that prevents speed hacking while accurately identifying cheaters with detection of lagging connections.
**Key features:**
- Credit buffer (200ms) absorbs timing jitter from legitimate players
- Movement queue handles larger bursts, draining at proper game-tick intervals
- RTT measurement distinguishes network lag from speed hacks
- Queue depth detection catches ACK-throttled speed hacks (going straight)
## How It Works
**Throttle** (prevention): Movements arriving too early either consume credit or get queued. The queue drains at
correct intervals, so speed hackers can't move faster regardless of what they send.
**Detection** (identification): Combines multiple signals to identify cheaters:
| Signal | What it catches |
|--------|-----------------|
| Queue depth ≥4 sustained | ACK-throttled speed hacks (client limits unacked moves to 5) |
| Movement rate >1.05x | Direction-change speed hacks where timing is visible |
| Stable RTT + high queue | Eliminates false positives from laggy players |
**RTT-Aware Logic:**
- Probes only sent to players actively moving (event-driven, not global loop)
- Stable low-latency + problems = suspicious
- Unstable/high-latency + problems = probably just lag, throttle handles it
## Configuration
```json
{
"movementThrottle.maxCredit": 200,
"movementThrottle.softQueueLimit": 6,
"movementThrottle.hardQueueLimit": 10,
"movementThrottle.debugLogging": false
}
```
> [!IMPORTANT]
> **Breaking Changes**
> - DecodePacket and EncodePacket delegates replaced with IClientEncryption interface
> - NetState.Connection (Socket) replaced with internal RingSocket management
> - NetState.RecvPipe and NetState.SendPipe removed (buffers managed internally)
## Summary
Upgrades the networking stack from PollGroup-based I/O to io_uring, significantly improving I/O performance on Linux.
This also adds native client encryption support for encrypted UO clients.
## Major Changes
io_uring Networking Architecture
- Replaced PollGroup with IORingGroup for async socket I/O operations
- Removed Pipe.cs (mirrored ring buffer) and TcpServer.cs in favor of RingSocketManager
- Added NetState.Network.cs - centralized network infrastructure handling accept, recv, send, and disconnect
completions
- Added SocketHelper.cs - platform-specific socket utilities for raw socket handle operations (getpeername,
getsockname)
- Buffer management now handled by RingSocketManager with configurable slab allocation
### Client Encryption Support
- Added full encryption stack in Network/Encryption/:
- EncryptionConfig.cs - configurable encryption modes (None, Unencrypted, Encrypted, Both)
- EncryptionManager.cs - encryption detection and initialization for login/game packets
- LoginEncryption.cs - handles login packet encryption with version-derived keys
- GameEncryption.cs - handles game server encryption using Twofish
- TwofishEngine.cs - optimized Twofish block cipher implementation
- LoginKeys.cs - encryption key table for client versions
- IClientEncryption.cs - interface for client encryption implementations
### NetState Improvements
- Replaced Socket Connection with RingSocket _socket for managed socket lifecycle
- Changed from GCHandle polling to event-based completion processing
- Disconnect handling now properly waits for pending sends to flush
- Simplified connecting socket management using lazy queue removal
### Configuration
- New settings: network.encryptionMode and network.encryptionDebug
- Encryption mode flags: Unencrypted, Encrypted, or Both
### Dependencies
- Replaced PollGroup NuGet package with IORingGroup
- Linux requires liburing-dev / liburing-devel package
### Test plan
- Verify server starts and accepts connections on Linux with io_uring
- Verify server starts and accepts connections on Windows (fallback to IOCP)
- Test unencrypted client connections (ClassicUO with encryption disabled)
- Test encrypted client connections if available
- Verify graceful disconnect flushes pending data
- Confirm CI builds pass on all target platforms
## Summary
- Adds proper Latin1 encoding support, replacing CP1252 usage throughout the codebase
- Adds specialized, optimized string decoding methods with safe string filtering for each encoding type
- Filters invalid Unicode characters (C0/C1 control codes, non-characters) by removal rather than replacement since
the UO client renders nothing for these characters
- Fixes UTF-16 null terminator position handling to correctly advance by 2 bytes
## Changes
TextEncoding.cs
- Added SearchValues-based invalid byte/char detection for efficient filtering
- Added encoding-specific GetString methods: GetStringAscii, GetStringLatin1, GetStringUtf8, GetStringBigUni,
GetStringLittleUni
- Each method supports a safeString parameter for filtering invalid characters
- Little-endian UTF-16 uses direct memory cast for zero-copy decoding on LE systems
- Invalid characters are removed (not replaced with U+FFFD) since the client renders nothing for them
SpanReader.cs
- Added ReadLatin1() and ReadLatin1Safe() methods
- Rewrote encoding-specific read methods to use optimized TextEncoding.GetString* methods
- Fixed UTF-16 null terminator handling: position now correctly advances by byteLength (2) instead of 1
SpanWriter.cs
- Added WriteLatin1 and WriteLatin1Null methods
## Packet Updates
- Updated all packet code to use Latin1 encoding instead of CP1252
- Affected: account packets, equipment packets, menu packets, message packets, mobile packets, player packets, secure
trade packets, vendor packets, gump packets, book packets, mahjong packets
## Filtering Behavior
Invalid characters filtered in safe mode:
```
┌───────────────┬────────────────────────┐
│ Range │ Description │
├───────────────┼────────────────────────┤
│ 0x00-0x1F │ C0 control codes │
├───────────────┼────────────────────────┤
│ 0x7F │ DEL │
├───────────────┼────────────────────────┤
│ 0x80-0x9F │ C1 control codes │
├───────────────┼────────────────────────┤
│ 0xFFFE-0xFFFF │ Unicode non-characters │
└───────────────┴────────────────────────┘
```
Note: Surrogate pairs (0xD800-0xDFFF) are not filtered because proper validation requires context checking for paired
vs unpaired surrogates. The UO client renders nothing for these anyway.
## Test Plan
- All 631 Server.Tests pass
- Verified client rendering behavior using TestUnicodeGump command (pages 1-5)
- Confirmed U+FFFD, unpaired surrogates, and non-characters all render as blank in client
- Verified Latin1 characters (0xA0-0xFF) display correctly
- Verified C1 control codes (0x80-0x9F) are filtered and don't display
### Summary
- Moves `CharacterCreated` event to UOContent using code generated event _CharacterCreatedEvent_.
- Moves `TargetByResourceMacro` event to UOContent using code generated event _TargetByResourceMacro_.
- Moves `GameLogin` event to UOContent using code generated event _GameLoginEvent_.
- Moves `ServerList` event to UOContent using code generated event _ServerListEvent_.
- Streamlines ProfessionInfo
> [!IMPORTANT]
> **Developer Note**
> Custom scripts that use any of these event sinks will need to be updated to use the new code generated events.
### Summary
- Fixes various exploits that can crash the shard when the client misbehaves.
- Clients will now be disconnected if they send packets that are marked as out of game only (new flag), while they are in-game.
> [!Note]
> **Developer Note**
> Added an `OutOfGameOnly` which should be used to flag packets as only available out of the game.
> This is the opposite of, yet not the converse to `InGameOnly`.
### Summary
- Fixes various memory leaks related to spells
- Fixes Spell Plague
- Added ability to determine if `sdi` should take effect for Spell Damage.
- Fixes animal form timer ticking non-stop while logged out.
### Summary
* Fixes syntax compile error when THREADGUARD is enabled.
* Removes `int packetLength` from incoming packet handles since they aren't needed.
### Developer Notes
Incoming packet handler `SpanReader` is now properly scoped to that packet by length.
## Breaking Changes
Incoming packet registration signature has changed to:
```cs
delegate* void OnReceiveCallback(NetState state, SpanReader reader, int packetLength);
IncomingPackets.Register(int packetID, int length, bool ingame, OnReceiveCallback onReceive);
```
For example, an incoming packet handler signature would now look like this:
```cs
public static void SomeIncomingPacket(NetState state, SpanReader reader, int packetLength)
{
// Parse the data
}
```
## Summary
Updates the network Pipe class to use a mirrored memory technique. This technique involves mapping the same physical memory to two contiguous virtual memory spaces so the byte buffer appears duplicated. This allows writing to a double-sized array to wrap around without the need for the `CircularBuffer` classes.
In practice this allows us to use `Span<byte>` as if the buffer was a regular array.
### Bug Fixes
- [X] Fixes bad fixed length string parsing
